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Abstract
Argumentation theory conceptualises the human practice of debating. Implemented as
computational argumentation it enables a computer to perform a virtual debate. Using
existing knowledge from research into argumentation theory, this thesis investigates
the potential of computational argumentation within biology.
As a form of non-monotonic reasoning, argumentation can be used to tackle incon-
sistent and incomplete information - two common problems for the users of biological
data. Exploration of argumentation shall be conducted by examining these issues
within one biological subdomain: in situ gene expression information for the devel-
opmental mouse.
Due to the complex and often contradictory nature of biology, occasionally it
is not apparent whether or not a particular gene is involved in the development of
a particular tissue. Expert biological knowledge is recorded, and used to generate
arguments relating to this matter. These arguments are presented to the user in
order to help him/her decide whether or not the gene is expressed.
In order to do this, the notion of argumentation schemes has been borrowed from
philosophy, and combined with ideas and technologies from artificial intelligence. The
resulting conceptualisation is implemented and evaluated in order to understand the
issues related to applying computational argumentation within biology.
Ultimately, this work concludes with a discussion of Argudas - a real world tool
developed for the biological community, and based on the knowledge gained during
this work.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Argumentation theory [1] is a multidisciplinary field that studies arguments and ar-
guing.
An argument is a reason to believe something is true. This may be a formal proof,
or a piece of natural language: for example, a reason to carry an umbrella.
Philosophers, e.g. Walton [2], who wish to study arguments in greater depth use
the notion of argumentation schemes [3] to classify individual arguments. A scheme
is essentially a natural language template in the form of a if-then rule: if X, Y , and
Z are true, then A may be true too. Additionally, this layout enables schemes to be
used for the generation of arguments.
The crucial attribute of an argument is its defeasibility. Defeasible is a term orig-
inating from the legal community meaning that an argument is “open in principle to
revision, valid objection, forfeiture, or annulment” [4]. The word defeasible is derived
from the Old French word desfesant meaning ‘undoing’ [4]. As such an argument may
provide a reason to believe something is true, but it does not prove it is definitely
true. Defeasibility is important because arguments can be in conflict: one argument
can suggest a conclusion is true whilst a second argument intimates that the same
conclusion is false. Often it is desirable to make a decision about the validity of a
conclusion. As the evidence and corresponding arguments change over time, it may
be necessary to revise that decision. Defeasibility enables this.
Arguing (commonly referred to as argumentation in the literature) is the process
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of using arguments to justify a point of view. This process may take place between
multiple agents (human or software) inside a debate, or it may be carried out by a
single agent: e.g. a politician justifying the government’s decision to increase taxes.
The idea of argumentation is natural for humans. Debating who will win the
weekend’s big football match, discussing whether or not it will snow, quarrelling with
a partner over whose turn it is to stack the dish washer - all of these are typical
examples of argumentation. However, it is a different form that is of interest here.
Envisage two medics discussing the treatment of a patient: one may recommend
a particular course of action whilst the second prefers a different approach. Ideally,
each medic will put forward arguments supporting their favoured option, and possibly
highlight a weakness with the other’s choice. The medics will listen to their colleague’s
view, and express an honest critique of the arguments advanced. The debate will be
fair, reasoned, and (where possible) based on solid medical research. Two important
differences exist between this example and the work presented in this thesis; firstly
the domain is biology not medicine, and secondly the agents will be virtual.
The subdomain of computational argumentation involves the use of computers for
constructing and using arguments. The range of domains in which argumentation has
been applied is broad, for example: artificial intelligence & law [5], ontology matching
[6], decision support systems [7], and agent communication [8].
Argumentation in relation to biology is surprisingly rare. Jefferys et al. [9] use
argumentation to analyse the output of a protein prediction tool. However, most work
involves pedagogical efforts to improve the construction of natural language scientific
arguments by students, e.g. Adu´riz-Bravo et. al. [10].
Although the study of argumentation is rare in biology, it is common within the
medical world. A wide range of decision support systems exist, for example Fox et.
al. [7]. Additionally, argumentation can be used to persuade patients to change
their behaviour [11], and generate pamphlets to explain complex issues to patients
[12]. Although clear differences exist between medicine and biology, there are many
similarities. If argumentation has been shown to work well in one field, intuitively it
should work in the other.
The overarching goal of this work is to explore argumentation within biology, with
the focus on a single use case - in situ gene expression information for the devel-
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opmental mouse. Genes are units of biological instructions that direct the body on
what to build, and how to do it. In situ gene expression is concerned with discovering
where the genes are present in a particular organism. In this use case the organism
is the unborn (so-called developmental) mouse. Like most biological subdomains, the
information is distributed across a number of resources and is both incomplete and
inconsistent.
1.2 Summary of thesis
The ambition of this work is to improve the understanding of the applicability of com-
putational argumentation within biology through the study of a particular biological
use case involving in situ gene expression for the developmental mouse. Whilst tack-
ling the problems faced in the use case, insights into the future role of computational
argumentation in biology shall be sought.
This will be achieved through the following activities:
Creation of argumentation schemes to record the knowledge of an expert biolo-
gist within the use case. The knowledge will be converted into logical inference
rules for use in a third party argumentation toolkit.
Consideration of what argumentation means within the current use case. Which
approach makes most sense? What constraints are shown to restrict the solu-
tions available?
Design of an architecture suitable for argumentation systems in the biological do-
main. In the biological domain data is commonly spread across a number of
resources, and requires integration.
Implementation of a series of prototypes that collectively enable the ideas con-
tained in this thesis to be tested. Associated evaluations ensure that the lessons
can be documented.
Exploration of argument presentation in order to improve the understanding
of the manner in which biologists want arguments and argumentation to be
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presented.
Review of the work undertaken and lessons learnt for future argumentation activities
within biology.
1.3 Contributions
Important outcomes of this work include both academic and domain community con-
tributions; they are both summarised in the following list of bullet points before being
discussed at length afterwards:
• Creation of argumentation schemes to document expert knowledge relating to
the analysis of gene expression information;
• Development of an architecture for an argumentation-based platform, which
aggregates distributed data before arguing with it;
• Investigation of the mechanisms with which argumentation can be presented to
a biological audience. Encompassing evaluation, analysis and direct comparison
of a number of presentation forms including natural language representations
and graph-based visualisations;
• Exploration of a gene expression use case leading to a consideration of the
application of argumentation in the biological domain including an assessment
of the role of the wider notion of argumentation theory plus the application of
computational argumentation;
• Review of the issues that hinder the development of argument-based solutions
within biology;
• Proposal of ideas for the development of both argumentation and biology to en-
able further penetration of argumentation-related technology into the biological
domain;
• Implementation of a real world tool that implements, evaluates, and evolves the
ideas discussed in this work;
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• Frank consideration of the future role of the notion of argumentation within the
life sciences, including the genesis of a number of key questions regarding the
future of this technology.
Expert knowledge for the domain of in situ gene expression information for the
developmental mouse has been extracted and documented. To date, this thesis ap-
pears to be the only collection of such knowledge that is not geared towards domain
experts. The application of argumentation schemes in this context provides a useful
resource for those argumentation scholars who wish to investigate the philosophical
aspects that this work has not explored. Additionally, the publications obtained from
this process provide a pragmatic evaluation of the use of schemes in this manner. Fol-
lowing on from the generation of schemes, is the transformation of schemes into formal
logic inference rules. Again, real world experience of applying academic theories is
communicated.
During this thesis an architecture supporting argumentation with distributed data
sources is developed. Analysis of this architecture supports its evolution, and enables
it to be utilised as a starting point for future endeavours.
An investigation of the presentation of arguments has revealed that the biological
user group has a wide variety of expectations. As such it is unlikely that any single
presentation framework will satisfy everyone. Whilst some users clearly prefer written
forms of argument, they do not wish to read a lot of information. Others prefer visual
communication means; however, there is no single presentation form that satisfies this
group. The default form of visual presentation for the argumentation community is
shown to be the least suitable for a biological user group. Manifestly, this is a difficult
area of research requiring a significant application of resources and expertise. This
work reaches a compromise solution, which is shown to be effective for the current
use case, and may provide a blueprint for future work.
The thesis provides an analysis of argumentation within the use case, and the
wider biological world. Consideration is given not only to the role of computational
argumentation, but to the ways in which other forms may be deployed. It is clear that
there is significant potential for the application of argumentation. Yet the success of
argumentation will be limited by both the nature of biological knowledge and the lack
of maturity in argumentation-centric research.
5
Chapter 1. Introduction
Currently biological data is very fragmented and its organisation arbitrary, which
creates a significant barrier to the deployment of argumentation based technologies.
For many techniques, not least argumentation, their promise can never be fulfilled
within this field until access to the domain’s information resources is standardised.
For those researchers interested in further contemplating the role of argumentation,
or similar concepts, the nature of biological data is recounted in a manner that makes
explicit the difficulties encountered.
Reviewing this document provides a number of ideas for future research for those
interested in following behind this work. Perhaps most vital is the need for cross
community teams that will develop the social and technical aspects concurrently. For
example, there is clearly a requirement to consider further the presentation of both
arguments, and the context in which they are used (argumentation). Equally obvious
is the imperative for an improvement in the tools and methods used to help domain
experts develop schemes.
Ultimately, this work generates a solution to the problems associated with the
individual use case. During the lifetime of the BBSRC1 funded Argudas project, the
ideas contained in this thesis were implemented for the benefit of real users. Following
a sustained dialogue with typical users, the tool evolved in a number of unexpected
ways. The experience gained through the development of Argudas is documented,
and drawn upon to illuminate the role of argumentation within the life sciences.
From this thesis two conclusions are immediately obvious. Firstly, argumentation
is a concept with substantial potential. Secondly, the tools, methods, and ideas sup-
porting the application of argumentation are not yet mature. Accordingly, there are a
number of issues to tackle before argumentation can be easily, and successfully, used
within the life sciences. These matters are considered, and where possible solutions
are discussed. Where realistic resolutions are not feasible within the constraints of a
PhD, the relevant topics are highlighted for future consideration.
1.4 Structure of thesis
This thesis has been organised into 13 chapters as follows.
1Biotechnology and BioSciences Research Council - www.bbsrc.ac.uk
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Background to the field of argumentation, and a discussion of the key elements
appropriate to this work, are provided in Chapter 2. This chapter attempts to portray
the broad and varied constitution of the research undertaken in this field; however,
it does not stray into the psychological or sociological aspects. Nor does it dwell in
depth upon the philosophical or logical roots of the discipline. Instead attention is
directed towards computational argumentation and the areas of its application.
Chapter 3 explores the relevant biology necessary for an understanding of this
document. This includes a depiction of in situ gene expression techniques, the data
resulting from the exploitation of those techniques, and the developmental mouse. A
thorough investigation of the biological resources at the centre of the current use case
provides the finish.
The problem and motivation behind this work are discussed in Chapter 4. It
scrutinises the twin issues of inconsistency and incompleteness within the use case, and
demonstrates that the distributed nature of the data causes frustration for biologists.
Included in this review are a series of illustrative examples that clearly define the
use case. This chapter finishes by defining the topics that subsequent chapters will
investigate, including: the best way of presenting arguments to typical biological end
users, the appropriateness of argumentation for this use case, and knowledge gleaned
relevant for the application of argumentation within biology in general.
Chapter 5 presents one way of using argumentation to tackle the problems de-
scribed in Chapter 4. Before this approach is tested in subsequent chapters, an
overview is provided here. As part of this discussion, the use of argumentation is
justified by comparing it with a number of possible alternative technologies. Con-
cluding this chapter is a walkthrough that explores argumentation within the current
use case.
The proposed solution requires the capture of expert biological knowledge, and the
transformation of that knowledge into inference rules. These topics are the central
themes of Chapter 6, which first refines the notion of argumentation schemes before
recalling the workflow used to generate the inference rules.
To ensure the ideas contained in this thesis are both practical and applicable
in the real world, two separate prototype systems are designed and implemented.
The initial prototype is an instantiation of the architecture developed during this
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work, and acts as a basic proof of concept. The second facilitates the evaluation
of the argumentation presentation mechanism developed here. Recorded within this
prototype was the current understanding of the best way to present arguments, and
argumentation, to a biological user. Chapter 7 discusses these systems reviewing the
implemented architecture and workflow, before considering the constraints that shape
the systems.
Chapter 8 documents the evaluation of the second prototype. Two separate eval-
uation exercises are performed. The first is a detailed inquiry into the usability of
argumentation within biology, and the appropriateness of the prototype system for
the expected end users. The second evaluation examines the presentation of visual
arguments, endeavouring to ascertain which presentation style is most appropriate.
Chapters 9 - 11 respond to the queries raised during Chapter 4, attempting (where
possible) to answer them succinctly and provide concrete recommendations for im-
proving the uptake of argumentation within biology.
An analysis of the results from Chapter 8 is provided in Chapter 9. The em-
phasis is on replying to the query: what is the best way of presenting arguments to
typical biological end users? Accordingly, this chapter considers the presentation of vi-
sual arguments, and whether or not textual representations should supplement visual
presentation. Additionally, the appropriateness of summarising the argumentation
process is reflected on.
The pertinence of argumentation for biology is explored during Chapter 10. Ad-
ditionally, the applicability of the solution proposed is considered, alongside other
plausible ways of exploiting argumentation. Although the analysis is use case centric,
it applies equally to the wider biological world.
Reporting the knowledge gathered, especially that relevant to argumentation in
the wider world of biology, is the aim of Chapter 11. The chapter primarily revolves
around the capture and transformation of schemes; exploring and critiquing the work-
flow that provides the rules used to generate arguments. Additionally, an investigation
of what is required for computational argumentation to take a stronger hold within
the biological domain takes place.
An extension of the work described in previous chapters is the focus of the penul-
timate chapter. As part of a BBSRC funded project, the Argudas tool evolves from
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the solutions discussed in Chapter 7. Included is a review and justification of the
changes made, and the extensions considered in order to improve performance and
suitability for the biological end users. An evaluation of these changes provides the
close.
The document is concluded in Chapter 13.
1.5 Published papers
The work of this thesis has been reported in the following papers.
Journal
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ments for task composition in bioinformatics, BMC Bioinformatics, 10(Suppl 10):S12,
2009.
K. McLeod and A. Burger. Towards the use of argumentation in bioinformatics: a
gene expression case study. Bioinformatics, 24:i304i312, 2008.
Conference/Workshop
K. McLeod, G. Ferguson, and A. Burger, Argudas: arguing with gene expression
information, in Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Semantic Web Ap-
plications and Tools for the Life Sciences, 10 December 2010, Berlin, Germany.
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Argumentation
Argumentation theory - the study of arguments and arguing - is a multi-disciplinary
area with strong philosophical roots dating back to the work of Aristotle, e.g. [13].
Today argumentation theory covers a wide range of fields exploring the nature and sci-
ence of communication and persuasion. Work from the traditional sources - philosophy
and logic - is supplemented by research in psychology, sociology and communication
studies.
Artificial intelligence (AI) is central to the modern investigation of argumentation
theory. It provides the mechanism to implement many of the theories produced, and
an increasing range of tools that further the understanding of the domain.
This thesis takes a pragmatic approach to investigating the potential of argumen-
tation theory for bioinformatics. Consequently, the approach will be AI-centric - the
other main contributors to modern argumentation theory are less relevant, and shall
not be explored in depth.
In this chapter the core of argumentation shall be explored, starting with an in-
troduction to argumentation theory (Section 2.1), and progressing to concentrate on
argumentation in AI (Section 2.2). Section 2.3 briefly describes different mechanisms
for performing argumentation in AI, while Section 2.4 focuses on one - argumenta-
tion frameworks. The visualisation of arguments and argumentation is considered in
Section 2.5 before applications are discussed in Section 2.6.
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2.1 Argumentation theory
Although argumentation is used in this work to refer to the process of arguing, it is
often used to refer to argumentation theory. A subject that has evolved considerably
over the years:
Argumentation, as a growing interdisciplinary field of research, was con-
ducted mainly in logic, philosophy, and communication studies in the be-
ginning. It has now branched and become truly interdisciplinary as it has
affected more and more fields, like cognitive science, where models of ra-
tional thinking are an essential part of the research program. ([14] page
287)
Likewise there is a suitably extensive view of argumentation e.g.:
. . . the concept “argumentation” understood as an intrapersonal, inter-
personal, inter-group and intercultural process of mutual influence and
decision-making ([15] page 18)
This quote highlights the role of social sciences within argumentation, and the impor-
tance of real world argumentation. Although the focus of this thesis is on the use of
computers to perform argumentation, it is acknowledged that this is fundamentally a
human process:
Professionals routinely undertake argumentation as an integral part of
their work. Consider diverse types of professional, such as clinicians, sci-
entists, lawyers, journalists, and managers, who have to identify pros and
cons for analysing situations prior to presenting some information to an
audience and/or prior to making some decision. ([16] page 1)
To emphasise further the human nature of arguing this section continues with an
informal discussion of real world argumentation.
2.1.1 Real world argumentation
Monological and dialogical are two categories of argumentation in the real world.
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Dialogical argumentation is based on the notion of a dialogue - a goal directed
communication in which, at least, two parties participate sequentially by responding
to the previous communication from the other party [14]. Arguments supporting their
alternative views on a subject are traded with the goal of changing the opinion of the
other party (or audience). The ability of the second party to respond creates the
dialogical aspect. Common examples include class room debates, legal procedures
and medical case conferences.
Monological argumentation involves one agent. Examples include newspaper edi-
torials, scientific reports, and political speeches. One person creates all the arguments,
often presenting the case for and against the issue being discussed before deciding on
a viewpoint to recommend to the audience. The audience is then able to evaluate
the arguments and determine if they accept the recommended view. Unlike dialogical
argumentation, there is no opportunity for a direct response or debate.
Besnard and Hunter describe the difference between the two forms as follows:
. . . in monological argumentation, the emphasis is on the final result, whereas
in dialogical argumentation, the emphasis is the process as represented in
terms of dialogue exchanges. ([16] page 11)
Common to both styles are the notions of audience and persuasion. In each
form of argumentation the aim is to persuade the audience that what the speaker
says is correct. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca [17] discuss the role of the audience,
highlighting that each member of the audience will bring their own views and values
to bear in their evaluation of arguments, and thus one argument may persuade some
members but not others.
The notion of burden of proof [18] is associated with dialogical argumentation. It
determines which participant in a dialogue has something to prove. If the speaker
makes a claim, then (s)he has a responsibility to back it up if required to do so.
Likewise, a listener who rejects a claim should be able to support his/her objection.
Argumentation is only one form of communication. A single dialogue may contain
many different categories - dialogues often being classified according to the system of
Walton and Krabbe [19].
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Research
A number of research domains focus on real world arguments, one such is informal
logic (IL), also known as critical argumentation - those with a logical background
favouring the former title and philosophers the latter. This subject can be defined as:
The three goals of critical argumentation are to identify, analyze, and eval-
uate arguments. The term“argument” is used in a special sense, referring
to the giving of reasons to support or criticize a claim that is questionable,
or open to doubt. ([14] page 1)
Traditionally this field studies monological arguments, captured in a written form,
preferring to leave dialogical argumentation to those interested in dialogue logic [20].
As such, it uses the argument as product notion. Increasingly researchers are moving
towards the idea of argument as process as a mechanism for evaluating arguments,
e.g. Walton [21].
The distinction between argument as a product and a process is based on the
work of O’Keefe [22] and Habermas [23]. The former category is the traditional
logical notion of an argument as a series of statements that lend some support to
a particular conclusion. An argument is a unit of reasoning. Habermas called this
argument, and O’Keefe argument1. Argument as process is a debate or discussion,
with the purpose of reaching a conclusion about some particular claim that is initially
in doubt. Now argument is a reasoning process. This is argument2 in O’Keefe’s
terminology and argumentation in Habermas’. In this thesis Habermas’ terminology
is adopted.
Pragma-dialectics [24] is one of the most famous disciplines devoted to studying
argument as process. It views argumentation as a:
complex speech act which is both constituted and regulated by pragmatic
rules. ([14] page 288)
Such work, together with argumentation theory in general, has shaped the view
of argumentation in AI.
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2.2 Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence
Traditionally, mathematical based disciplines assume that the domains they are rea-
soning in are consistent, complete, and monotonic. The term consistent indicates that
none of the information in the domain is contradictory. Complete describes a situa-
tion where all information is known (or the necessary information/knowledge can be
derived from the known information). A result of the consistent and complete nature
of these domains is that they are monotonic - the addition of new information never
causes previously inferred knowledge to be withdrawn.
The assumptions of consistency, completeness, and monotonicity are clearly flawed
when considered in terms of real life. Planning, data management and decision
making all need to consider situations that are incomplete, inconsistent and non-
monotonic - such challenges are studied by the AI community under the heading of
non-monontonic reasoning (NMR).
AI has proposed a variety of solutions for NMR; Reed and Grasso [25] claim that
the majority of these solutions are descended from four proposals. These techniques
focus on what it is possible to believe in the absence of information. For example,
default logic [26] proposes that a generalisation is used to infer what would normally
happen, e.g. birds normally fly, and Tweety is a bird, so Tweety can fly. Nonmono-
tonic logic [27] uses a different approach to perform essentially the same intuition.
Negation as failure [28], is a mechanism to implement the closed world assumption:
when something is not known to be true, assume it is false. In circumscription [29] a
list of abnormal situations is described, with all other situations assumed to be normal.
Then a proffered inference is taken to be true unless the situation is abnormal.
These approaches are all linked through the work of Lin and Shoham [30], which
is the ancestor of Dung’s seminal work [31]. Dung himself said:
. . . many of the major approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning in AI and
logic programming are different forms of argumentation. This result should
not be very surprising . . . all forms of reasoning with incomplete informa-
tion rest on the simple intuitive idea that a defeasible statement can be
believed only in the absence of any evidence to the contrary which is very
much like the principle of argumentation. ([31] page 4)
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Furthering the idea of tying together the various forms of NMR, the assumption-
based framework [32] provides a way to model all major implementations of NMR
including argumentation.
Argumentation is not limited to merely NMR, it has emerged as a general com-
putational paradigm. The point of crossover is often attributed to the work of Dung
[31]:
. . . the model of argumentation described in [31] is now recognised as pro-
viding an important bridge between argumentation theory as a supporting
analytic tool for non-monotonic reasoning and the independent exploita-
tion of argumentation models in wider AI contexts. ([1] page 4 - reference
style changed to that of this dissertation1.)
Reed and Grasso [25] chart the history of argumentation in AI from the early days
in which it considered NMR, through the work of Dung, and on towards the use of
argumentation in an expanding range of AI problems. They split systems into two
broad categories: those that model with argument, and those that perform modelling
of argumentation. The former category includes work where the concepts of arguing
and arguments are applied to situations that are not normally associated with them,
for example the work on NMR.
Modelling of argumentation is the idea of modelling natural argumentation - that
is human based argumentation. Much of this work has taken place in the field of
AI and law (see Section 2.6.1). Additionally it includes: visualisation tools that help
diagram arguments, e.g. Reed et. al. [33]; tools for collaborative work, e.g. de Moor
and Aakhus [34]; decision making systems in a variety of domains, e.g. Glasspool
et. al. [35]; and systems for educational purposes, such as giving dietary advice, e.g.
Grasso et. al. [11].
Work on multi-agent systems (e.g. Rahwan et. al. [8]) and the prevalence of
dialogue games in many applied areas of argumentation (e.g. AI and law) has in-
creased the importance of the dialogue and the dialectical aspects of argumentation,
prompting the field of computational dialectics [36].
Some of the above systems encompass a wide definition of argumentation that
1In the future, the style of reference will be changed without comment.
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includes all aspects of argumentation theory in order to create and present arguments
in a natural manner to the user, e.g. Grasso et. al.[11]. Others have a more restricted
definition, similar to:
Argumentation is the process of putting forth arguments to determine the
acceptability of propositions. ([37] page 1)
Still, it may be more accurate to suggest that:
. . . argumentation systems are not concerned with truth of propositions,
but with justification of accepting a proposition as true. ([38] page 16)
Increasingly though:
Argumentation processes are typically dialogs involving two or more agents,
but may also be monologs. Procedural norms, called argumentation pro-
tocols, regulate the process, to help promote values such as rationality,
fairness, efficiency, and transparency. ([37] page 1)
Loui [39] goes further, suggesting that argumentation can be rational only if it is
conducted inside a fair and effective dialectic disputation protocol. This takes argu-
mentation in AI closer to real world argumentation, e.g. a legal debate in which the
procedural rules are written in law and enforced by a judge.
From a computational viewpoint, argumentation is normally perceived as the cre-
ation and evaluation of arguments, to determine which stance (for/against a particular
claim) has the strongest arguments. That position is taken to be true. Often such a
system is wrapped inside dialectical procedural models, e.g. dialogue games, in order
to create a more natural process.
2.3 Methods of arguing
Removing the procedural wrapping, and considering solely the creation and evaluation
of arguments, Besnard and Hunter [16] identify three basic techniques through which
argumentation is performed. Their preferred approach, called a coherence system,
removes conflict and reasons with consistent subsets of information. Using a logic
that allows the inference and later retraction of a conclusion, a so-called defeasible
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logic such as DefLog [40], is the second mechanism featured. The third category
discussed is abstract systems, the most famous being the seminal work of Dung [31].
Others, e.g. Prakken [41], would call these argumentation frameworks.
Such argumentation frameworks represent the most commonly applied mechanism
for conducting argumentation in AI. Consequently, they shall be explored in more
detail in the following section.
2.4 Argumentation frameworks
As noted by Prakken [41], the definition of the term argumentation framework is not
always consistent:
. . . the term ‘framework’ will be used to denote the general model, to
highlight that it can be instantiated in various ways (such instantiations
will in turn be called argumentation systems). This contrasts with Dung’s
[31] use of the term ‘argumentation framework’, which denotes a specific
set of arguments with a specific attack relation. (page 95)
This work shall adopt the terminology proposed by Prakken.
Essentially, argumentation frameworks provide an abstract specification of a sys-
tem that allows computers to conduct argumentation automatically. Different styles
of framework exist; Prakken [42] identified five common traits: an underlying logical
language; the concept of an argument; the idea of conflict between arguments; a def-
inition of defeat between arguments; and a method for determining if an argument is
justified. Each layer builds upon the previous one, as summarised in Figure 2.1.
Layers one and two are common to most standard logical systems, it is the subse-
quent three layers that differentiate argumentation frameworks.
Not all frameworks specify every feature, the most obvious example being Dung
[31], which only defines the final layer. There is no need to describe everything
because:
Argumentation frameworks [31, 43] for aggregating and evaluating argu-
ments depend only on relationships between arguments, not the method
used to construct them. ([37] page 2)
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Figure 2.1: Prakken’s argumentation framework from [42].
Frameworks, like Dung’s, are often said to represent abstract argumentation. Other
authors, for example Prakken [41], specify the structure of an argument (and thus all
subsequent levels) - work of this nature is referred to as structured argumentation.
The following subsections run through the main layers of an argumentation frame-
work.
2.4.1 Logic
Prakken’s description of an argumentation framework begins with the specification
of a logical language on which the rest of the system is developed. Though any logic
can be used, Prakken recommends the use of a monotonic logic [42]: because defeated
arguments can be reinstated they should be retained.
Often the logics utilised have a defeasible inference, e.g. Verheij’s DefLog [40]. In
this way two of the three methods of performing argumentation discussed in Section
2.3 can be linked. It is possible to use more powerful logics with strict (i.e. non-
defeasible) implication such as classical logic [44], e.g. Pollock [45]. Unfortunately,
this makes it harder to capture the defeasible nature of arguments:
. . . In classical logic, any inference can follow from an inconsistent set
of assumptions. . . . Thus, inconsistency causes classical logic to collapse.
([16] page 16 - 17)
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2.4.2 Arguments
Central to argumentation theory is the notion of an argument. This term is overloaded,
with many domains having specialised meanings - in computer science, an argument
is the name given to a piece of input passed into a program or sub-program. These
definitions shall be ignored in this thesis.
Even within argumentation theory the term argument has a very broad range of
definitions, and thus usages, as illustrated by:
There are, as might be expected, almost as many definitions of argument
as there are argument theorists. At one end, the all-encompassing tax-
onomy of Gilbert [46] covers a panoply of situated action that can count
as argument, from artistic creation, through non-lingustic communication,
to physical activity. At the other end, van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s
pragma-dialectics [24] associates argument with the notion of critical dis-
cussion, a closely bounded, tightly specified linguistic activity whose defi-
nition rests upon speech act theory. ([47] page 4)
As there is no canonical meaning, in this work the definition of argument will be
a reason to believe something is true. Examples include a reason to believe a gene is
expressed in a tissue, or a mathematical proof of a formula.
Often in disciplines with philosophical roots, such as AI, arguments are composed
from propositions. Propositions are statements that can be evaluated to be true or
false, e.g. it is raining. One proposition is taken to be the claim (or conclusion) of the
argument, i.e. the statement that the argument supports. The remaining propositions
are the premises (see Figure 2.2). When all the premises are evaluated to be true,
the conclusion is likely to be true. The level of likelihood depends on the class of
argument, generally speaking three exist: deductive, inductive, and a third category,
which shall be called defeasible in this document.
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Figure 2.2: The basic layout of a logical argument.
A simple example of an argument could provide a reason why someone will get
wet today:
The weather report said it would rain today, therefore you will get wet.
This argument clearly has a premise (The weather report said it would rain today),
and a conclusion (you will get wet). However, this argument does not provide a link
between the premises and the conclusion, i.e. a statement of why the premises imply
the conclusion. Often in natural language arguments the link is implicit, in this case:
If it rains, you will get wet.
The weather report said it will rain,
therefore you will get wet.
Arguments of this style correspond to the logical inference rule known as modus
ponens, which has the basic form: If A then B. Analysis of arguments, and classes
of arguments, reveal that this is the pattern of many, perhaps even most, common
arguments [48]. Many real world arguments need to be rewritten in order for that
arrangement to become obvious - as demonstrated above.
Modus ponens style rules are widely applied in AI, where they are used for forward
chaining [49]. Through this mechanism of chaining an individual argument can be
used as a part of a bigger argument, see Figure 2.3. Arguments are linked by using the
conclusion of one argument as a premise in the second. This can continue indefinitely.
However, if any sub-argument is shown to be invalid then the whole argument is
invalid.
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Figure 2.3: Arguments can be chained.
Argument strength
Earlier in this section, three classes of argument strength are identified: deductive,
inductive and defeasible. These classes represent arguments of varying strengths, from
the definitely true to the plausibly true. The stronger the argument, the greater the
confidence one can have in its conclusion.
Deductive arguments are essentially proofs. They show something is true, i.e.
when the premises are true the conclusion must be true. Inductive arguments are
based on probability, and thus the premises being true implies the conclusion is prob-
ably true. Inductive arguments are weaker than deductive ones as there is a possibility
that the premises are true whilst the conclusion is false. The third category is more
difficult to classify, one definition is:
forms of reasoning that are often necessary, but are more tentative in
nature and need to be judged circumspectly by reserving some doubts.
Such reasoning is presumptive and defeasible. This kind of reasoning is
only plausible and is often resorted to in conditions of uncertainty and
lack of knowledge. ([2] page 10)
An argument is plausible when it appears to be true [50], i.e. plausible inferences
seem reasonable, but cannot be verified. Such arguments are the weakest of the three
classes.
According to Walton:
A presumption is something that can be accepted by agreement temporar-
ily as things go forward unless at some future point in the exchange it is
shown to be unacceptable. ([50] page 166)
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For example: “innocent until proven guilty”. From the definition, it seems that a
presumption is based on a plausibility that in the future may be proven false, thus
overturning the presumption.
The term defeasible was introduced to the philosophical world by Hart [51] through
his work in law. Traditionally it refers to arguments that are rationally compelling
but not deductive. Today its meaning is more restricted:
In recent work, the term defeasible reasoning has typically been limited
to inferences involving rough-and-ready, exception-permitting generaliza-
tions, that is, inferring what has or will happen on the basis of what
normally happens. [52]
This definition suggests that something can be presumed true “on the basis of what
normally happens” unless there is an unusual circumstance (i.e. exception) indicating
that this is not a normal situation.
There appears to be an overlap between the definitions of presumption and de-
feasibility, with both intertwined with the notion of plausibility. A clarification of
these terms is beyond the scope of this document. Instead, the third group of argu-
ments, lacking the verifiable backing of probability and thus the strength of inductive
arguments, shall be called defeasible to emphasise their fragile nature.
Argument acceptability
Earlier, to define argumentation, the following quote was used:
Argumentation is the process of putting forth arguments to determine the
acceptability of propositions. ([37] page 1)
According to this quote, the ability to determine if an argument is true or false is
central to argumentation. Details of the mechanisms for performing this classification
are reserved until Section 2.4.6; however, the abstract notion shall be discussed further
in this section.
Acceptable arguments are those that the evaluator (software or human) finds to
be correct (true) - as such these are the arguments with which a dialogue can be
won. Pollock [53] defines two types of acceptability. Firstly, an argument is justified
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if it appears to be acceptable at the current moment. It becomes warranted if the
argument would be acceptable if the agent evaluating it had infinite resources to apply.
This distinction is not universally employed, with most authors seeming to concentrate
on what Pollock calls justified arguments. Terms used to indicate acceptance include
valid, undefeated, justified, in force, and, preferred amongst others.
If there are acceptable arguments, intuitively there are some that are unacceptable,
i.e. believed to be false. Invalid, defeated, overruled, not in force, and not preferred
are some of the terms used to describe this group.
A third group, sometimes called defensible arguments [38], may be added. These
are arguments that are neither valid nor invalid.
2.4.3 Classes of argument - argumentation schemes
This subsection breaks away temporarily from the overall theme of argumention
frameworks in order to discuss argument hierarchies and how they can be applied
in frameworks.
In the same way that object oriented programming [54] uses the notion of a class to
define standards for a set of similar concepts, the notion of an argumentation scheme
defines standard arguments. This thesis employs the notion of schemes created by
Walton that has evolved from [55] to [2] in response to further investigation by Walton,
and in light of criticism from peers such as Blair [56].
The history of argumentation schemes is long, with Grassen [3] tracing the lineage
of modern work by Walton and others back through the writings of Kleinpointner
[57], Hastings [58], Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyreca [17], and more, to eventually
reach Aristotle’s work on Topics [13]. Many of these authors present their own notion
of a scheme and classification system for it. Today, there is no agreed formalism
or classification system for schemes. Most research describes schemes in a manner
similar to the following:
Argumentation schemes are forms of argument (structures of inference)
that represent structures of common types of argument used in everyday
discourse, as well as in special contexts like those of legal argumentation
and scientific argumentation. They include the deductive and inductive
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forms of argument that we are already so familiar with in logic. However,
they also represent forms of argument that are neither deductive nor in-
ductive, but that fall into a third category, sometimes called defeasible,
presumptive, or abductive. ([2] page 1-2)
Following the work of Walton [55] schemes are associated mostly with defeasible
arguments. Schemes are now widely used in fields such as communication studies, IL
and AI.
An example scheme, from Walton [55], is presented in Figure 2.4. It captures the
notion that a user can trust the opinion or conclusion of someone who probably knows
the answer to a query (s)he has. For example, if you are lost in Tokyo you may ask
a local person where you are as they probably know the answer. This argument is
defeasible because there is no guarantee that the person knows where you are, or that
they will answer truthfully. In Figure 2.4 the letters a and A represent variables that
can be instantiated, doing so generates an instance of the scheme, i.e. an argument.
a is in a position to know whether A is true (false).
a asserts that A is true (false).
Therefore A is true (false).
Figure 2.4: An argumentation scheme: argument from position to know [55].
Because of Hastings [58], each scheme is associated commonly with a range of
critical questions (Figure 2.5 provides the questions for the scheme in Figure 2.4).
The exact role and function of the critical questions is still open to philosophical
debate [59]. Many consider the questions to be a heuristic or memory tool guiding
the evaluation of an argument, e.g. Walton [55]. In such a role the questions help a
user verify that an argument is both convincing and a valid instance of the scheme.
However, the application of the documented critical questions is rarely sufficient to
prove the acceptability of an argument.
The uses of schemes
Broadly speaking, schemes can be used for the classification and evaluation of existing
arguments, or the generation of new arguments.
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1. Is a in a position to know whether A is true (false)?
2. Is a an honest (trustworthy, reliable) source?
3. Did a assert that A is true (false)?
Figure 2.5: Argument from position to know: critical questions [55].
Classifying an argument involves determining which scheme it is an instance of. An
argument must be dissected to find the premises and conclusion. These propositions
may need to be simplified and rewritten in order to fit a scheme. The content and
purpose of the argument must be compared to those of the schemes, and the critical
questions examined to ensure they are appropriate. Such is the variety and complexity
of schemes that this may be a difficult task. Once classified it is possible to use the
scheme to reconstruct and/or evaluate the argument.
Reconstruction is common because many written and spoken arguments are incom-
plete with a premise or conclusion left unsaid - in logic these are called enthymemes
[60]. If the argument has been classified it is possible to determine what the missing
statement should be, and thus reconstruct the full argument. However, doing so may
misrepresent what the arguer meant and should be considered potentially misleading
[61].
Evaluation of an argument is undertaken to determine if the argument is valid
(cogent). The role of a scheme, and its critical questions, in the evaluation of an
argument is summarised as:
The scheme identifies the form of the argument and its premises. Once
the premises have been identified, they can then be questioned to see if
there is support for them. The critical questions indicate other ways in
which the arguments can be questioned or criticised by indicating key
assumptions that the worth of the argument depends on. The asking of a
critical question throws doubt on the structural link between the premises
and the conclusion. ([2] page 15)
Philosophically rooted debate continues into the exact role and nature of the crit-
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ical questions, e.g. [20, 59]. This will impact on the implementations produced in AI.
However, the above approach is not the sole mechanism for evaluating arguments in
AI.
Tangentially, within AI, schemes are being used increasingly to create arguments:
the schemes represent templates that produce arguments when their variables are
instantiated. For example, Grasso et. al. [11] use Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecas’
interpretation of schemes [17], to create arguments that persuade a human to eat
more healthily.
Implementation of argumentation schemes
To employ argumentation schemes with a system, both in general and within this
thesis, the work of Verheij is utilised.
Verheij [48] approaches schemes through his work in AI & law. He suggests that
most schemes appear to have a form similar to modus ponens in which a series of
premises imply a conclusion is true. Further, as the arguments he examines are
defeasible and modus ponens is not, he proposes a defeasible form called modus non
expliciens. Many authors, such as Walton [60], rename this defeasible modus ponens.
Verheij [62] shows this new form of modus ponens makes it possible to model schemes
as defeasible inference rules - Verheij does this in his own language DefLog [40].
Subsequently, Verheij models critical questions in logic. His analysis of the usage of
critical questions in the literature, [62], leads him to believe they fulfil four functions:
restating the premises of the scheme; adding extra conditions; highlighting exceptions
to the use of the scheme; and finally, suggesting other arguments that may be relevant.
He proposes that the first role can be ignored as any formal system should ensure the
premises are true. The second role essentially adds extra conditions, or premises, to
the defeasible inference rule. The exceptions can be modelled as a Pollock undercutter
(see Section 2.4.5 for an explanation), with the other arguments being modelled in
new schemes and thus new rules. A similar approach is given in Bex et. al. [63].
Schemes can be used in argumentation systems by converting the schemes into de-
feasible inference rules. Verheij’s method allows many existing argumentation frame-
works to use schemes, even though they are not explicitly catered for, because these
frameworks sit upon a logical language that permits the use of defeasible inference
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rules.
This is perhaps the most common way of using schemes in a framework, although
others exist. For example, Gordon [37] views them as computational models for
argument generation producing a search space that can be explored heuristically for
acceptable arguments that support (or defeat) a particular conclusion. The evaluation
of arguments is carried out via his Carneades Argumentation System [43].
Schemes may be used in other argumentation theory tools. An increasingly pop-
ular XML based representation of arguments, Argument Interchange Format (AIF)
[64], can be used to model them [65]. This allows arguments and schemes to be
shared between tools, for example a framework plus an argument visualisation tool
like Araucaria [66].
2.4.4 Attack
Section 2.4.2 presents two views of arguments. Initially, a real world view in which
arguments are fashioned from natural language. Secondly, a logical view in which
arguments are described as a series of propositions that form premises and a conclu-
sion. The two separate views are linked through Verheij’s work [62], which shows that
natural arguments can be represented in frameworks as an instance of an inference
rule.
The arguments in argumentation frameworks are traditionally of a logical form
(although some model arguments in other ways, e.g. Gordon has modelled them as a
functional specification of a computer program [67]). Logical forms can be created by
classifying real world arguments as schemes and performing the conversion, or they
may be created by directly modelling the arguments as a series of logical statements.
If the assumption is that the arguments are now in a standard logical form - strict
or defeasible modus ponens - there is a finite number of ways in which they can
be attacked. The terms attack, conflict, and counterargument are all related to the
principle of one argument directly attacking another.
Figure 2.6 repeats the earlier diagram shown in Figure 2.2. If this argument is
strict modus ponens, i.e. deductive, the argument may be attacked by contradicting
the premises. If it is defeasible it is possible to attack the premises, the inference
linking the premises to the conclusion, and the conclusion.
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Figure 2.6: The basic layout of a logical argument.
The two main forms of attack are rebuttal and undercut. If one argument claims
a gene is expressed in a tissue, and a second claims it is not, these arguments are said
to rebut one another. Rebuttal is a direct opposition to the conclusion or a premise2
of a second argument.
The philosopher Pollock, e.g. [68], is closely associated with the notion of undercut.
He describes an undercutter as follows:
For instance, suppose x looks red to me, but I know that x is illuminated
by red lights and red lights can make objects look red when they are
not. Knowing this defeats the defeasible reason, but it is not a reason
for thinking that x is not red. After all, red objects look red in red light
too. This is an undercutting defeater. Undercutting defeaters attack the
connection between the reason and the conclusion rather than attacking
the conclusion directly. ([69] page 3)
As it attacks the inference rule, Pollock’s undercut can attack only defeasible
arguments. One important difference between rebuttal and undercut is that rebuttal
is symmetric - if argument A rebuts argument B, then B also rebuts A. Yet, if A
undercuts B, B does not automatically respond.
Regrettably, Pollock’s is not the only definition of an undercut, e.g.:
Each undercut is a counterargument that contradicts the premises of an
argument. ([16] page viii - x)
The terminology is further complicated as Pollock’s notion of undercut corresponds
to Toulmin’s notion of rebuttal [70]. In this thesis, Pollock’s terminology is favoured,
2Some authors, e.g. Prakken [41], prefer to classify this as third form of attack. Prakken names
it undermining.
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with no distinction made between rebutting a premise and rebutting a conclusion -
both are thought of as rebuttals.
Prakken and Vreeswijk [38] identify a third form of attack called assumption attack.
This applies to logics that include the notion of an assumption - there is no mechanism
to prove that X is true (or false) so X is taken to be false (or true). Assumptions are
found in some logics such as Default Logic [26] and have been used in argumentation
frameworks, e.g. Prakken and Sartor [71]. To attack an assumption, it is necessary
to show it is wrong - if X is assumed to be true, one must prove it is false. With
the assumption proven incorrect, any inference based on that assumption fails. This
notion of an assumption corresponds to weak negation.
Furthermore, Prakken and Sartor [38], define two methods of attack: direct; and
indirect. Indirect attacks are against sub-arguments, with the idea that if a sub-
argument is defeated, the total argument is defeated. Direct attacks are launched
against the final argument.
Most systems for argumentation consider attack as the only relationship between
two arguments, although bipolar frameworks [72] add the concept of support. Bipo-
larity is useful in decision making where it can be used to provide arguments that
both support and oppose a decision, e.g. Amgoud and Prade [73].
2.4.5 Defeat
In order to analyse the validity of an argument it is necessary to first resolve the
conflicts in which the argument is involved. Settling a conflict involves determining
which argument is most persuasive. If an argument is “better” than an opposing
argument it is said to be stronger. In real world argumentation the audience measure
the strength of arguments and decide which is strongest.
Within an argumentation framework it is the fourth layer that performs this task.
It examines all conflicts in the argumentation process and, for each conflict, attempts
to decide which argument wins. Resulting in a series of binary relationships each
stating that argument X is in conflict with, and stronger than (or at least as strong
as), argument Y :
The notion of defeat is a binary relation on the set of arguments. It
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is important to note that this relation does not yet tell us with what
arguments a dispute can be won; it only tells us something about the
relative strength of two individual conflicting arguments. The ultimate
status of an argument depends on the interaction between all available
arguments ([38] page 13)
This subsection discusses defeat in terms of individual conflicts, and not the overall
status of the arguments. It is the the fifth layer of the framework that awards a status
to individual arguments. It does this by creating a network (argument graph) through
which it is able to determine which arguments are defeated, which are reinstated, and
which are undefeated. More details on this can be found in Section 2.4.6.
Returning to the notion of defeat between pairs of arguments, Prakken and
Vreeswijk [38] state that there are two basic forms of defeat: weak and strict. Weak
defeat occurs when the attacker is not weaker than the argument being attacked.
Where the arguments are the same strength they defeat each other thus cancelling
each other out. Strict defeat describes the situation where the attacking argument
is stronger than the attacked argument - the attacked argument is defeated, and the
attacker is unblemished. For instance, if argument A is weaker than argument B it
cannot rebut or undercut it successfully; however, B can undercut and/or rebut A.
Some frameworks, e.g. Prakken and Sartor [71], deem that assumption attacks and
undercuts always work, thus only rebuttals require the individual argument strengths
to be compared. Prakken and Sartor justify this on the basis that it is the reality in
their chosen application domain, law.
A feature of Prakken and Sartor [71] is that they use both strict and defeasible
inferences. A strict inference can produce a strict argument that cannot be defeated.
However, any argument that contains a defeasible inference, or piece of defeasible
information, is automatically defeasible even if the rest of the argument is strict.
Conflict resolution
Generally speaking there are two paradigms for conflict resolution. In the first the
conflicting arguments are compared in isolation. Arguments are balanced with all
related (supporting and attacking) arguments in the second approach.
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As an example of the latter technique Pollock [69] documents the idea that several
weak arguments can combine to defeat a single strong argument, so-called collaborative
defeat. In an extension of this idea, an argument that is weaker than an opponent can
still diminish that opponent. Both of these approaches rely on the arguments having
an associated strength.
Additionally, the concept of strength is utilised when arguments are compared
directly. An argument can defeat another if it is at least as strong as it (weak defeat);
being stronger than the other argument results in strong defeat.
In Pollock [69], each component of an argument (premise, inference rule, sub-
argument) has a weight assigned to it, indicating the degree of confidence in that
component. Subsequently, the weakest link principle is used to aggregate these weights
to produce a single score for the global argument. This principle captures the idea
that an argument is as strong as its weakest component, and thus the lowest weight
from the components is assigned to the global argument. An alternative mechanism
is the last link principle - the argument’s strength is equivalent to the strength of the
final inference rule used in the argument’s creation. Krause et. al. [74] propose that
the weight of an individual argument could be a probability, and thus the strength of
the global argument computed using probability calculus.
Another mechanism to compare arguments in isolation is the notion of preferences.
Instead of computing the individual strengths of arguments, this mechanism decides
that one argument is preferable to another. This is done on the basis of a list of
binary relations indicating a preference between arguments, often on the basis of a
preference between premises and/or inference rules in the arguments. Such systems,
called preference-based argumentation frameworks [75], are an extension of Dung’s
framework and only allow one argument to strictly defeat another if it is preferred
over it. Prakken and Sartor [71] take the notion of preferences a step further by
allowing them to be the subject of argumentation.
A popular mechanism for calculating such preferences is specificity - the most
specific argument wins any conflict [76]. Simari and Loui [76] calculate their preference
order using implicit information from the knowledge base. It is possible that the
original data source has an explicit degree of confidence associated with the data, and
this could be used in the creation of a preference ordering.
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Many argue that the mechanism for deciding between arguments should be domain
specific [77, 71]. For example, only a legal application will apply principles such as
lex posterior which captures the notion that newer laws override earlier ones.
An alternative to preference-based frameworks is value-based argumentation frame-
works [78]. These extend Dung’s framework by taking account of Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s notion of audience [17]. Arguments are evaluated based on the
values and beliefs of individual audience members. Value-based systems ensure at-
tacks only succeed if the value promoted by the attacker is preferred to the value
promoted by the attacked; however, the success is relative to each individual in the
audience as each person is likely to have their own preference ordering for the values.
For example, a medic will believe effective treatment is more important than cost-
effective treatment, and thus accept arguments that promote the notion of effective
treatment when they are attacked by arguments that promote a cheaper, less effective
alternative.
2.4.6 Evaluation of arguments
In this document, and the fifth layer of an argumentation framework, evaluation
is treated purely as the process of determining if an argument is acceptable. Ad-
ditionally, in argumentation theory it may refer to the tasks of classification, and
reconstruction.
Different branches of argumentation theory evaluate arguments in various ways as
they have differing purposes. In this subsection the focus is on the approach of Dung
traditionally favoured in AI.
A defeated argument is one that is not accepted (i.e. regarded as false or invalid).
In IL an argument that appears to be valid, but actually is not, is traditionally called
a fallacy - the precise definition of this term is still being explored [79].
Broadly speaking, argumentation theory takes the suggestion of Johnson and Blair
[80] that a valid argument is one where: the premises are rationally acceptable; they
are relevant to the conclusion; and, they are sufficient for the conclusion to be ac-
cepted. Regrettably, this definition is problematic when considering defeasible ar-
guments: because such arguments can be defeated, the premises cannot provide a
sufficient reason to accept the conclusion. One possible solution, presented by Wal-
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ton, involves weakening the meaning of sufficiency:
Sufficiency doesn’t mean that the respondent has to accept the conclusion
of the argument, period. It means only that he needs to respond to it in
an appropriate manner, which could include expressing doubts about it
([2] page 36)
Acceptability in AI
Although there are many methods for determining the acceptability of an argument,
only one is considered in this text. For a discussion of some of the other ways see
Prakken and Vreeswijk [38].
In 1995 Dung produced a seminal paper [31] that provided what Fox et. al. call
“a calculus of opposition” ([7] page 38). Dung’s work is purely theoretical; yet, it has
subsequently been widely implemented, studied, and extended. For example, Prakken
and Sartor [71] use it in combination with Pollock’s work (e.g. [68]) to create a system
for arguing in law, and Williams and Williamson [81] use it as the basis for generating
explanations to be communicated to cancer patients.
Dung concentrates on the final layer of an argumentation framework - evaluation.
As input to his system, Dung assumes a set of arguments and a binary set of rela-
tions for these arguments. The binary relations indicate that the second argument is
defeated by the first. The input may be modelled as a directed graph (e.g. see Figure
2.7) with the nodes being the arguments and the edges the defeat relations between
them.
Figure 2.7: Three argument graphs in which letters represent arguments and arrows
are defeat relationships between the arguments.
The foundations of Dung’s approach are based on the concepts of: reinstatement;
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acceptance of an argument with respect to a set of arguments; conflict-free sets; and,
admissible sets.
Reinstatement captures the idea that a defeated argument can become undefeated
if its attacker is defeated. In Graph 1 of Figure 2.7, argument D is defeated by C,
but reinstated by A and B.
For Dung, acceptance is in relation to a set of arguments, so-called collective
acceptability - others, such as Krause et. al. [74], calculate acceptance solely by
considering the argument in question: individual acceptability.
An argument is acceptable with respect to a set of arguments if the argument is not
attacked, or is reinstated, by a member of the set. A conflict-free set of arguments
is one where no member of the set attacks another member. If each member of a
set is acceptable with respect to the set, and the set is conflict-free, Dung calls it an
admissible set. This notion is used to define a series of semantics for determining the
acceptability of an individual argument; being a member of an admissible set can be
considered the weakest form of acceptability.
Grounded semantics
Grounded semantics is the simplest semantics proposed by Dung. The idea is to
construct the maximal admissible set. This may be done by seeding the set with all
arguments that are not attacked, and then recursively adding all arguments that are
acceptable to that set until no more can be added or conflict is caused. For example,
in Graph 1 of Figure 2.7 the set would be seeded with A and B. These arguments
defeat C so D can be added. Thus the grounded extension is {A,B,D}.
The advantage of grounded semantics is that it always produces an extension. In
Graph 2 of Figure 2.7 the set cannot be seeded because all the arguments are attacked,
thus the extension is the empty set. Such behaviour is a consequence of the decision
to create a single consistent set - doing so rules out possibly valid alternatives.
Similar approaches are used by, amongst others, Pollock [45].
Preferred semantics
Unique status assignment approaches, for example grounded semantics, adopt the
idea that there can be only one solution, and thus one valid result. However, to solve
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the problem of Graph 2 in Figure 2.7 it is necessary to take the viewpoint that there
may be multiple sets of possibly valid arguments, so-called multiple status assignment.
Preferred semantics aims to construct one or more maximally admissible sets with
respect to set inclusion. Inconsistency is resolved by producing multiple sets, each of
which is consistent. In Graph 2, one set contains A and a second B. As A defeats C
the first preferred extension is {A,D} and similarly the second is {B,D}.
With these semantics, it is possible to define a credulous reasoner as one who
accepts an argument if it is in any extension, and a sceptical reasoner as one who only
accepts an argument if it is in every set. Therefore, D is sceptically accepted, B is
credulously accepted, and C is defeated.
Preferred semantics can still provide an empty set as the sole extension. Graph
3 of Figure 2.7 features a so-called odd defeat loop (as opposed to the even defeat
loop in Graph 2). The cycle is problematic because the conflict cannot be settled by
placing each conflicting argument in a separate extension. To illustrate, if A is in
the first extension C should be added because A reinstates C. However, C defeats A
meaning that the extension is inconsistent. In this example it is not possible to create
a consistent maximally inclusive set with respect to set inclusion.
Another problem with preferred semantics is their computational overhead. Grounded
semantics can be computed with a linear algorithm; however, Dimopoulos and Torres
[82] show that determining if a set is a preferred extension is CO-NP-complete.
Stable Semantics
Dung [31] also produced stable semantics ; which shall not be discussed further as it
is of no relevance to this work.
2.5 Argument visualisation
As discussed by Reed et. al. [33], the representation of arguments in diagram form
has a long history with early applications including the recording of legal evidence,
e.g. Wigmore diagrams [83], and logic, e.g. the Toulmin scheme [70].
There are many different styles and visualisations of argument. This chapter shall
explore some of them through the use of an artificial classification. Category one dis-
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cusses systems that visualise arguments often providing their user with a mechanism
to analyse the argument’s form. The second class contains systems that include a col-
laborative element, and thus help a range of people work together to reach a common
goal. Argument visualisations associated with systems that perform argumentation,
e.g. argumentation systems, are reserved for the final class. Instances of the third
group may not be implemented by their creators.
2.5.1 Visualisation tools
Tools such as Araucaria [66] provide a mechanism to visualise arguments that can
help with their study and pedagogical efforts [84]. These tools allow the user to
draw arguments on the screen identifying the component parts and the links between
them, e.g. an argument in Araucaria is shown in Figure 2.8. There is a wide range
of such tools including: Reason!Able [85] (superseded by a commercial product called
Rationale3), Belverdere [86], and Convince Me [87].
Figure 2.8: Araucaria argument visualisation - Figure 1 from [33].
3http://austhink.com
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Figure 2.9: Reason!Able argument visualisation from [85].
Figure 2.10: An IBIS argument map - Figure 7 from [88].
In general, as their default style, these tools provide a standard tree-like graph
with the conclusion at the top, e.g. Figure 2.9. Premises are boxes linked to the
conclusion (also a box) by directed arrows. Conclusions are pointed to, and the
source of the arrow is a premise. Frequently, extra customisations are available.
For example, Reason!Able allows the user to flip the diagram so the conclusion is
at the bottom, left, or right. Araucaria takes this further by providing alternative
visualisation models, in particular a Toulmin scheme [70] and Wigmore diagram [83].
Belvedere and Convince Me allow their users to drag and drop the boxes, enabling
them to create any presentation style they wish. Some systems, e.g. Araucaria,
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provide the ability to customise the arrows. This can be seen in Figure 2.8 where a
text label indicates which scheme the argument is an instance of (i.e. argument from
consequences [2]).
2.5.2 Collaborative work tools
There are a number of tools designed to help humans work together to reach a com-
mon goal, for example make a business decision. Some of these tools are built upon
underlying argumentation [89], e.g. those that implement IBIS [88]. IBIS, or issue-
based information system, is a mechanism to help solve so-called wicked problems [90]:
problems that cannot be tackled with standard scientific problem solving approaches.
IBIS based approaches have a common graphical presentation of information, Figure
2.10 presents a simple example taken from Conklin [88]. In IBIS icons are used to
add meaning to the basic graph form. A question mark icon indicates the issue to be
discussed. The light bulbs represent possible solutions to the issue. A green plus is
an argument supporting one solution, with a red minus being an argument against a
solution. Thus the example in Figure 2.10 presents arguments for choosing system Y
over system X.
One of the first systems to implement IBIS was gIBIS [91]. Both IBIS tools and
the method have evolved. IBIS is now used as the heart of dialogue mapping - a
method for having successful group communications that treats IBIS as a grammar
on which it can build [92]. Compendium [93] represents the current state of the art.
In addition to standalone tools web-based mechanisms for collaboration are be-
coming common. Since inception the web has been used as a mechanism to help
humans communicate and collaborate; now this communication can be structured to
improve the quality and fairness of any debate. One site attempting to do this is
DebateGraph4. It is similar to IBIS in that it commences with an issue that people
wish to discuss: the issue is in the centre of the visualisation (called a map).
A series of maps taken from the DebateGraph site are presented in Figure 2.11.
In part A the question asked is, Should Iceland join the EU?. This is related to the
debates on Iceland and the economic crisis. There are two viewpoints. Examining
4http://debategraph.org
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Figure 2.11: Argument map from DebateGraph.
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the no view, reveals Figure 2.11 part B. Now No becomes the central issue, which
is related to the debate Should Iceland join the EU?. Various reasons why Iceland
should not join are given in green nodes. Clicking on Iceland has fared best when
independent brings Figure 2.11 part C, where the argument is attacked by the red
node, which is presumably referring to the economic problems of 2008/9.
Colours are used in the graphs to identify the role of the nodes, e.g. green for
support, and red for attack. By linking the different levels of a debate, and debates
on related topics, the maps provide a mechanism to walk-though debates, focusing
on individual aspects of interest. The underlying debates, from which the maps are
generated, are conducted by the site’s user community - they create topics and add
their opinions, other users rate these and add their own views. The maps represent
one way in which the site presents a summary of this information to its users, the
other being a simple hierarchical tree.
2.5.3 Visualisations from argumentation systems
The third category of argument visualisations is related to systems that actually per-
form argumentation. Diagrams can be used by these systems to present the arguments
they have created, or they can be used by the creators of such systems to help clarify
their analysis of arguments.
The philosopher Pollock is an example of the latter. During his career he used a
range of diagramming styles and techniques for the presentation of examples. This
ranged from simple diagrams largely drawn using text-based characters (e.g. see
Figure 2.12) to sophisticated diagrams involving colour and different types of line (e.g.
Figure 2.13). Throughout his work the basic ideas and elements of the presentation
are relatively constant: diagrams are kept simple; arguments can be either horizontal
(with the conclusion at the right) or vertical (with the conclusion at the bottom);
and, they often feature embedded logic. This use of logic is in stark contrast to the
natural language used in the systems discussed in the previous two categories. The
above systems are attempting to deal with the real world and thus focus on real world
arguments using natural language, whereas Pollock is trying to formalise defeasible
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reasoning5 accordingly his graphs are focused in a logical world.
One system for performing argumentation that presents the resulting arguments
visually is ArguMed [94]. This employs a simple tree-like graph; yet, it is different in
style to those proffered by Araucaria and Reason!Able. In this case, see Figure 2.14,
the propositions are all directly under the conclusion. Different styles of arrowhead
are used to clarify the relationship of the proposition to the rest of the argument, for
example a cross is used to identify an undercut (see Section 2.4.4 for more information
on undercuts).
Figure 2.12: A simple argument graph drawn by Pollock - Figure 2 in [45].
Figure 2.13: A sophisticated argument graph drawn by Pollock - Figure 9 from [53].
Other systems for argumentation stick to the normal tree-like graph, for example
the Carneades Argumentation Framework [95] (a typical argument can be seen in
Figure 2.15) - in which a range of arrows and arrowheads are employed to convey the
meaning of the relationship between the boxes. Carneades can help users create and
evaluate arguments diagrammatically. A similar task is performed by AVER [96], al-
though it concentrates on helping crime scene investigators explore gathered evidence
and inferences made; it too uses the common tree-based paradigm for presentation.
5The term used by philosophers to describe non-monontonic reasoning.
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Figure 2.14: ArguMed argument diagram - Figure 2 from [94].
Figure 2.15: Carneades argument graph - Figure 1 from [95].
2.6 Applications of argumentation
Argumentation is applied in a range of areas, during this section some of the appli-
cations of argumentation in AI will be reviewed.
Reed and Grasso [25] suggest that the role of argumentation in AI may be divided
roughly into two categories: modelling with argument, and modelling of argument.
The latter class employs argumentation theory to model natural language arguments
that take place between humans, for example a legal debate (see Section 2.6.1 for more
information). The former captures the idea of using argumentation to tackle problems
like non-monotonic reasoning, i.e. areas that do not naturally contain arguments.
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As NMR has been discussed in Section 2.2, this section will start with an explo-
ration of AI & law, before progressing to more biologically relevant domains such as
medicine (in Section 2.6.2) and science (Section 2.6.3).
2.6.1 AI & law
AI & law is one of the most active domains for argumentation research. Because law
involves a series of arguments and persuasion dialogues, it provides an excellent play-
ground for researchers [5]. Nevertheless, not all work in AI & law uses argumentation
theory [97]. However, work has focused increasingly on the natural link between the
practise of law and argumentation theory.
The idea of studying jurisprudence to improve the understanding of arguments
first originated from Stephen Toulmin [70]. He presented a model of argument (the
Toulmin scheme) that provides a useful model for interpreting and understanding
natural language arguments, be they legal or otherwise.
One of the first argumentation-based systems was HYPO [98]. It models case-
based reasoning (the application of precedence) which is central to U.S. law. HYPO
is notable for the application of arguments within a dialogue. HYPO evolved into
CATO [99] a system used to teach precedence based reasoning to legal students.
HYPO and CATO apply an informal theory of the method used to conduct legal
reasoning; yet, formal accounts of reasoning exist. To handle the defeasible aspects
of legal reasoning non-monotonic approaches were investigated, with argumentation
theory providing one of the most popular. Dung’s framework [31] was first applied by
Prakken and Sartor [71] to investigate the possibility of arguing over the preference
order assigned to arguments. Dung’s work has been applied to case-based reasoning
too, e.g. Prakken [100].
Gordon [101] produced a system, The Pleadings Game, which wraps a civil law
dispute in a dialectical process. Humans create arguments, the computer evaluates
them, and controls the game ensuring it is fair. In this way, access to an argumentation
system is controlled through the dialogue. Evolutions of this work include TDG [102]
and dialaw [103]. TDG uses the Toulmin scheme to improve the readability of its
arguments.
With the application of a game, tactics become germane. The player who is to
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make the next move may be able to use any one of multiple arguments, so which
argument should he/she/it6 choose? This work was started by CABARET [104],
a system that attempted to form strategies by classifying arguments and determin-
ing how/when they could be best used or attacked. The classification of arguments
according to their form is continued under the banner of argumentation schemes.
The most famous scheme is that created by Toulmin and discussed above. It is
used in dialogue games, e.g. TDG [102], and tools that visualise arguments, e.g.
PLAID [105]. Toulmin’s scheme is generic. Others, e.g. Walton [55], try to create
specific schemes for specific types of argument some of which, e.g. the argument
from expert opinion [106], directly target applications in law. Furthermore, Verheij
approaches his work, e.g. [94, 48, 62], through law.
AI & law was one of the first domains to investigate the visualisation of arguments
with Wigmore diagrams in the 1930s [83]. They deliver a mechanism to analyse all
the information in a case, record the relationships (support, attack) between the infor-
mation, and assign each piece of information a degree of belief (strength). Wigmore
diagrams are used in the MARSHALPLAN system [107], which is designed to help
visualise preliminary fact investigation. Subsequent work evolves the diagramming
techniques, and now may implement some of Walton’s schemes, e.g. AVER [96].
AVER, a tool for crime scene investigators, goes beyond diagramming and provides
methods to evaluate the argument displayed. More generic tools can be applied for
diagramming, e.g. Araucaria [66], or diagramming and evaluating legal arguments,
e.g. Carneades [95].
In summary, the domain of AI & law has been central to the development of
computational argumentation and very influential in the wider world of argumentation
theory.
2.6.2 Medicine
Medicine employs argumentation theory primarily in two main ways. The first is the
application of argumentation for decision support and explanation. The second is the
generation of natural dialogue for use in communication with the user.
6The player may be a software agent.
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One of the earlier instances of the latter category is from Grasso et. al. [11]; the
authors avail themselves of schemes to generate arguments as part of a persuasive
discussion in which the system tries to improve a human user’s eating habits. An
obvious descendent of this work is by Mazzotta and de Rossi [108]. It exploits Walton’s
notion of schemes to generate persuasive emotional arguments to convince someone
to improve their diet. Related work by Alberg [109] tries to deal with malnutrition
in elderly people. Day [110] applies similar ideas to try and persuade someone to
improve their health by exercising.
Bickmore and Sidner [111] combine the ideas of communication and decision sup-
port to propose a system that takes advantage of a dialogue framework to improve
communication between medics and patients resulting in an improved treatment plan.
Schultz and Rubinelli [112] aim for a similar outcome; however, they advocate starting
by trying to understand the communication mechanism between medics and patients.
To this end they apply IL techniques to a set of documented medic-patient consulta-
tions.
Hunt et. al. [113] show that decision-support systems in medicine can be very
helpful for medics. The exceptions are systems targeted at diagnosis which universally
fail. Examples of decision support include the work of the advanced computation labo-
ratory at cancer research UK (now COSSAC7). They commenced with the creation of
an argument-based logic for reasoning under uncertainty, the logic of argumentation
(LoA) [74]. This is employed within a model of clinical guidelines, PROforma [114],
which allows the guidelines to capture reasons for and against performing a partic-
ular treatment. PROforma is utilised within a series of tools such as REACT [115]
(decision support for medical planning by a single medic), and LISA [116] (a clinical
information and decision support system for Leukaemia treatment). These systems,
and others, have been evaluated and shown to be successful [117].
In addition to work using LoA, COSSAC built an implementation of a Dung-
style framework through their involvement in the ASPIC project [7]. Williams and
Williamson [81] use the Dung inspired framework of Prakken and Sartor [71] to gen-
erate arguments that act as explanations of reasoning performed by other means.
Other research teams have brought argumentation to bear in order to provide
7www.cossac.org
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explanations for clinical decision support systems. Shankar et. al. [118] operate the
Toulmin model of argument to generate arguments that explain a decision made by
the athena decision support system [119]. In Tolchinsky et. al. [120] a framework
utilising argumentation to decide on the viability of a human organ for transplant is
discussed. Many agents (software and human) create arguments, which are sent to,
and evaluated by, a mediator agent. The mediator uses argumentation to make a
final decision: critical questions are employed to assess the arguments sent, then an
implementation of Dung’s framework evaluates the status of those arguments.
Part of the reasoning undertaken by Tolchinsky et. al. [120] is case-based, which
provides an overlap with the legal domain. Dolins and Kero [121] suggest that this
form of reasoning is important for medicine, and next-generation medical informatics
systems. Another common link between law and medicine is the Toulmin scheme,
which is exploited by both communities to represent arguments in a natural way.
An example from medicine is Green [12], where it forms part of a natural language
generation system designed to help create pamphlets for patients engaging in genetic
counselling.
2.6.3 Science
Despite the prominence of argumentation in medical informatics, it is still relatively
untried in main stream science (chemistry, biology, and physics). One noticeable
exception from biology is the work of Jeffreys et. al. [9]. It employs a simple model of
argumentation to evaluate the output of a bioinformatics tool. Their work shows that
argumentation is as effective as other mechanisms such as decision trees. Furthermore,
Jeffreys et. al. intimate that argumentation frameworks and Bayesian networks are
not directly comparable because they are designed to tackle different problems.
Argumentation’s relationship to science seems to be mainly in the field of peda-
gogy, where it is used to help students learn to create good scientific arguments, e.g.
McNeil and Pimentel [122]. As such, the natural language aspects of the field are
used, as opposed to the computational elements focused on in this thesis.
It should be remembered that argumentation theory has roots in the fields of
psychology, e.g. Voss and Van Dyke [123], and cognitive science, e.g. Erduran and
Jime´nez-Alexiandre [124]. Consequently these disciplines both use and contribute to
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the study of argumentation theory.
2.6.4 General applications
Throughout this chapter a number of application areas in addition to medicine, law,
and science have been discussed. These include: agent communication, e.g. Rahwan
et. al. [8]; collaborative working, e.g. de Moor and Aakhus [34]; and pedagogy,
e.g. McNeil and Pimentel [122]. Furthermore, argumentation is being applied to
related areas such as e-democracy, e.g. Cartwright and Atkinson [125]; practical
reasoning, e.g. Gilbert [126]; and decision support, e.g. Bury et. al. [116]. In reality,
argumentation may be applied to any area in which information is uncertain, because
in such situations there is room for debate. As an example of how far argumentation
has spread, Trojahn et. al. [6] demonstrate that it can be used to combine different
techniques for ontology matching.
2.7 Summary
This chapter reviews the world of argumentation research. The primary aim of this
chapter is to furnish the user with the knowledge necessary for an understanding of
the rest of this document.
Whilst this chapter undoubtably focuses on an AI-centric view of argumentation,
brief consideration is given to some philosophical aspects - for example the purpose
of argumentation schemes, and the ways in which these schemes can be verified. The
role of other fields in developing argumentation theory is acknowledged, but not dwelt
upon. Similarly, the application of argumentation related technologies in these fields
is not considered.
Subsequent chapters use a third party argumentation toolkit to perform com-
putational argumentation. The toolkit is based on the notion of an argumentation
framework, in which an implementation of Dung’s seminal work [31] analyses whether
arguments are true or false. Hence particular attention is paid to an exploration of
frameworks and an explanation of Dung’s contribution.
Walton’s [55] notion of argumentation schemes - loosely defined as a natural lan-
guage template for documenting arguments - plays a pivotal role in future chapters.
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Likewise, Verheij’s [62] approach for converting schemes into formal logic inference
rules. Both topics are discussed in depth.
A variety of research and commercial activity has considered the best approaches
for visualising arguments. These efforts are reviewed before applications of com-
putational argumentation are considered within the domains of AI & law, medical
informatics and general science.
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Biology
The biology behind this document’s use case is discussed, prior to outlining the incen-
tive for the research in Chapter 4. An introduction to some basic biological concepts
is found in Section 3.1. Subsequently the use case’s domain is explored beginning with
the notion of gene expression (Section 3.2), and continuing with the developmental
mouse (Section 3.3). Following on to that a brief review of the main forms of gene
expression experiment - including in situ hybridisation - is conducted in Section 3.4.
Before the chapter concludes in Section 3.6, Section 3.5 examines some of the key
resources in this field focusing upon those utilised in this thesis.
3.1 Biology 101
To commence, a brief overview of basic biology is provided.
Species is the name given to a group of similar individuals that are members of
the same close biological family. Constituents of the same species should be able to
reproduce as should their offspring. An individual member of a species is called an
organism. Organisms are comprised of systems, e.g. the respiratory system. These
systems contain organs (for example the lungs), which are in turn composed of similar
groups of cells known as tissues. Cells are the basic unit of life and contain distinct
structures (so-called organelles), e.g. the nucleus.
In mammalian cells the nucleus contains chromosomes - a chromosome is a long
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) molecule. The chromosome may be split into a series
of small units called genes. Each gene supplies the information required by the cell
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to function or develop. Every cell in an organism contains the same DNA; however,
for an individual gene to be used by a cell it must be “switched on”. Genes that are
switched on are said to be expressed. Similarly, genes that are not switched on are
not expressed.
Genes enact changes in a cell by causing the formation of proteins. In addition
to carrying material out of a cell and around the body, proteins are molecules that
alter the behaviour and function of the cell. Consequently, proteins have a wide range
of activities ranging from catalysing chemical reactions, and switching off genes, to
being the building blocks used to support cells and create structures such as hair.
Gene regulation is the process of controlling the expression level of a gene. Regu-
lation is often a secondary result of a complex chemical reaction. During the reaction
proteins are generated that either reduce or increase the current level of expression.
If reduced sufficiently, the gene will be “switched off”.
Unwanted or abnormal features such as cleft lips are a result of certain genes
having the “wrong” level of expression, e.g. genes that should be expressed are not
expressed. To gain an understanding of these features, the set of genes expressed in
normal healthy tissues must be compared to the set of genes expressed in abnormal or
unhealthy tissues. The difference between the two sets provides an indication of the
root cause of the abnormality and a basis for further research into a cure or prevention.
A more in-depth discussion on the basics of biology is provided in standard text-
books such as Campbell et. al. [127].
3.2 DNA, genes and gene expression
As mentioned in Section 3.1, genes are instructions that control the development of
an organism by affecting the type and number of proteins produced at any one time.
Genes are small units, comprised of DNA, found in the chromosome of every cell.
Initially, the DNA is transcribed to form RNA (ribonucleic acid). The RNA is then
translated into proteins. When a protein has been produced, the gene can be said to
be expressed.
A series of nucleotides constitute a DNA molecule. There are four distinct nu-
cleotides found in DNA: adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine. Each nucleotide is
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a short molecule that acts as a “link in the chain” of the longer DNA molecule. The
distribution of these nucleotides varies throughout the length of the molecule creating
the so-called genetic sequence. It is this variation that encodes the information stored
in the DNA.
DNA is broken into a series of triplets called codons ; each is a sequence of three
nucleotides. Particular codons demarcate the individual genes within the long DNA
molecule (i.e. the chromosome). Different codons are used to split genes into segments.
A promoter is an area that controls the regulation of the gene; depending on which
protein binds to the promoter, the gene will be ignored or transcribed. The sequence
of nucleotides to be transcribed into RNA is likewise a region wrapped by codons.
Gene expression experiments are interested in determining which genes are active
(expressed) in a specific location within a particular organism at a precise time. Mea-
suring the type and number of proteins present gives a true picture of which genes
are expressed. Not every RNA is translated into a protein, so looking at RNA levels
merely allows an estimate of the gene expression to be made. Examining DNA indi-
cates whether or not a gene is present - it conveys nothing about the expression level
of that gene.
In this document’s use case, gene expression is studied with respect to the devel-
opmental mouse.
3.3 The developmental mouse
It is not possible to experiment on humans for practical, ethical, and legal reasons.
Consequently substitute organisms are used by scientists. These are known as model
organisms. A wide range of plants, animals, fish, and insects are studied. This work
concentrates on one of those, the mouse.
“Mouse” is the common name for the animal with the latin name Mus. There
are many species ranging from mus musculus (the house mouse) to peromyscus man-
iculatus (the deer mouse). In addition to knowing the species of mouse used, it is
necessary to know whether or not the mouse is a mutant. So-called wild type mice
have a normal, or natural, set of chromosomes. Whereas mutants are bred to insure
they have a particular trait, for example cancer. To enable the comparison of results
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obtained from different individuals, the mice must be genetically uniform, i.e. the
mice must be of the same strain.
The mouse develops from a single cell into a mammal with a complex anatomy
comprising countless cells. This development was studied by Karl Theiler [128]. He
split the development of the house mouse into 28 distinct stages, called Theiler Stages.
The first 26 Theiler Stages deal with the unborn mouse. The final two describe
the newborn and then postnatal adult mouse. Current convention creates a split
between the unborn mouse and the final two stages. The former group being called
the developmental mouse and the latter the adult mouse.
A Theiler Stage is accompanied by an approximate time since conception measured
in days, called days post conception (dpc). Additionally, it includes a description of
the anatomy at that stage, and highlights what has changed from the previous stage.
Diagrams illustrate these differences. A summary and outline of these stages can be
found at the Edinburgh Mouse Atlas Project (EMAP) website1.
Each Theiler Stage has an associated anatomy, and corresponding ontological rep-
resentation - see Figure 3.1. Although multiple anatomies exist, the main anatomy
in this work is EMAP.
3.3.1 EMAP anatomy
The acronym EMAP is ambiguous because it is overloaded. It applies to both the Ed-
inburgh Mouse Atlas Project2 and the anatomy developed as one part of that project.
Part of the anatomy ontology for TS 14 can be seen in Figure 3.2. The anatomy of
the developmental mouse is described using a series of part of relations, thus looking
at Figure 3.2 it is obvious that the future brain is part of the central nervous system,
which is in turn part of the nervous system and that is part of the organ system.
Each structure in the ontology is given a unique identifier in the form
EMAP:number, e.g. EMAP:152. Moreover the structure has a name, for example
future brain. This is the structure’s short name. Its full name is the entire path from
the root node of the ontology to its short name, e.g. mouse > embryo > ectoderm >
1www.emouseatlas.org/emap/ema/theiler_stages/StageDefinition/stagedefinition.
html
2www.emouseatlas.org
53
Chapter 3. Biology
Figure 3.1: Illustrating the development captured by the different Theiler Stages;
each stage has an anatomical and associated ontological representation. The anatomy
ontology shown here is a subset of EMAP Theiler Stage 11.
neural ectoderm > future brain.
The same structure can appear in multiple stages, and can have the same short
and full names in these stages; the above example applies equally to Theiler Stages
11, 12, and 13. The unique feature of the future brain in these different stages is its
ID: in TS11 it has EMAP:152; in TS12 EMAP:235; and in TS13 EMAP:441.
More details on the EMAP anatomy (ontology) can be found in Baldock and
Davidson [129].
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Figure 3.2: Part of the EMAP anatomy ontology for Theiler Stage 14.
3.4 Gene expression experiments
There is a wide range of techniques to determine the expression level of a gene. These
mechanisms differ not only in their method, but in their precise focus. Primarily,
experiments can concentrate on the location of expression or on the quantity of the
gene expressed.
Often experiments rely on the close association between individual genes, RNA,
and proteins - a gene is transcribed into RNA, which may be translated into a protein.
This means a protein or RNA can be mapped onto a corresponding gene. Therefore,
gene expression can be evaluated by examining the proteins or RNA contained in a
sample.
One key principle relied on in many of the different experimental techniques is the
notion of hybridisation. This is the idea of chemically bonding a probe to DNA, RNA
or a protein. Normally probes are designed to bond with a single gene/RNA/protein,
but this is not always the case. Probes are very conspicuous - for example they may
be highly coloured or radioactive - the visibility of the probe provides an insight into
where genes are expressed and the quantity of the expression found in that area.
A brief overview of several available techniques follows in Section 3.4.2. However,
the technique of in situ hybridisation is given special consideration in Section 3.4.1,
as it is the main class of experiment in this thesis’s use case.
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3.4.1 In situ hybridisation gene expression experiments
In situ is the latin for “in place”. Accordingly in situ experiments focus on identifying
precisely where a gene is expressed. They produce images that are either an entire
mouse embryo (a so-called wholemount), or a slice/section (e.g. Figure 3.3) of that
mouse. The areas of intense colour indicate where the gene is expressed. To docu-
ment the link between the genes and the location of their expression the visual result
may be mapped manually to an anatomy. The anatomy may have an ontological
representation, e.g. EMAP, or a 3D spatial depiction (see Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.3: Result of an in situ gene expression experiment - EMAGE:6089.
3.4.2 Common experimental techniques
Gene expression techniques attempt to measure the level of gene expression by exam-
ining the RNA, or proteins present in a biological sample. In addition, DNA can be
examined to determine if a gene is present. There are a variety of techniques designed
to do these tasks including:
Southern blot A simple method of deciding if a known gene is present in a sample
by looking at the DNA. A small sample is fixed onto a surface, and a probe
washed over it.
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Northern blot Similar to the southern blot, but this time measuring the RNA levels,
and thus the level of gene expression.
Western blot Similar to the Northern blot, but this time measuring protein levels.
In situ hybridisation against mRNA An in situ experiment, as described above,
focusing on one type of RNA. It differs from the blots, because the sample is
the surface and the probe is washed directly over it.
Immunohistochemistry A method of identifying a particular cell by determining
which proteins are located inside it.
In situ reporter A method of identifying gene expression by replacing a particular
gene with a mutated form that may be detected easily, allowing the location of
the gene to be tracked as the organism develops.
RT-PCR polymerase chain reaction (PCR) involves increasing the level of a partic-
ular RNA to make it more visible and thus easier to detect and count. Once the
count has been performed, the amount of the original RNA can be calculated.
RT stands for reverse transcription, thus in this particular form of PCR, the
RNA is reverse transcribed to generate DNA, and then amplified.
RNase protection ribonuclease (RNase) protection provides a mechanism for de-
tecting and quantifying specific RNAs within a sample. A series of probes are
hybridised with the sample. The hybrid, formed by the reaction between a
probe and the RNA, is separated from the remaining unused probe and sam-
ple. RNase is applied to the hybrid, it digests all the RNA leaving behind the
successful probes. Determining which probes are left, and how many of each
probe type is present, furnishes information on which genes are expressed and
the quantity in which they are expressed.
SAGE serial analysis of gene expression is a technique to quantify the number of each
gene expressed in a subject using RNA. The basic process involves extracting
RNA from the cells in the subject. The RNA is converted into short sequences
of DNA called tags. Each tag uniquely represents the gene from which the
original RNA was translated. The tags are collected together and processed by
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a computer, which counts the number of each tag. The quantity of each tag
indicates the quantity of the original gene that is expressed in the subject.
Microarray A technique to quantify gene expression. A microarray is a small chem-
ically stable platform, which contains thousands of probes - each detecting a
different gene. A sample is produced by chopping up and liquidising a piece of
tissue from one or more organisms. The sample is washed over the platform,
allowing the probes to hybridise. If a probe has hybridised with a RNA, that
probe becomes visible. The greater the number of suitable RNA, the more hy-
bridisation takes place. There is a direct relationship between hybridisation and
visibility with increases in hybridisation leading to greater (more intense) vis-
ibility. The microarray is analysed by a computer, which determines the level
of visibility of each probe, and quantifies the expression levels. Microarray ex-
periments are very high throughput, which makes them popular. However, the
fact that the biological sample has to be blended results in only coarse grain
location information being obtained.
More details on gene expression and experimental techniques can be found in
Avison [130].
3.5 Resources
The following section examines some of the main resources in the chosen field in
addition to some of the large gene expression resources.
3.5.1 EMAGE
EMAP is the Edinburgh Mouse atlas Project. It is the umbrella name for a range of
activities.
The first of these activities is EMA is the Edinburgh Mouse Atlas. EMA is respon-
sible for the creation and maintenance of an anatomy (and corresponding ontology)
for the developmental mouse. The ontology has the name EMAP, and was discussed
in Section 3.3.1. In addition to the ontology, the project has produced a series of
3D computer models of the mouse, e.g. Figure 3.4. There is at least one 3D model
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for each Theiler Stage between 7 and 26. Each model comprises a number of voxels
(volumetric pixels) that are stacked in a 3D space.
Figure 3.4: An illustration of the EMAGE 3D model for Theiler Stage 14.
Figure 3.5: Textual annotations versus spatial annotations - spatial are linked to one
of the 3D models whereas textual are tied to the anatomy ontology.
EMAGE3 is the Edinburgh Mouse Atlas of Gene Expression, the second main ac-
tivity of EMAP. This is a gene expression database that (re)publishes in situ gene
expression data for the developmental mouse. When researchers perform an exper-
iment they may publish it in a traditional journal, and then have it republished in
EMAGE (or a similar resource). Alternatively, the researchers may submit their data
directly to a resource, such as EMAGE, by-passing the orthodox scientific journals.
EMAGE publishes two forms of results (see Figure 3.5): those tied to the anatomy
ontology (so-called textual annotations); and results linked to the 3D models (spatial
annotations). EMAGE is unusual in this respect, because most gene expression re-
3www.emouseatlas.org/emage/
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sources still do not use 3D models, and thus cannot produce spatial annotations.
EMAGE experimented briefly with a third type of annotation: textual annotations
derived from spatial annotations. A computer algorithm was used to turn the spatial
annotations into textual annotations. This proved to be expensive and unreliable.
Consequently, no new annotations are being created; however, the set of generated
annotations is still available.
In terms of content, EMAGE contains the following types of experiment: in situ
hybridisation against mRNA, immunohistochemistry, and in situ reporter. In Decem-
ber 2011, it contained details of over 40,000 procedures.
More details on EMAGE can be found in Venkataraman et. al. [131].
EMAGE walkthrough
In order to illustrate the information supplied by a typical gene expression resource,
a single experiment from EMAGE shall be examined. The experiment’s web page
can be seen in Figure 3.6; there is nothing remarkable about this particular page or
experiment, it was selected because it is a typical example.
At the top left of the page, in bold font, is EMAGE:697. This is the accession
identifier, a unique ID for the experiment.
Below that is information on the Gene. The gene’s unique symbol (in this case
Fgf5 ) precedes the gene’s name (fibroblast growth factor 5). At the end of the line
is a link to a page containing more details on this gene. That page is provided by a
different resource, The Mouse Genome Informatics (MGI)4. The link is presented as
the accession ID for the gene in that resource.
The next line indicates the Theiler Stage on which the experiment was per-
formed, i.e. the age of the mouse when the experiment was conducted. Theiler Stage
8 corresponds to approximately 6.5 days after conception.
Data source indicates whether or not the experiment was performed by a screen-
ing program, in this case it was not. Screening programs are projects that are opti-
mised for throughput and thus perform large volumes of experiments. The alternative
is for the experiment to be conducted by a small research lab, possibly one specialising
in the tissue or gene being experimented on.
4www.informatics.jax.org/mgihome
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Figure 3.6: An EMAGE screenshot: a typical set of gene expression information
presented via the web interface (with header and footer removed).
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The subsequent five sections impart the experimental results. The first gives the
actual result of the experiment - a series of images illustrating where the gene is
expressed. The images are of a slice of a particular mouse. The following Notes for
interpretation presents a key for the annotations used in the images.
By examining the images, an expert is able to identify which structures5 the gene
is expressed in. The researchers do this for their journal publication by creating
textual annotations. This analysis is reported in the segment called Sites of Gene
Expression Annotated Manually. Three are provided, along with an indication
of the level of expression, e.g. strong.
A manually produced mapping of the above images to a 3D model creates the
Spatial Annotation section. This starts by displaying the actual spatial mapping
performed. Subsequently, a list of quality measures is supplied. “Data pattern clarity
and extraction” signals how clear the experimental image is. “Morphological match
of data embryo to template model” indicates how well the subject in the image relates
to the standard 3D model used for spatial annotations. Lastly it states who approved
the spatial mapping: it can be either the researcher or the EMAGE editors.
Next comes Sites of Gene Expression Inferred by the Spatial Mapping
- this is the list of textual annotations derived from the spatial annotations. A list
of relevant structures is shown, as is the volume of the structure that has the gene
expressed in it. This is shown as a percentage for each level of expression. For example,
1.5% of extraembryonic ectoderm has fgf5 strongly expressed, and the remainder of
the tissue (98.5%) does not contain the gene.
Authors lists the people responsible for the different information on the page.
Firstly, the researcher is credited and their research paper cited (if one exists). “In-
dexed by” indicates who took the experimental result and mapped it to the EMAP
anatomy ontology. It may be the researcher, the GXD editors, or the EMAGE edi-
tors (for more information on GXD see section 3.5.2). Finally, the reader learns who
created the spatial mapping, normally this is an EMAGE editor, but it may be the
researchers.
Submitted to EMAGE by specifies who submitted the experiment for inclusion
5Although there is disagreement in the biomedical world as to the exact definitions of the terms
tissue and structure they will be used as synonyms in this document.
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in EMAGE. EMAGE supplies tools that allow researchers to do this directly, and the
EMAGE editors read published papers and submit data themselves. Historically, they
have shared data with GXD, and verified it before it is included in the database. In this
instance, the “Indexed by GXD” from the previous Authors section notifies a reader
that GXD read the published paper, mapped the results to the EMAP anatomy, then
shared the data with EMAGE. The “Submitted to EMAGE by . . . EMAGE Editor”
indicates that the editorial team have reviewed and accepted the data from GXD.
The following two sections provide provenance information for the experiment.
Ideally the Probe section imparts enough information for the same probe to be used
by someone else. The information presented here will be taken from the article in
which the experiment is published.
Specimen gives details of the experimental subject. The age of the mouse is given
in two forms: Theiler Stage; and days post conception. Its “Genotype” indicates that
this is the standard mouse with no genetic mutations.
The penultimate section presents a reference for the paper in which this experiment
was published. In this case there are two publications, because the second one contains
details of the probe used in the current experiment (the first citation).
Links presents connections (URLs) to related information in other resources. No-
tice, another link to the MGI (MGI:1930524). Clicking on this displays the page
shown in Figure 3.7.
3.5.2 GXD
Mouse Genome Informatics (MGI) contributes a range of functions and online re-
sources. One of these is a gene expression database called GXD.
Like EMAGE this resource has a web interface. It is fully integrated with the other
MGI databases and it is not obvious where GXD stops and the other resources start.
The complete suite delivers information on genes (linked to by EMAGE), proteins,
probes, structures, gene expression information, pathways, protein functions, and a
wide variety of links to other resources such as the Gene Ontology6 - an ontology that
provides a mechanism for describing genes.
6www.geneontology.org
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Behind GXD is the EMAP anatomy. In places the original anatomy has been
extended to deliver finer granularity (lower level nodes). Furthermore, GXD has
extended the ontology to cover the adult mouse (TS28).
Unlike EMAGE, GXD only produces textual annotations. It has a different or-
ganisation and presentation of information. To illustrate this, Figure 3.7 is the web
page for the experiment in Figure 3.6 - due to the size of the actual web page, this is
merely a subset of it. Immediately it is noticeable that the page contains details of
more than one procedure. There are seven specimens used, and seven different pro-
cedures performed. Results are given for each procedure on this page - though most
are not shown in Figure 3.7. EMAGE has the policy of splitting such procedures up,
so that each one has a different EMAGE ID.
Another difference between EMAGE and GXD is the content in terms of exper-
imental types. EMAGE only contains experiments that supply spatial information
whereas GXD attempts to supply a more complete picture of gene expression and as
such contains a far wider range of experiments including Northern blot, Western blot,
RNAse, and RT-PCR.
Despite the obvious differences in presentation, and the lack of spatial annota-
tions, both resources publish similar information, accordingly Figure 3.7 shall not be
discussed further. For more information on GXD see Smith et. al. [132].
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Figure 3.7: A GXD screenshot: a typical set of gene expression information. This is
part of the page for the experiment shown Figure 3.6.
3.5.3 Cancer Genome Anatomy Project
The Cancer Genome Anatomy Project7 (CGAP) has the goal of determining the
genes responsible for causing cancer in different types of cells. This resource contains
information on RNA interference8, biological pathways, genes, tissues, and SAGE
experiments. Only the SAGE data is used in this thesis - for a brief description of
the SAGE technique see Section 3.4.2.
The SAGE data is for mouse and human, and features both libraries with long
tags and libraries with short tags. Much of the mouse data came from the Mouse
Atlas of Gene Expression Project9. This resource focuses on providing a numerical
count of the amount of a gene expressed in a particular area of the mouse. Associated
7http://cgap.nci.nih.gov
8A process that effects the rate at which a piece of RNA is translated into a protein. As such, it
has a similar effect to gene regulation.
9www.mouseatlas.org
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with each library is an image of the structure(s) from which the library was produced.
The anatomy used by CGAP is their own proprietary anatomy for the develop-
mental mouse.
3.5.4 Allen Brain Atlas
The Allen Brain Atlas10 (ABA) was set up to research gene expression in the mouse
and human. Currently it focuses on the mouse’s brain and spinal cord, and the human
cortex - only publishing experimental results that the project has produced itself.
Concentrating on the mouse’s brain, the project experiments on both the devel-
opmental11 and adult mouse12. These are spatial experiments (in situ hybridisation
with MRA levels), the results of which are associated with the ABA’s proprietary
anatomy and digital atlas.
Because ABA is funded privately by a philanthropist there is no requirement for
all the ABA data to be published. Accordingly, the data made publicly available is a
small subset of the total collected.
3.5.5 GENSAT
GENSAT 13 is another resource dedicated to the developmental and adult mouse cen-
tral nervous systems (i.e. the brain). GENSAT uses in situ techniques to capture
gene expression information, which the project then publishes in its own database.
GENSAT is funded by U.S. government bodies, and thus the entire database is made
publicly available.
3.5.6 Microarray resources
ArrayExpress14 and GEO15 are dedicated to publishing information from microar-
ray experiments. These resources publish experimental results from a variety of or-
10www.brain-map.org
11http://developingmouse.brain-map.org/
12http://mouse.brain-map.org/
13www.gensat.org
14www.ebi.ac.uk/microarray-as/ae/
15www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/geo/
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ganisms, including the developmental mouse. ArrayExpress and GEO share data,
consequently their content is relatively similar.
As array-based experiments are not considered in this work these resources shall
not be reviewed further.
3.6 Summary
Previously in this chapter the biological background necessary to understand this
thesis is discussed. This document’s use case is in situ hybridisation gene expression
for the developmental mouse.
Gene expression information notifies a reader which genes are responsible for the
development of particular anatomical features such as the mouse’s tail. In situ gene
expression experiments indicate exactly where a gene is expressed in the unborn mouse
- ultimately bestowing an image of the exact location. Other types of gene expression
experiment exist, and some of these are mentioned briefly.
Once performed, gene expression experiments may be published in a journal, and
then their results re-published in a series of specialised online resources. A number of
such resources are discussed, with particular emphasis given to those featured in this
document: EMAGE and GXD.
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Online biological resources:
problems and solutions
The chapter shall focus on the motivation for this thesis, firstly describing the problem
and then outlining a possible solution. Work concentrates on one particular area of
biology: in situ gene expression for the developmental mouse; however, it is applicable
to biology in general. The following quote from Antezana et. al. relates to the field
of biology:
In the post-genomic era, life sciences (LS) turned into a very data-intensive
domain. Therefore, scientists in this domain are facing the same challenges
as in many other disciplines dealing with highly distributed, heterogeneous
and voluminous data sources. However, these problems are more acute in
the LS compared to many other domains due to a number of factors.
Those factors could be divided into two groups. One group that could be
called natural, reflects the specifics of biological data and knowledge, first
of all its complexity [133]. The other group of factors could be categorized
as cultural. The avalanche of data outpouring from the high-throughput
genome-wide technologies caught life scientists unprepared. . . . The result
was an abundantly idiosyncratic domain specialization. In particular, the
biomedical domain is plagued with extremely high fragmentation. ([134]
page 395)
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Although the quote clearly describes the wider biological domain, the content of this
chapter will illustrate that the description is equally valid for the use case described
in Chapter 3.
The interconnectedness of biology ensures that the field of gene expression is just
as intricate as any other. This complexity is commonly realised as inconsistency.
Conflict occurs in a number of situations, for instance, between experiments that
seemingly should produce the same result, but in reality do not. Section 4.1 considers
this from the perspective of the use case.
Furthermore, the sheer scale of the biological world means that our knowledge of
it is incomplete, with a significant number of gaps requiring investigation. Again, the
situation is identical within the use case - as discussed in Section 4.2.
In Section 3.5 a range of resources providing gene expression information for the
mouse are reviewed: EMAGE, GXD, GENSAT, ABA, GEO, and ArrayExpress. Most
of these resources use their own anatomies, and their own online publishing mechanism
(i.e. a proprietary database schema, web site, and programmatic interface). In short,
fragmentation is just as serious an issue for the use case as Antezana et. al. state it
is for the wider biological realm. Section 4.3 shall probe the distributed nature of the
use case.
Subsequently, Section 4.4 outlines the high level objective of this work. In Section
4.5 the reasons behind the use of argumentation shall be explored. Penultimately
Section 4.6 discusses some of the issues to be investigated in this work, and the
chapter is concluded with a summary in Section 4.7.
4.1 Inconsistent data
When two identical experiments are performed, instinctively it is expected that the
outcomes will be identical. Yet, the actual results may contradict one another -
experiment one may suggest that a gene is expressed in a tissue, while experiment
two indicates that the gene is not expressed.
Such contradictions can occur for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the complexity
of the experiments means that many parameters can affect the outcome. Ensuring
that two experiments are truly identical is nigh on impossible when something as
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apparently minor as a brief 1◦C temperature change can alter the result1. Secondly,
experiments are performed and analysed by humans introducing the possibility of
human error, such as incorrectly identifying the age (developmental stage) of the
mouse. Thirdly, the outcome of an experiment is evaluated and mapped by a human
creating the prospect of differences of opinion. For example, when the result of an
experiment is as vague as Figure 4.1 it is understandable that two people may disagree
about the conclusion.
When two supposedly identical experiments seem to disagree, it is easy to say
that they are not actually identical and thus there is no conflict. Yet this is not the
attitude of the biologists. They perceive such a disagreement as an inconsistency that
needs to be resolved. Accordingly the same viewpoint shall be adopted during this
work.
Figure 4.1: A result from EMAGE experiment EMAGE:821.
Regrettably inconsistencies are common in biology, which creates a problem for
resources such as GXD that republish experimental results. Determining which result
is correct would be problematic as it would involve the use of personal opinion and
judgements that may not be shared by other biologists (alternatively the experiment
could be repeated, but the resources are not equipped to do so). Consequently, re-
sources such as GXD publish all the experiments that meet their quality requirements.
This effectively places the onus for the resolution of contradictions onto the biologists
who use the resource.
1This is related to the amount of energy required to break the pre-existing chemical bonds so
that the probe can bond with its target RNA/protein. More heat means more energy is available,
thereby directly increasing the ability of the target and probe to bond.
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In some cases the solution is simple. For example, GXD contains one annotation
suggesting that the gene Tnc is not expressed in the mouse brain in TS24 and fourteen
suggesting Tnc is expressed.
At other times the settlement is far more complex. Consider the gene Bmp4 in
the eye TS22. At the time of writing, GXD features one annotation2 suggesting the
gene is expressed, and one annotation3 suggesting it is not expressed. Tackling this
disparity requires a closer examination of the data in GXD, and possibly a perusal of
the published papers.
An examination of GXD in 2007 suggested that the resource contained some 1300
inconsistent annotations [135] - it must be stressed that this is not an issue unique to
GXD, it is used merely to illuminate the discussion. GXD continues to publish new
annotations leading to a gradual increase in the number of inconsistencies.
In summary, it is essential to query for genes expressed and not expressed in the
tissue of interest and manually resolve the resulting inconsistencies. However, as
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 show, it is necessary to repeat this for multiple resources.
4.2 Incomplete data
Many biological resources, including those in the field of in situ gene expression for
the developmental mouse, are incomplete because they do not publish an entire view
of their chosen domain.
To be a complete resource, it would require to be more than an in situ hybridisation
resource such as EMAGE, it would entail covering the full range of gene expression
experiments. Furthermore the resource would need to publish details from every single
gene expression experiment undertaken on the mouse. In addition, these experiments
must, collectively, have used every technique to look for every gene in all mouse
tissues. This is a colossal volume of data, and it is not surprising that no resource
accomplishes this.
Some might argue that any resource that does contain all the above information
is still deficient as it does not consider mutants. For them, a complete resource would
2GXD accession ID = MGI:3039849.
3Accession ID = MGI:3756832.
71
Chapter 4. Online biological resources: problems and solutions
contain the above information for the wild type mouse, plus the same information for
every single mutant mouse.
Consider three resources in the use case domain: GXD, EMAGE, and ABA. The
final resource is incomplete because it specialises in one class of experiment on only
one part of the mouse (the brain). Therefore if a user wishes to know which genes
are expressed in the leg it cannot help them. ABA was set up by a project to publish
the experimental results of that project. Currently, the resource publishes only a
fraction of all the data collected by the project - creating another respect in which
this resource is incomplete.
EMAGE is incomplete because it publishes only experiments examining the lo-
cation of the expression, thus ignoring experiments focusing on the quantity of ex-
pression. It only considers the developmental mouse, and thus is missing information
because it does not consider the adult mouse.
GXD publishes a wider range of experimental results, and covers all 28 Theiler
Stages of the mouse - it provides a richer, fuller, picture of the domain. However, it
too has gaps in its coverage. GXD publishes experimental results from the community
at large - as opposed to ABA which is a proprietary database publishing results for
one project. Therefore, for GXD to be complete it would need to publish every single
gene expression result for the mouse. However, this is not the case. Often large
scale projects, such as ABA, only publish their data in their own resource(s). In
addition some experiments will not be submitted to the GXD editorial team, and will
“slip under the radar”. Furthermore, some experiments will be rejected because the
editorial team do not believe that they satisfy the quality metrics desired by their
resource.
In summary, it is impossible to obtain a complete picture of gene expression in
all mice (wild type and mutants). Moreover, to gain as comprehensive a picture as
possible, it is necessary to consult a wide range of resources.
4.3 Distributed data
A third problem associated with biological data is its distributed nature. This is
something that has already been broached in Section 4.2 where EMAGE contains one
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set of data and GXD a second set.
EMAGE and GXD contain significant overlap because both resources publish ex-
perimental results from third parties - this is depicted by Figure 4.2. Notice that
Figure 4.2 illustrates that the resources overlap in one particular area (in situ ex-
perimental results), and that the overlap is not absolute. Consequently, some spatial
experimental results are found in GXD but not EMAGE and vice versa. Thus a bi-
ologist wishing to gain an understanding of the domain must consult both resources.
Figure 4.2: Illustration of the overlap between EMAGE and GXD from
www.emouseatlas.org/emage/about/mgeir.html.
In addition to creating inconsistencies within a single resource, the issues described
in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 may cause inconsistencies between different resources. For
example, when asking if the gene Otx2 is expressed in the primitive streak in TS9,
at the time of writing EMAGE has one annotation4 providing the answer “yes”. Yet
GXD has one annotation5 advancing the answer “no”. Hence it is very difficult to
determine whether or not Otx2 is expressed. The situation is confusing because
the resources are citing the same experiment, i.e. the resources have analysed the
experimental result (shown in Figure 4.1) in different ways. This highlights the level
of subjectivity involved in assessing a result.
Such conflict reinforces the message that neither resource can be used on their
own, and that care has to be taken when posing a query. Simply asking which genes
are expressed in primitive streak TS9 will provide only the EMAGE opinion. Unless
the opposite query is posed too, the conflict will not come to light.
4Accession ID EMAGE:821
5Accession ID MGI:2154979
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4.4 Objectives
Sections 4.1 to 4.3 illustrate the problems faced by a biologist when trying to determine
if a gene is (not) expressed in a particular tissue of the developmental mouse.
The ambition of this work is to improve the understanding of the applicability
of computational argumentation within biology through the study of a particular
biological use case involving in situ gene expression for the developmental mouse.
Whilst tackling the problems faced in the use case, insights into the future role of
computational argumentation in biology shall be sought.
4.5 Why argumentation?
The previous section clearly states that the objective of this work includes the use of
argumentation. However, it did not state the reasons for using argumentation - they
shall be outlined here.
4.5.1 Requirements
Before commencing the process of solving the issues previously discussed in this chap-
ter, it is worthwhile contemplating what would constitute a solution.
To start with, it is assumed that an application will be created to provide the
biologists with the support they need. Yet what task should this system perform?
It is clear that incomplete and inconsistent information needs to be dealt with.
Additionally, it seems natural to consider that the goal of the system should be to
make a decision. Yet this is not the case. Decisions regarding gene expression are
controversial, therefore it would be necessary to customise a system to each user, in
order to make a “correct” decision. However, this would not be enough, as ultimately
it does not indicate why the decision is made. Moreover, in all likelihood a final
resolution will come with further biological research. Any solution attempted here
would be little more than informed speculation based on a partial view of the world.
As such the aim should not be to provide a definitive conclusion, but instead to
consider what inference seems most likely with the current state of the domain. As
new experiments are performed, new annotations will become available, and thus the
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inference will need to be reconsidered.
To be of genuine use to the biological community a system must explode the
reasoning process providing unobscured access to the underlying information and
knowledge on which the inferences are based. This allows the user to treat the system
as a platform on which to base their own thought processes. Supplying direct links to
the underlying data (sources), will strengthen the platform constructed, by allowing
the user to conduct any further research that they may desire.
Finally, in order to be trusted, any system must use techniques that are clear
to the user group - many of which do not have the time, appetite or the necessary
background to comprehend complex mathematical or logical solutions.
4.5.2 Alternatives
Manifestly a wide range of technologies (and thus research) is applicable to the above
problem. Although decision making has previously been rejected, instinctively there
appears to be a need to make and then explain a decision, thus decision making and
explanation mechanisms may be appropriate. As data is being brought together from
a variety of heterogenous sources, data integration technology must be considered too.
Data integration
Data integration is a research domain interested in:
In general, integration of multiple information systems aims at combining
selected systems so that they form a unified new whole and give users the
illusion of interacting with one single information system. ([136] page 39)
Outwardly this is very similar to the aim of this work. However, there is one clear
difference: the goal of this work is not to create a “unified new whole”. Instead
of unifying the data, the idea is to create a unified inference based on that data,
i.e. whether or not the gene is expressed. Yet, in this work the unification is less
important than the reasons for the unification. Furthermore, the idea of combining
all the data into a “new whole” is unlikely to be popular with the data sources who
provide the information. Those sources spend valuable human and financial resources
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gathering and annotating data. Naturally they expect, and deserve, credit for their
work.
One domain related to data integration investigates the resolution of conflicts in
data sources. Clearly, in that area, there are parallels with this work. Unfortunately,
most so-called inconsistency management solutions suffer from one fundamental prob-
lem:
. . . almost all past approaches proceeded under the assumption that there
was some epistemically correct way of resolving inconsistencies or rea-
soning in the presence of inconsistency. More recently, [137] argued that
inconsistency can often be resolved in different ways based on what the
user wants ([138] page 367)
As discussed in Section 4.5.1, deciding whether or not a gene is expressed is often
controversial. Thus the traditional answers from this domain are clearly unsuitable.
However, there are solutions that attempt to rectify this problem. For example,
Martinez et. al. [138] suggest creating a number of so-called policies which allow the
user to select their own resolution. Martinez and Hunter [139] further this idea by
using computational argumentation to decide which policy is most appropriate for a
particular context.
At first glance Martinez’s work seems to provide an attractive panacea to the
issues discussed in this document. However issues remain. Firstly, she is dealing
only with inconsistent information. Secondly, her basic idea is that a finite number
of functions can be developed that allow all inconsistencies to be resolved - when
considering human opinion in a complex domain this is questionable. Finally, the
principle is still very much in the research phase and is not yet ready for real world
deployment. This means that there is no solution ready for trial to ascertain whether
or not a biologist can understand how and why these policies work for them.
Decision making
Like all the domains discussed in this section, decision making is a large area of
research with numerous proposals and solutions. Properly documenting this field is
beyond the scope of this work, and a brief profile is offered instead.
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Decision making techniques can be split, broadly speaking, into four categories:
certainty deterministic knowledge;
risk complete probabilistic knowledge;
uncertainty partial probabilistic knowledge;
ignorance no probabilistic knowledge.
In this use case there are no known, measured, and verified probabilities. Yet, it
is possible to approximate such knowledge by consulting an expert. Although these
expert assignments are controversial, they may act as a basis for conducting decision
making under uncertainty. Alternatively, it may be possible to learn the probabilities
from a training set. Either of these approaches would allow a range of technologies
to be adopted, including the popular Bayesian nets [140].
Intuitively there is no reason why Bayesian networks could not be applied to the
current problem. Indeed Friedman et. al. [141] use this technology to investigate gene
expression for microarray data (see Section 3.4.2). Their aims are more sophisticated
than those proposed for the current research:
Our aim is to model the system as a joint distribution over a collection
of random variables that describe system states. If we had such a model,
we could answer a wide range of queries about the system. For example,
does the expression level of a particular gene depend on the experimental
condition? Is this dependence direct or indirect? If it is indirect, which
genes mediate the dependency? ([141] page 607)
The work of Friedman et. al. proves that Bayesian nets can be used with gene
expression data. However, that does not mean their work may be applied to the cur-
rent task. In order to construct their model of gene expression they use the following
variables:
In this paper, we are dealing mainly with random variables that denote
the mRNA expression level of specific genes. However, we can also con-
sider other random variables that denote other aspects of the system state,
such as the phase of the system in the the cell-cycle process. Other exam-
ples include measurements of experimental conditions, temporal indicators
77
Chapter 4. Online biological resources: problems and solutions
(i.e., the time/stage that the sample was taken from), background vari-
ables (e.g., which clinical procedure was used to get a biopsy sample), and
exogenous cellular conditions. ([141] page 607)
They are able to obtain all this information because they are using results from
microarray experiments. Traditionally, these experiments are well documented, with
adopted guidelines6 defining the minimum provenance information to be captured and
associated with the experiment’s publication in both journals and online data sources,
e.g. ArrayExpress.
This work considers in situ hybridisation (ISH) experimental results. There is a
standard7 for documenting this class of experiment too - disappointingly, the research
community does not strictly adhere to it. Consequently, far less provenance infor-
mation is collected in comparison to array-based experiments; examining Figure 3.6
in Section 3.5.1 it is obvious that scant information regarding the experimental tech-
nique and sample is provided. Therefore a number of the variables used by Friedman
cannot be applied.
The results of ISH and array-based experiments differ further in one crucial way.
The main variable used by Friedman was the mRNA expression level of a specific gene.
In array-based experiments this is quantified precisely as a number; however, ISH
experiments only provide a vague natural language description such as “moderate”
or the even less descriptive “present”.
With far less data available on which to base a model, it is questionable if the
Bayesian approach adopted by Friedman et. al. would be applicable to the current
use case.
Another relevant work is that of Jeffreys et. al. [9]. Jeffreys et. al. suggest that
there are two tasks in the use case they are considering: analysing the results of a
protein structure prediction tool. Firstly, something must generate the predictions;
secondly, the predictions are analysed by a human expert to provide a final decision
on their validity. Their work is aimed squarely at the latter task, in effect replacing
the human expert. When comparing Bayesian nets to argumentation for this task the
authors remark:
6www.mged.org/minseqe/
7http://scgap.systemsbiology.net/standards/misfishie/
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Our aim is to model the reasoning process of the researcher who uses the
tool and evaluates its output. Whilst human reasoning of this kind accom-
modates a degree of uncertainty, it does not use a complex probabilistic
model. Bayesian nets and argumentation frameworks are thus not direct
competitors. Argumentation theories have been developed as an approach
to reasoning about uncertainty where even rough estimates of probabilities
are not available or meaningful. ([9] page 932)
Parallels can be drawn betweens Jeffreys et. al. [9] and the current work. Although
the data sources, information, and tasks are different, in both cases the idea is to
replace, or enhance, analysis performed by a human expert. Consequently, the reasons
why Bayesian nets are not appropriate in Jeffreys et. al. [9] renders them, and other
probability-based decision making techniques, redundant for this work.
Explanation systems
Closely related to the notion of making a decision, is the idea of explaining that
decision to the user. As an example consider the work of Williams and Williamson
[81] in which argumentation is used to generate explanations for decisions made with
Bayesian nets.
Irandoust summarises the main purposes of explanations:
. . . one could say that explanations can be used to: (i) assure the user
(or ultimately convince her) that the systems reasoning is logical and
its conclusions sound, relevant and useful; (ii) provide visibility into the
systems states, actions and intentions and guide the user in performing her
problem-solving tasks (iii) teach or give the user the possibility to learn by
exposing the systems domain knowledge and reasoning techniques. ([142])
Many argumentation scholars, such as Walton [143], believe that the domain of
argumentation can help AI understand and better implement explanation-aware sys-
tems. The two concepts are remarkably similar, with Walton providing the following
distinction:
... the purpose of an argument is to give a reason to support a claim made
by one party in a dialogue. The claim is something that is doubted by the
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respondent in the dialogue. It is a proposition that is at issue or unsettled.
An argument is supposed to present a good reason for the respondent to
come to accept this proposition as true, thus removing the doubt. The
purpose of an explanation is to help the questioner who doesn’t understand
something. ([14] page 76)
Research in argumentation and explanation has overlapped for a considerable pe-
riod of time - in 1992 Wick [144] noted that explanation research had taken the
Toulmin scheme for their own:
It is interesting to reflect on how research in expert system explanation
has, without stated intent, evolved to consider each piece of knowledge in
an expert system as a single Toulmin structure. (page 167)
The high level of similarity means that argumentation structures and techniques
are used often for generating explanations:
. . . a number of works have advocated use of argument structures as a basis
for knowledge representation [145]; and in particular characterisation of
computer generated explanations as arguments, [146, 147, 148]. Indeed Ye
and Johnson [149] describe empirical studies demonstrating that argument
structured explanations are the most effective in terms of bringing about
changes in users attitudes toward rule-based systems. ([150] page 33)
The use of argumentation in explanation-aware systems is particularly beneficial when
the user is sceptical of the advice given by the system and requires some persuasion:
an example being the medical systems that try to explain why it makes sense to adopt
a healthier lifestyle, e.g. [11, 108].
In summary, argumentation and explanation frequently use the same technology.
This is possible because the two concepts are extremely similar, the difference be-
ing contextual - arguments seek to persuade whereas explanations aim to elucidate.
Consequently it seems that if an explanation is necessary, one of the best ways of
providing it is to exploit argumentation.
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4.5.3 Motivation for argumentation
The current use case requires the ability to reason with inconsistent and incomplete
information. Inferences drawn from this information are controversial, and need to be
revised as new information becomes available. In essence, a presumptive, plausible,
and defeasible form of reasoning is required. Non-monotonic reasoning solutions are
designed for such a situation. As Section 2.2 reports, argumentation is one of a number
of ways of performing non-monotonic reasoning. Dung highlights the similarities of
these different forms:
. . . many of the major approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning in AI and
logic programming are different forms of argumentation. ([31] page 4)
One of the main rationales for choosing argumentation over other styles of rea-
soning is the intuitiveness of the basic concept. Although the theory behind argu-
mentation may be complex and rely on logic, the basic concept is an everyday human
practice. Everyone can understand the idea of people debating a topic, and it is not
difficult for them to imagine a computer doing the same. This simplicity confers an
advantage over many other forms of reasoning, as it allows the system to be explained
quickly and effectively to everyone, regardless of their background.
A further justification for this exploration of argumentation in biology, is the pop-
ularity of the practice within the medical informatics community. Inherently the two
domains are similar - biology provides much of the scientific basis of modern medicine.
Thus if argumentation can be used in medicine (see Section 2.6.2 for evidence of this)
then it must be useful for biology too? The answer, of course, is ‘perhaps’. There
is no doubt the two domains are interrelated; however, they are clearly different - a
degree in medicine does not qualify a person as a biologist and vice versa. Therefore
it may be that this difference effects the applicability of argumentation.
Finally Occam’s razor8 contributes a reason to employ argumentation - this is the
idea that simplicity is good. It is possible to use one technology to make an inference,
then a second to explain that inference, and possibly a third to make a decision based
on the inference. Alternatively, argumentation can be used to fulfil every role.
8www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/occam’s%20razor
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4.6 Remaining issues to be resolved
For argumentation to be applied successfully to biology a number of questions must
be raised and resolved. It is the aim of this work to explore possible answers to
these questions through the development of a solution to the use case issues described
in Sections 4.1 to 4.3. This section will document the questions to be investigated.
The detailed questions are given below, but first a summary is presented using the
following abstract queries:
1. Which form of argumentation is appropriate as a solution to the issues described
in Sections 4.1 to 4.3 - and how effective is it?
2. How should argumentation be presented to a biologist so that (s)he can under-
stand, and utilise it?
3. What insights have been gained from the work, and how does that inform the
future use of argumentation within biology?
The detailed questions are listed and explained in the following text.
The first abstract query asked what form of argumentation is appropriate, and
how effective is it? Yet, it failed to consider the possibility that argumentation may
not be appropriate at all. Might it be the case that simply generating reasons (ar-
guments) for and against each side of a query will be sufficient without the added
debate (argumentation)?
Alternatively, this first abstract query can be interpreted as asking what argu-
mentation actually is? How shall it be implemented in this domain? What form can
the argumentation realistically take? What practical constraints exist? What are the
consequences of these constraints?
A number of implementation related questions may be posed under the banner
of abstract query 1. For example, which architecture appears appropriate for this
situation? In addition, how can this argumentation system be deployed in order that
it is used by a range of biologists?
Abstract query 2 relates both to the presentation of arguments and argumentation.
Traditionally argumentation theory presents arguments using a graphical representa-
tion. Several main forms of graphic presentation are featured commonly in tools
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and publications. Which of these is favoured by the biologists? Furthermore, is the
graphical form actually preferable to a textual depiction? Moreover, how well do the
standard argumentation concepts translate to the biological domain?
The final abstract query considers issues relating to the broader use of argumen-
tation within biology - effectively what has been learned during this work? Assuming
that this process represents the first step towards the widespread deployment of ar-
gumentation in biology, what foundations need to be laid before the common uptake
of argumentation can take place?
Chapters 5 to 8 document the work undertaken to resolve the above questions,
and may contain implicit answers to the above questions; however, explicit answers
will not be provided until the work is analysed in Chapters 9, 10 and 11.
4.7 Summary
This chapter examines the problems of conflicting, incomplete and distributed in-
formation that affects two biological databases EMAGE and GXD. Although these
databases are situated within the field of gene expression for the developmental mouse,
the nature of biology ensures that these issues affect most domains to a degree.
Following on from this, the objectives of this work are stated, before a justification
of the application of argumentation is provided. Finally a number of questions to be
answered by this work are documented.
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Argumentation in biology - a
conceptual consideration
Argumentation is a multifaceted research discipline that can be implemented in a
variety of ways for a diverse range of purposes. Central to all of these approaches is
the idea of an argument being fundamental - as a unit of reasoning, communication
or modelling.
Biology is a productive discipline that generates a large volume of data each year.
Chapter 4 explains why some of this information is inconsistent - furthermore it doc-
uments the reasons behind the incompleteness of resources that republish biological
information online.
This document focuses on a use case in the world of in situ hybridisation gene
expression for the developmental mouse. That domain epitomises the problems of
inconsistency and incompleteness commonly found in biology. In the previous chapter
the objective of this thesis was summarised as:
. . . to improve the understanding of the applicability of computational ar-
gumentation within biology through the study of a particular biological
use case involving in situ gene expression for the developmental mouse.
Whilst tackling the problems faced in the use case, insights into the future
role of computational argumentation in biology shall be sought. (Section
4.4)
Any solution for the use case must align the terminology and practices of the biological
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world with the domain of argumentation. To do so it is necessary to contemplate the
following:
• What is an argument? How are these arguments to be used?
• Where do arguments come from?
• What can be argued over? How can arguments be attacked?
This chapter shall deliberate on the questions posed here. The first section (Section
5.1) reconsiders the problem examining how it stipulates the abstract notion of the
solution by defining what an argument is in this context. This theme is continued
into Section 5.2 where the impression of an argument is explored further alongside
the strategy for the argumentation process. Section 5.3 takes a pragmatic stance,
considering the data available for use in argumentation, and in what manner it may
be applied. Throughout this scrutiny, the notion of conflict is pursued. An example of
argumentation in biology occupies Section 5.4. The theme of the chapter is concluded,
in Section 5.5, with an outline of the solution and the rest of this document, before a
summary of the chapter in Section 5.6.
5.1 What is an argument?
As discussed previously, the notion of an argument has an array of effectuations, but
which are of most relevance in the current situation? To arrive at an appropriate
conclusion it is necessary to dwell on what is being attempted.
Resources (re)publish experimental results - in this case in situ gene expression
results. Commonly users search the resources by the experiment’s conclusion, i.e.
roughly 90% of EMAGE’s users query the resource by asking where a particular gene
is expressed1. Alternatively, via EMAGE’s web interface, a user can ask:
• which genes are (not) expressed in a specific tissue;
• which genes are (not) expressed in an area of the mouse;
• which genes are associated with a GO term, and where are these genes (not)
expressed?
1Figure obtained using Google Analytics in Autumn 2009.
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GXD provides similar functionality, albeit presented differently.
When interrogating either of the use case’s resources the user may come across
inconsistent and/or incomplete data. Such phenomena are at best a time consuming
annoyance and at worst a full stop to the user’s research. By loosely aggregating
the data from the resources some of the incompleteness may be alleviated. Unfortu-
nately, this comes with the disadvantage of highlighting the inconsistencies between
the resources.
With inconsistencies between the resources, and between experiments in the same
resource, it is not enough to aggregate data. There must be some mechanism by
which the inconsistency is tackled too. Magically pulling an answer from a black box
is unlikely to result in a user trusting the solution: indicating a transparent mechanism
is vital.
Manifestly there is a requirement to reason with the biological data, and thus work
around its limitations. Equally clear is the need to communicate this reasoning to the
user. In conclusion the following two notions of an argument seem appropriate:
• a natural language justification;
• an element implemented in a computer program for problem solving (reasoning)
purposes.
The notion of an argument can be further specified by reconsidering the resources
and how they are used. The queries listed previously in this section can be reduced
to two forms:
1. Where is gene G (not) expressed?
2. Which genes are (not) expressed in tissue T in Theiler Stage S?
Accordingly, the argumentation must centre on these questions too. Regardless of
which question is asked, the outline of the answer is the same: G is (not) expressed
in T at S. With this perspective, arguments can be viewed as reasons why G is (not)
expressed in T at S.
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5.2 Where do the arguments come from?
Previously, the current chapter has defined an argument for the context of this work.
This was achieved by considering the broad theme of the thesis, and refining the ideas
within it until only a limited range of argument conclusions were considered:
• Gene G is expressed in tissue T at stage S;
• Gene G is not expressed in tissue T at stage S.
The arguments are obliged to fulfil two roles: one designed with the computer
as the intended audience, and one for the biological end-user. These roles are not
distinct. The ideas communicated to the user must be related to the ideas generated
during the reasoning process. As such, the latter role is a ‘natural’ presentation of
the former, and shall be derived from it - the true origin of the end-user’s arguments
is the genesis of the computer’s arguments.
Arguments utilised by the computer must be constructed from the available infor-
mation, in essence the data available in resources such as EMAGE and GXD - this
shall be analysed in Section 5.3. However, to generate arguments it is necessary to
have raw information and knowledge of the correct way to analyse that information.
Often such knowledge is not documented and instead exists as the intellectual prop-
erty of domain experts. A summary of this discussion is presented in Figure 5.1. The
summary is simplified, as before arguments can be constructed for the argumentation
process, the knowledge must be extracted and modelled in a suitable representation
for the argumentation system.
From this viewpoint, an argument is a defeasible inference because the expert’s
knowledge, and the domain information, are both defeasible. The expert will extend,
and refine his/her knowledge over time affecting the reliability of inferences based
on previous knowledge. Likewise, the domain information will change. Furthermore,
in both cases the possibility of errors cannot be ruled out - creating the hazard of
erroneous arguments.
Conceivably this is not the only instantiation of argumentation that may work.
Rather than using gene expression resources (database and human) exclusively, it
might be possible to generate arguments that consider the expression level of a gene
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Figure 5.1: A high level examination of the solution proposed in this work. Expert
knowledge is combined with biological facts, and wielded to generate arguments.
based on the underlying biological processes, rather than an analysis of the outcome
of those processes. In this circumstance, the biological processes of translation and
transcription would need to be modelled, as would all the subprocesses such as alter-
native splicing2. The sheer complexity of this is overwhelming. It is likely that many
different argumentation processes would need to be undertaken and aggregated into a
debate on whether or not the gene is expressed. For example, one debate may consider
if the DNA sequence was accurate, a second may focus on the transcription process,
a third on the splicing of that RNA and so on. In addition to requiring considerably
more resources, this approach has the same basic flaw as the technique illustrated in
Figure 5.1.
In order to debate any of the biological processes, knowledge of that process and
the method necessary to analyse it is required. Regardless of whether that knowledge
is acquired from a textbook or a direct face-to-face meeting, it emanates from a human
being. Accordingly, there is the question of how reliable that person is. Even if this
person is a world renowned expert, gaps in existing knowledge ensure that no person,
or persons, could generate a perfect model of every biological process. One solution
would be to argue over the reliability of the expert and when their knowledge can
be applied; however, the model of expert reliability might itself be open to question,
and thus subject to an argumentation process. Clearly a line must be drawn beyond
2A single RNA can be translated into several different proteins because of alternative splicing.
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which weaknesses are acknowledged but not rectified.
The approach of arguing about the low level mechanics of gene expression demands
far more work than can be achieved within one project. Accordingly, this work shall
proceed by using expert knowledge of how to evaluate the data in EMAGE and GXD.
5.3 What can be argued over? Experiment versus
annotation
Previously, in Section 5.2, the strategy for the argumentation process was chosen.
The discussion continues by considering the data available for arguing and how it
may be applied in the generation of arguments and counterarguments. The following
terminology, although not widely used in biology, shall be used in this work to aid
clarity:
Experiment The actual research undertaken including the experimental result (an
image for in situ data);
Result The published outcome, i.e. the researcher’s interpretation of the experimen-
tal result;
Annotation The (EMAGE or GXD) editors’ analysis of the experiment, including
their own interpretation of the result - may be textual or spatial;
Verdict The statement that a gene is (not) expressed in a tissue, which is either
stated directly in an annotation or may be derived from an annotation. The
term may be used to refer to the final conclusion drawn by the user.
The relationship between the concepts is documented in Figure 5.2. In an abstract
sense, an experiment is performed and analysed to produce a result. The combination
of the experiment and the result provides the source material for the annotation. That
annotation contains limited provenance information and an analysis of the result. This
analysis will contain one or more conclusions, e.g. gene bmp4 is expressed in the future
brain, and bmp4 is not expressed in the neural fold. This information will lead to a
user inferring a particular verdict, e.g. bmp4 is expressed in the future brain.
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Information on the raw experiment is stored in the journal article (assuming it
was not part of a large screening program), and as such is not available unless the
journal article can be textmined. Consequently, this work will access the experimental
information contained within the annotation, as illustrated in Figure 5.2 through the
use of a double line defining the extent of the system.
Figure 5.2: Illustrating the relationships between the original experiment, the original
(published) result and the notions of annotation and verdict used in this work; green
lines indicate a support or inference relationship with red lines depicting attack.
When viewed informally from an argumentation stance, the experiment and the
result combine to allow the annotation to be generated. Thus if the experiment and
result are trustworthy it increases the likelihood that the annotation is correct. In
a similar vein, the annotation directly supports the inference of the verdict. These
relationships are demonstrated in Figure 5.2 by the use of green lines. Considering the
annotation in more depth: the analysis of the result is supported by the provenance
information. The notion of experimental provenance contains all the data the resource
holds on the experiment including the researcher, the probe, the sample, and the
genuine result (image) produced by the experiment.
Normally the annotation is a subset of the information in the experiment and
result, possibly with a small extension provided by the resource. However, it is possible
that one experiment, when published, refers to a second experiment, in which case
the annotation may be generated from two experiments and results. Occasionally,
when examining the experimental result, the database’s editors decide they disagree
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with the published result. As the experimental result is part of the experiment,
the resulting annotation can still be considered a subset of the information in the
experiment-result pair.
There is a difference between the two relationships: experiment/result to anno-
tation; and, annotation to verdict. The annotation is, in some form, a view (in the
database sense) over the experiment and result. Therefore the experiment is not a rea-
son to believe the annotation as they are, at some level, equivalent; however, reasons
to trust the experiment are automatically reasons to trust the annotation. In contrast,
the annotation does provide a reason to believe the verdict. This occurs because the
verdict is based either on the raw provenance information3 (i.e. the image taken as
the result of the experiment) or on the resources’ analysis of the result. Either way,
the verdict is inferred from the provenance information rather than simply being a
re-publication of raw information.
There is another way of examining this difference in the relationships. Without
an experiment there is no annotation. Yet, a verdict - bmp4 is expressed in the future
brain of stage 12 - can exist, albeit irrational, without an annotation to support it.
However, if the annotation does exist it is possible to use it as a justification of why the
verdict is correct. As such, the latter is the traditional argumentation notion of sup-
port where one entity allows the other to be inferred with some degree of confidence.
A more detailed consideration of the relationship between the experiment/result and
annotation is tangential, as the raw experimental information is not available, and
shall not be pursued.
Figure 5.2 uses red lines to indicate potential lines of attack within the area of the
system4, with a double headed line pointing at the potential for rebuttal and a single
headed arrow indicating an undercut. Immediately, a red line seems to be missing:
the line attacking the support between the annotation and the verdict. This is not
included because such an attack is not viable within the current work.
To attack the support between an annotation and a verdict would imply that
there was something wrong with the notion that “an annotation provides a reason to
believe a verdict”. Here the discussion is not about a particular annotation but the
3Experts often prefer to perform their own results analysis.
4Lines of attack outside the system are ignored.
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principle in general. In biology the basic principle stands and is not deemed open to
negotiation, thus such an attack is not considered here.
Considering the attack relationships in Figure 5.2, the most obvious is the rebuttal
between the annotations. As annotations directly lead to verdicts, it is possible for
the verdicts to contradict one another.
The final line of attack is between the experimental provenance and the result
analysis. Without access to the underlying article (assuming there is one), the ex-
perimental provenance contains all the information that can be used to evaluate the
experiment and the resource’s analysis of that experiment. Clearly this information
has the potential to influence the reader’s confidence in the result analysis. Accord-
ingly, there is both a green line of support and an undercut of that support depicted
in Figure 5.2 between the notions of experimental provenance and result analysis. It
is worth noting that if an annotation is defeated in this manner, and the verdict is no
longer supported, that does not provide a reason to support the opposite verdict.
For instance, if a verdict suggesting that bmp4 is expressed in the future brain, is
defeated by removing the supporting annotation then at most it is possible to say that
it is unknown if bmp4 is expressed in the future brain. In contrast, if the verdict’s
only supporting argument is defeated by a stronger rebutting argument, then with
the currently available knowledge, it is possible to claim that bmp4 is not expressed.
Ultimately, an annotation is deemed to be a reason to support a verdict. The
information contained within the annotation provides the reason to trust that anno-
tation, and thus the verdict it supports. However, it may contain the information
necessary to reject the annotation and its associated verdict too.
5.4 Arguing about in situ gene expression data -
an example
In Chapter 6 the real arguments used in this work shall be discussed. Before that a
straightforward example will illustrate the basic principles of arguing over the current
use case - this will be a simplification of the real process.
During this example a PROLOG-like logic will be assumed - PROLOG [151] is a
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logic programming language often used for academic purposes. It has a simple proto-
col in which uppercase letters indicate variables, and lowercase letters are constants.
Thus the constant bmp4 may be stored in the variable Gene.
emageExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb) indicates that EMAGE has an experiment sug-
gesting the gene bmp4 is expressed in the tissue called hindlimb. Inferences are gen-
erated through rules such as expressed(Gene, Tissue) <- emageExpressed(Gene, Tissue)
which can be interpreted as saying that when EMAGE believes a gene is expressed in
a tissue, then that is a reason to believe that the gene is expressed in the tissue.
Switching to using the letters G and T for genes and tissues respectively makes
the first rule:
expressed(G, T) <- emageExpressed(G, T).
Thus, EMAGE can say the gene is not expressed by contradicting the first conclusion:
∼expressed(G, T) <- emageNotExpressed(G, T).
The same is true for GXD:
expressed(G,T) <- gxdExpressed(G, T).
∼expressed(G, T) <- gxdNotExpressed(G, T).
Appropriate facts may include that EMAGE believes the gene bmp4 is expressed in
a tissue called hindlimb, whereas GXD disagrees:
emageExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb).
gxdNotExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb).
If the query ‘is expressed(bmp4, hindlimb) true?’ is posed, the following arguments will
be produced:
expressed(bmp4, hindlimb)
emageExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb).
expressed(G, T) <- emageExpressed(G, T).
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and
∼expressed(bmp4, hindlimb)
gxdNotExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb).
∼expressed(G, T) <- gxdNotExpressed(G, T).
Ultimately there are two arguments, with rebutting conclusions. There is currently
no mechanism to resolve this conflict. At this point it is not possible to state whether
or not bmp4 is expressed in the hindlimb.
5.4.1 Resolving the conflict
Currently emageExpressed seems to magically appear. Instead imagine it is derived
from information in the EMAGE database. Perhaps the information that a gene is
expressed in a tissue is encoded as:
emageTextualAnnotation(G, T, expressed).
Likewise, the information that the gene is not expressed:
emageTextualAnnotation(G, T, absent).
In the case of EMAGE, there are also spatial annotations:
spatialAnnotation(G, T, expressed).
spatialAnnotation(G, T, absent).
emageExpressed may be derived via the following inferences:
emageExpressed(G, T) <- emageTextualAnnotation(G, T, expressed).
emageExpressed(G, T) <- spatialAnnotation(G, T, expressed).
Correspondingly emageNotExpressed:
emageNotExpressed(G, T) <- emageTextualAnnotation(G, T, absent).
emageNotExpressed(G, T) <- spatialAnnotation(G, T, absent).
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Similar rules can be created for GXD; however, it does not have spatial annotations:
gxdExpressed(G, T) <- gxdTextualAnnotation(G, T, expressed).
gxdNotExpressed(G, T) <- gxdTextualAnnotation(G, T, absent).
Most people prefer textual annotations to spatial annotations because spatial an-
notations are derived using complex image processing techniques whereas textual
annotations are raw expert opinion. Accordingly, most users will favour rules featur-
ing textual annotations over rules utilising spatial annotations. To capture this, a
confidence level is assigned to each rule. Rules with textual annotations will have a
confidence level of STRONG whereas rules with spatial annotations will be assigned
a lesser degree of confidence: MODERATE.
When inspecting the resources EMAGE suggests the gene is expressed and GXD
has the opposite view:
spatialAnnotation(bmp4, hindlimb, expressed).
gxdTextualAnnotation(bmp4, hindlimb, absent).
Proposing the same query as before, one MODERATE argument is generated:
expressed(bmp4, hindlimb)
emageExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb).
spatialAnnotation(bmp4, hindlimb, expressed).
emageExpressed(G, T) <- spatialAnnotation(G, T, expressed).
expressed(G, T) <- emageExpressed(G, T).
and one STRONG argument is produced:
∼expressed(bmp4, hindlimb)
gxdNotExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb).
gxdTextualAnnotation(bmp4, hindlimb, absent).
gxdNotExpressed(G, T) <- gxdTextualAnnotation(G, T, absent).
∼expressed(G, T) <- gxdNotExpressed(G, T).
As STRONG implies more confidence than MODERATE, the second argument
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wins the debate. On the basis of the currently available information and knowledge,
bmp4 is not expressed in the hindlimb.
Whilst manifestly simplified this example illustrates many of the key concepts in
computational argumentation. Biological information is represented as facts, expert
knowledge as inference rules. Arguments can be chained by using the conclusion
of one argument as a premise in a second. The final arguments rebut one another.
Arguments can have an associated strength, or preference ordering, and this can be
used to resolve conflict.
However, such argumentation is of little use to biologists, for them natural lan-
guage is required. In which case the final argument might read:
Evidence in GXD suggests bmp4 is not expressed in the hindlimb: a textual annotation
suggests the gene is absent from the tissue. CONFIDENCE=STRONG.
Regardless of which presentation is chosen, the real argumentation would have
more arguments and associated conflict due to a richer knowledge model and an
increased supply of information.
5.5 Argumentation in biology: a solution
To draw this chapter to a close, the current section will bring together some of the
themes discussed previously to illuminate the solution proposed and give prominence
to issues that require further consideration - this takes place in the second half of this
section. The first half contains an explanation of why an existing solution from the
more active argumentation use cases of medicine and law cannot be simply ‘dropped’
into place.
5.5.1 Distinguishing biology from medicine and law
Chapter 2 recounts applications of argumentation, in particular, within the fields
of medicine and law. It is important to demonstrate that there are clear differences
between biology and the other domains, which ensure a resolution for biology is unlike
the solutions provided for the other domains.
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Law, the field in which most AI-based research into argumentation has occurred, is
plainly removed from biology. As Section 2.6.1 describes, the study of argumentation
in law centres on the dialogues between lawyers and judges in a courtroom. A critical
aspect of these dialogues is their formal and prescriptive nature.
In contrast, direct communication between biologists is neither governed nor re-
stricted. The behaviour, thought processes, and decisions of a biologist are not limited
by parliament and hundreds of years of legislation. Likewise, there is no formal mech-
anism for settling disputes or reaching decisions within the life sciences. Although bi-
ologists may engage in highly structured formal argumentation within journal papers,
neither these papers nor the review process constitutes a debate (see the difference
between monological and dialogical argumentation in Section 2.1.1). Accordingly,
much of the research into AI & law - for example dialogue games modelling aspects
of legal wrangling - is not relevant within the biological world.
Medicine is likewise clearly different from biology. Medicine is a safety critical
domain in which mistakes carry a high penalty. Accordingly, medical researchers
expend considerable effort creating and subsequently adhering to best practice - so-
called clinical guidelines. During treatment, practising medics perform case-based
reasoning to determine the correct course of action for their patients.
Again, none of these aspects is relevant to biology. Biology does not carry a
significant punishment for error, thus reasoning is less robust. Whilst biologists may
create best practise guidelines, MISFISHIE ’s5 lack of adoption highlights that they
often do not follow them. Finally, biologists reason over information to determine
what they can infer from that information, i.e. they reason about what to believe.
In general they do not use case-based reasoning, as there are no cases, and they do
not reason about actions. In contrast, case-based reasoning is the predominant form
of inference within both medicine and law, and reasoning about what to do next is a
common activity for medics.
Whilst the above discussion helps to explain why a solution from law, or medicine,
was simply not transferred into the use case explored in this thesis, other justifications
exist. Firstly, as Vreeswijk [77] and separately, Prakken and Sartor [71] suggest conflict
5http://mged.sourceforge.net/misfishie/ - defines the data that should be collected when
performing an in situ hybrdisation gene expression experiment.
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resolution requires a domain specific solution, it would not be appropriate to ‘borrow’
a solution from another area. Instead it is necessary to understand and implement
the mechanisms already used within the current field. Intuitively, this is sensible as
these techniques are already likely to have been deemed appropriate by the experts
in the subject. Secondly, whilst those fields have considerable research activity, and
some commercial enterprise too, they do not offer publicly available products. For
example, although the logic of argumentation has been applied in a number of tools
within the medical domain, it is only used by the research team that developed it.
At the time of writing, it is not possible to apply a toolkit or solution from either of
these fields.
In contrast to the above protestations, it is perhaps worthwhile to note that the
argumentation toolkit utilised during this work was implemented by a team working
within medical informatics, according to the theory provided by AI & law researchers.
Although the aim was to produce a general purpose toolkit, it could be claimed that
the author’s background inevitably effected the outcome. Accordingly, this thesis
applies both a theoretical understanding, and an insight into best practice obtained
from work in the medical and legal realms.
5.5.2 Outline solution
The forthcoming text switches its focus to the solution implemented in this work, and
discussed in future chapters.
Figure 5.1 presents a high level overview of the work proposed in this project.
It demonstrates that an argumentation system will receive as input biological infor-
mation from resources (EMAGE and GXD) and the knowledge of how to interpret
that information from an expert. A system could then produce biological arguments,
similar to those in Section 5.4. This simplistic view is augmented in Figure 5.3.
It is an argumentation system’s requirement to formalise information and knowl-
edge that is central to Figure 5.3 - the formalism in the diagram is from the example
in Section 5.4. In order to reason, the system must have its input presented in a
particular manner - the exact style will depend on the toolkit used to facilitate the
argumentation. In a similar vein, the system’s “formal” presentation style will be not
suitable for most humans. In summary, there is a need for four translations to occur:
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Figure 5.3: An extended version of Figure 5.1 in which the need for translation
between the resources, expert, argumentation system and end user is highlighted.
1. Convert the expert’s natural language into a formal representation for the ar-
gumentation system;
2. Convert the programmatic representation of EMAGE’s information into the
argumentation system’s formal representation;
3. Convert the programmatic representation of GXD’s information into the argu-
mentation system’s formal representation;
4. Convert the argumentation system’s formal representation of the argument into
natural language for the end user.
The first translation process represents a significant obstacle and shall be the
focus of the next chapter (Chapter 6); however, from Figure 5.3 it should be clear
that Walton’s notion of schemes (see Section 2.4.3) is used as a bridge between the
expert and the computer.
The remaining three renditions will be reserved for Chapter 7, where all imple-
mentation decisions will be analysed. In addition to reporting on the translations,
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this chapter will feature a discussion of the toolkit used in this work, the way it was
employed, and a more general review of the testbed.
An evaluation of argumentation, and the arguments generated by the system will
follow in Chapter 8, with a discussion of the results, and an analysis of this activity,
being reserved until Chapters 9 to 11.
5.6 Summary
The conceptual notions of arguments and argumentation were considered during this
chapter. The cogitation proceeded by re-examining the use case, and continued
through an examination of by which method the argumentation could work, and
where the arguments originate from.
Through these explorations it was discovered that the arguments would conclude
that a gene was either expressed or not expressed in a tissue, and that it must have two
presentations (one for the computer and one for the human end-user). Although there
are two obvious choices of which method to employ to proceed with the argumentation,
both have limitations. The best option is to use expert opinion to analyse the contents
of the EMAGE and GXD databases. Accordingly, the arguments must be initiated
from the contents of those databases, i.e. the annotations.
There is a need to map between the communication forms of the biologists, the
resources, and the argumentation toolkit. These communication gaps shall be con-
sidered in future chapters starting, in the next chapter, with a discussion of how to
use the expert’s biological knowledge in the argumentation process.
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Expert knowledge to inference
rules
A brief outline of the approach taken in this thesis is given in Section 5.5. The
basic idea, documented in Figure 5.3, involves capturing expert knowledge and un-
derstanding of the best ways to interpret and evaluate information in two in situ gene
expression resources for the developmental mouse, EMAGE and GXD. The expert
knowledge shall be applied to the biological information in the argument generation
process. This chapter will discuss the capture of the knowledge, its documentation,
and conversion into inference rules for use in the argumentation process.
Figure 6.1 concentrates on the parts of Figure 5.3 relevant to this discussion. It
demonstrates that the expert wishes to communicate in natural language, but that
the component of the system that uses his knowledge to argue requires its input
to be written more formally in logic. An additional issue to consider, is that the
expert knowledge needs to be verified, and thus read, by the expert. This forces the
knowledge to be documented in natural language. If the system is to receive accurate
expert knowledge that knowledge must be documented in a manner that allows fluent
conversion into the system’s desired format. As Figure 6.1 makes clear, ostensibly the
solution is Walton’s notion of schemes.
This chapter will document the process of knowledge extraction, scheme creation
and translation into inference rules. In the first section (Section 6.1) the notion of
argumentation schemes will be revisited, and an explanation of their suitability for this
work provided. Section 6.2 follows with a description of the process used to capture
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Figure 6.1: Exploration of relationship between expert biologist and the argumenta-
tion system developed in this work - a simplified version of Figure 5.3.
the expert knowledge and convert it into schemes, before the schemes are examined
in Section 6.3. The next section, Section 6.4, chronicles the process of turning the
schemes into inference rules. Finally Section 6.5 summarises this chapter.
6.1 Argumentation schemes
Argumentation schemes are discussed in Section 2.4.3; here a short review will be
conducted before an explanation of their suitability for this work is provided.
It is the modern interpretation of schemes, as provided by Walton [2], that is
utilised here. Schemes are formed from two components. The first is the actual
scheme, which is a natural language inference rule of the modus ponens form. Asso-
ciated with the scheme is a set of questions, which aid analysis (and criticism) of the
scheme’s application, and arguments produced by its employment. One of the most
commonly discussed schemes is Walton’s argument from expert opinion, this version
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is from [2]:
Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A
E asserts that proposition A (in domain S) is true (false)
Plausibly A may be taken to be true (false).
1. How credible is E as an expert source?
2. Is E expert in the field that A is in?
3. What did E assert that implies A?
4. Is E personally reliable as a source?
5. Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
6. Is E’s assertion based on evidence?
Although there is a close link between these schemes and natural language argu-
mentation, it is their secondary purpose of argument generation that is of interest. A
scheme can be converted into a range of formal logic rules, for use in an argumentation
system, by applying the method documented by Verheij [62] and discussed in Section
2.4.3.
Initially it was hoped that the above argument from expert opinion could be
specialised to create a range of schemes similar to the following1:
EMAGE contains an experiment suggesting that X is expressed in Y
with confidence score Z.
EMAGE is a leading biological resource in this field.
Therefore we may be“Z-confident” that X is expressed in Y
Where Z represents the result of a mechanism to quantify the quality of an ex-
periment. The exceptions and attacks on this scheme may be captured in a range of
questions for example:
1. Does EMAGE truly believe that X is expressed in Y ?
2. Does EMAGE really have Z confidence in this statement?
3. Is EMAGE genuinely a leading resource in the current field?
1Developed during a brief email exchange with Floriana Grasso.
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4. What evidence does EMAGE have that X is not expressed in Y ?
5. What relevant evidence does GXD contain?
Although this scheme is too simplistic, it was hoped that a range of specialised
schemes, similar to this, could be developed to cover both EMAGE and GXD.
As the argumentation toolkit applied in this work (see Chapter 7 for details) re-
solves conflict using the strength of the arguments, calculated from the degrees of
belief assigned to the component parts, it is necessary to capture these too. Ideally,
there would be some form of agreed confidence measure for the biological data. How-
ever, this is not the case. It is impossible to know how accurate the data in EMAGE
and GXD is. Accordingly, the degrees of belief must be associated with the rules.
This requires the expert to assign a level of confidence to each scheme he creates.
6.2 Scheme creation process
The knowledge extraction took place over a series of informal meetings with the
expert, Dr. Jeff Christiansen, who at the time held the role of EMAGE senior editor.
These meetings had four goals:
• Understand the expert’s reasoning process for analysing the data;
• Create and verify schemes documenting the expert’s reasoning process;
• Assign degrees of belief to the schemes;
• Determine the best presentation of arguments.
The final goal does not relate to the work on schemes, and accordingly will be
discussed in Chapters 8 and 9.
Before the first meeting took place, it was decided to minimise the technical details
the expert was exposed to. To this end, he understood that there was a desire to create
a range of rules that documented his reasoning processes, and a set of questions for
each rule that suggested how someone could test the application of the rule. The
theory of schemes was never discussed with the expert; however, he was given a
rudimentary introduction to the idea of argumentation and the proposed system.
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During the meetings the expert was asked to provide the link between the database
facts and the inferred conclusion; the inference rule required by the argumentation
toolkit. Following the meeting(s), the rest of the scheme was constructed from these
rules by the analyst. Frequently the expert would discuss how to check the rules,
and this knowledge was recorded as critical questions. If necessary, the expert was
prompted for such knowledge. The final completed scheme, and associated questions,
were shown to the expert, during a later meeting, for him to amend.
The planned outline of the meetings was as follows:
Meeting 1 High level discussion introducing gene expression concepts, and exploring
the procedure carried out by the expert to review data;
Meeting 2 Concrete examination of expert’s processes, leading to the creation of
schemes. Beginning to consider the degrees of belief by separating schemes into
groups according to importance (actual scheme creation to take place after this
meeting);
Meeting 3 Verification of schemes, and concrete decisions regarding degrees of belief.
Meetings 1 and 2 went according to plan; however, in meeting 3 the expert decided
that the process was not working. He proposed starting afresh, and creating new
schemes by considering real examples of conflict in EMAGE. This led to the following
meeting outline:
Meeting 4 Work through a range of conflicts in EMAGE with the expert suggesting
how they could be resolved;
Meeting 5 Review of the schemes;
Meeting 6 Creation of degrees of belief.
Despite this “re-start” the existing schemes were not removed, unless the expert
explicitly asked for that to happen. After Meeting 4, during a consultation with an
evaluation expert (Dr. Gus Ferguson), it was decided that the biological expert may
continue to amend the schemes indefinitely. Clearly this is impractical as it means the
knowledge is impossible to fix and thus use for argumentation - for a richer discussion
of the implications see Section 11.1.
105
Chapter 6. Expert knowledge to inference rules
To counteract the evolving schemes an artificial deadline was set with the expert
given one last meeting in which he could modify the schemes. During the fifth meeting,
the expert was asked to check the terminology of the schemes, but directly instructed
not to add or remove any. Due to the expert’s other commitments, the task of
assigning degrees of belief to the schemes was restricted to one meeting - number six.
During the discussion with Dr. Ferguson, he suggested that the most appropriate
way of collecting degrees of belief would centre on a card sort [152]. Hence, a series
of cards were prepared each featuring a different scheme (rule only). The card sort
involved the following steps:
1. Sort the cards (schemes) in order of importance2 - several may be grouped
together if they are equally important;
2. Split the cards into three groups based on confidence in them: high, medium,
and low;
3. Sort the cards within their groups, again based on confidence;
4. Define a confidence range for each group, with confidence being measured as a
percentage;
5. Assign each card a percentage value based on the limits for its group.
A percentage was used for the quantification of the strength, as it is a common measure
that is understood by a broad group of people and is easy to normalise for use with
the chosen argumentation system. The expert assigned high values 70% and above,
medium 50% to 69%, and low 0% to 49%.
In the above description of the card sort, the confidence relates to the confidence a
user can have in any argument produced from an application of the scheme. In effect
the strength of the resulting arguments.
Chapter 11 presents a post completion review of the process used to document the
expert knowledge.
2There is an assumption here that importance relates directly to confidence in the logic the scheme
captures.
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6.3 Description of schemes
This section will discuss the features, and issues, of some of the schemes created
during the process described in Section 6.2 - a full listing of the schemes is provided in
Appendix A. A number of insights emerged from the scheme creation work; however,
they are reserved for Chapter 11.
To start the current description, a review of the terminology is provided, and that
is used to fuel a discussion on the focus of the schemes. A study of the common
characteristics of the schemes finishes this section.
6.3.1 Terminology and focus
The terminology, introduced in Chapter 5.3, shall be used both within the schemes
and in the discussion of the schemes:
Experiment The actual research undertaken;
Result The published outcome, i.e. the researcher’s interpretation of the experimen-
tal result;
Annotation The (EMAGE or GXD) editors’ analysis of the experiment, including
their own interpretation of the result - can be textual or spatial;
Verdict The statement that a gene is (not) expressed in a tissue, which is either
stated directly in an annotation or can be derived from an annotation. The
term may also be used to refer to the final conclusion drawn by the user.
6.3.2 Portrait of characteristics
The schemes can be classified into three groups: those concerned with the reliability
of the underlying experiment; schemes focusing on the reliability of the annotations
derived from the experiment; and schemes relating to the anatomy of the mouse.
The first group incorporates a number of subgroups that consider a range of pos-
sible issues relating to the notion of a reliable experiment. This list includes: the
research team; the method used to conduct the experiment; and, the results obtained
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from it. The annotation group likewise has a number of subgroups focusing on spa-
tial3 and textual annotations4 in addition to schemes that are applicable to both. The
final group, anatomical schemes, considers how the location of the result can be used
to infer new knowledge.
The schemes cover a wide range of topics and do so with differing granularity. For
example the following scheme can be considered high level:
Experiment E indicates result R
Experiment E2 indicates result R
Experiment E3 indicates result ¬R
Two experiments indicating the same result, increases the likelihood of the
result being correct
Therefore R is probably correct
1. Are E and E2 performed by the same lab?
2. What do other experiments show?
whereas this scheme is more focused:
The spatial annotation SA for experiment E indicates verdict V
SA is based on spatial mapping SM
SM features N number of voxels
N < 10
Spatial mappings with less than 10 voxels are likely to be errors in the mapping
process
SA is not a good indicator that V is true
Ultimately the latter scheme was withdrawn as the expert felt that he could not
state with any confidence that it was accurate. To do so would require considerable
further research.
3The schemes in this group should apply equally to spatial annotations and textual annotations
derived from spatial annotations.
4This category of schemes does not apply to textual annotations derived from spatial annotations.
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The second scheme is a rare example of a low level scheme. However, it should be
noted that it still does not feature low level biological knowledge such as knowledge of
the processes behind gene expression, e.g. transcription. Instead the schemes contain
practical guidance in evaluating the information in EMAGE and GXD in such a
manner that little biological knowledge is required. The schemes mostly expect that
their reader is familiar with the domain vernacular.
A number of schemes have no critical questions. In the case of the second scheme,
it is because it was removed before the questions were considered. However, other
schemes have no questions because the expert does not think they are necessary, for
instance:
ISH experiment E suggests result R
The user, when examining the image from E, has confidence level C in R
The image is the actual result of the experiment, and so analysing it gives an
accurate result
R is C likely to be true
The expert believes that his peers will be equally as adept at analysing an image as
he is, and so he does not see any requirement to question their judgement.
During the creation process a modest number of tangential schemes were produced.
For example, one scheme has the conclusion “it is very likely that the experiment
used the probe”. This is never integrated into the general topic - how to analyse the
contents of EMAGE/GXD. Nor is the scheme retracted as it is an accurate statement.
Numerous schemes refer to the experimental result, despite the fact that only the
annotation of that result is available. For example:
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ISH Experiment E produced result R
E has low pattern clarity
Experiments with low pattern clarity are very hard to analyse and so their results
are not totally trustworthy
Therefore R is possibly correct
1. What does SAGE show?
2. What does Microarray show?
3. Is the equivalent result true in the previous developmental stage?
4. Is the equivalent result true in the subsequent developmental stage?
In such situations, the intuition behind the scheme can often be applied directly to
the annotation. For example, as the annotation is based on the result, any conclusion
implying the experiment or its result is not entirely trustworthy must mean that the
annotation is not trustworthy. This is captured in:
Annotation A was based on experiment E
E cannot be trusted
If an experiment cannot be trusted, an annotation based on it cannot be trusted
Therefore A cannot be trusted
A further issue is that a number of schemes cite other resources, e.g. :
Experiment E on the mouse produces result R for gene G and tissue T
Experiment E2 on the zebrafish produces result R for the zebrafish equivalents of G
and T
Finding the same result in multiple species provides a very good indication the result
is correct
Therefore R is very likely to be correct
This scheme suggests that finding an equivalent result in another species is a good
reason to trust a result for the mouse. Implementing this would entail the creation of
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a set of schemes to help determine when a mouse gene is equivalent to a gene from
another species. A second set of schemes would be required to identify equivalent
tissues across the species, with a third set vital to analyse the result of the gene
expression experiments in the second species. This is an immense amount of work,
and beyond the knowledge of the current expert. Accordingly, this work was not
undertaken.
With regard to the argument (scheme) strengths, although the expert had a range
of 0 - 100 to choose from, he grouped scores at specific points. An examination
of Appendix A reveals that only 10 strengths were used: 100%, 99%, 85%, 80%,
65%, 55%, 50%, 45%, 15%, and 1%. One contributing factor to this effect was that
occasionally the expert identified families of schemes that, although subtly different,
were based on the same intuition. Such families were assigned the same scores.
6.4 Schemes to rules
In order for the expert knowledge to be understood by the argumentation system, it
must be translated into the desired language of the argumentation toolkit employed.
A description of the toolkit used in this project shall be reserved till Chapter 7.
However, in order for the current discussion to take place it is necessary to state that
the chosen toolkit’s input form is a PROLOG-like language similar to that featured
in Section 5.4.
This section will describe the process for converting schemes to inference rules,
which is based on the work of Verheij discussed in Section 2.4.3.
6.4.1 Scheme to rule translation
As shown in Section 5.3 it is possible to argue either about the validity of the anno-
tations or the validity of the verdict. In the case of the former, information about
the quality of the experiment, and its subsequent inspection to form both the result
and result analysis, can be used to support or attack the quality of the annotation.
Ultimately, the verdict is based on the annotation, and thus arguments about it are
directly transferable to the verdict. Consequently, there is little pragmatic difference
between arguing about the verdict or the annotation.
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Biologists use resources, such as EMAGE, to answer specific questions such as:
where is bmp4 expressed? A debate on whether one annotation is accurate is in-
teresting. Yet, if a further five annotations exist and are known to be valid, and in
support of the same verdict, the first annotation becomes almost irrelevant. To illus-
trate, consider the situation if the first annotation supports the other five. In this case
nothing has changed as confidence in that verdict was already high. Alternatively,
if the first annotation disagrees with the other five then it is unlikely to be correct,
as the five are known to be valid. In conclusion, an evaluation of the validity of a
single annotation must include a consideration of all other related annotations. Thus
arguing about an annotation is interesting in the context of the verdict.
In this work, the conflict between annotations will be ignored until it is propagated
to the verdict level.
This section will discuss the actual mechanism employed to convert the schemes
into rules. The first step is to classify the rules according to an abstraction. The
following categories are employed:
• reasons to trust the experiment;
• reasons to doubt the experiment;
• reasons to trust the spatial annotation;
• reasons to doubt the spatial annotation;
• reasons to trust the textual annotation;
• reasons to doubt the textual annotation;
• anatomical inferences.
Reasons to doubt/trust the experiment are themselves reasons to doubt/trust the
spatial and textual annotations derived from the experiment (depicted in Figure 6.2).
Following on from this, reasons to trust an annotation become reasons to trust the
verdict it supports, similarly reasons to doubt the annotation are reasons to doubt
the verdict. This provides the overall pattern for the rules indicating how a reason
to trust an experiment can eventually become a reason to support a verdict. Yet this
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does not state the procedure used to convert natural language statements into the
required logical statements - this is considered next.
Figure 6.2: Hierarchy of reasons to trust within an argument; there is a similar graph
describing reasons to doubt.
Process
To illustrate the actual process for translating the schemes, consider the following
scheme:
Spatial annotation SA suggests verdict V
Spatial annotations are a reasonable indication of expression
Therefore it is likely that V is true
1. Is SA reliable (correct)?
2. What do the textual annotations show?
3. How good is the morphological match?
4. How high is the pattern clarity?
It is a straightforward scheme that captures an intuitive idea: spatial annotations
provide a reason to believe a particular verdict.
Conversion to a logical inference rule is a manual process, which requires the
operative to have both a knowledge of schemes and logic. As the expert does not
possess the latter, transformation was performed by the analyst.
Using the same grammar as Section 5.4: a spatial annotation (sa) indicates that a
particular experiment (E) suggests a gene (G) is (not) expressed in a certain percentage
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(P) of a tissue (T). L represents the precise level of expression. Accordingly, a spatial
annotation can be presented as:
sa(E, G, T, L, P).
A verdict (verdict) states that a gene and tissue are associated through a level of
expression:
verdict(G, T, L).
Whether or not ‘spatial annotations are a reasonable indication of expression’ is a
decision for the user. Yet, it may be assumed, in general, users agree with this state-
ment, otherwise there would be no reason for spatial annotations to exist. Likewise, as
the aforementioned annotations are EMAGE’s raison d’eˆtre, if they were not widely
received it is questionable if EMAGE would exist. As such, the statement is accepted
without further investigation or consideration. The reduced scheme now states that
a verdict supported by a spatial annotation is likely to be true:
verdict(G, T, L) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P).
This representation is identical to one of the formats accepted by the argumentation
toolkit used in Chapter 7. To include the toolkit’s required expert assigned strength
(65%), the following is used:
verdict(G, T, L) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P) 0.65.
Converting the natural language rule element of the scheme into a formal logic in-
ference rule is somewhat intuitive. Transforming the critical questions is less obvious.
Here the work of Verheij [62] is applied. He recounts four classes of critical questions
and advises how each class may be implemented - see Section 2.4.3.
The critical questions relating to the current scheme all propose possible ap-
proaches for attacking an argument derived from the scheme. The classification of
critical questions according to Verheij’s categories is subjective. Therefore, these ques-
tions may be implemented by adding extra conditions to the inference rule, creating
an undercutter or through the development of other rules that rebut the above infer-
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ence rule. In this case, the questions all refer to existing schemes, and thus the final
means is adopted.
The full list of rules can be found in Appendix B.
6.4.2 Limitations and considerations
A number of limitations and exceptions apply to the discussion about schemes and
their translation into rules. These issues shall be highlighted and discussed here.
Further analysis will be reserved until Chapter 11.
The first restriction is that not all of the captured schemes were implemented.
Several were removed by the expert. Others were omitted because they required an
appropriate new resource, and thus a new set of schemes, for which there was no
allocated time.
Also discounted were schemes that required the user to analyse the experimental
images. A real world system may allow the user to view these and record an opinion
of them; however, only experts could do so. For the system’s evaluation only two
experts could be guaranteed to be available, and there was no desire to intimidate the
other evaluation subjects5 by highlighting how little they knew of the domain.
A number of practical implementation decisions had to be taken when making the
rules. For example, one scheme states that when EMAGE and GXD have different
textual annotations (one says the gene is expressed, the other not expressed) for
the same experiment that is a reason to doubt both annotations. Although clear
in meaning, this scheme does not state which method to use to decide when two
experiments are the same. Nor does any other scheme. In this instance, the decision
was made by comparing the citation information for experiments.
The final limitation is that it is possible to have, depending on the experimental
data, a situation in which the reasons to trust an annotation are of equal strength to
the reasons to doubt it. This occurs partly because of the design of the rules, and
partly because of the expert assigned strengths. In this situation the outcome will
depend on the semantics employed in the engine - preferred credulous or grounded.
The preferred credulous semantics (see Section 2.4.6) resolves disagreement by plac-
5The other subjects are a mixture of Heriot-Watt University students and EMAP employees that
have expertise in other areas. See Chapter 8 for more information.
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ing conflicting arguments in different, equally valid, extensions. Resultantly, both
arguments (trust and doubt) are justified. The grounded semantics (Section 2.4.6)
builds only one extension, and is therefore sceptical in nature: neither argument will
be accepted.
6.5 Summary
This chapter focuses on the biological knowledge necessary to interpret the data con-
tained in the databases featured in the use case. It documents the process by which
this knowledge was obtained, and discusses the mechanism for recording it.
That mechanism is Walton’s schemes - a full list of the schemes generated in
this work is provided in Appendix A. Some of the schemes, and their features are
highlighted in this chapter before a discussion of the procedure for turning them into
the inference rules required by the argumentation toolkit is conducted. The chapter
is rounded off with a consideration of the disparities between the inference rules and
the original schemes.
The quality and relevance of the schemes shall be considered during the evaluation
in Chapter 8. Both the quality of the schemes, and the translation process shall be
considered further in Chapter 11.
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This chapter investigates the development of two prototype systems designed to tackle
the issues of inconsistent and incomplete information discussed in Chapter 4.
The opening section (Section 7.1) examines the outline requirements for a system,
before the initial implementation decisions that shaped the prototypes are reviewed
in Section 7.2. Section 7.2 also features an analysis of the argumentation toolkit
employed in this work. Subsequently, Section 7.3 considers the architecture and design
of the prototypes, with the subtle differences between the two prototypes highlighted.
In Section 7.4 a brief discussion of translating information to/from the argumentation
engine continues the discussion started in Chapter 6. Following on, the first and second
prototypes are described in Sections 7.5 and 7.6. The chapter is completed by linking
the second prototype with the evaluation carried out on it - the evaluation being the
focus of Chapter 8.
7.1 Outline requirements
In order to set a realistic context for this work, and thus the requirements capture, the
assumption will be that the tool created should be as close to usable in the real world
as possible. To this end a pseudo situation is proposed in which the goal should be
to produce a working system that could be deployed by one of the existing resources
in the field in order to help their consumers resolve the issues discussed in Chapter 4.
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With this in mind it is necessary to consider in what manner biologists would
access such a resource. The first step is to review in what ways other biological
information is accessed.
Web based publication has supplemented traditional forms, and now large re-
sources such as GXD and EMAGE not only present a range of information to their
users but additionally provide a gateway to more in depth information, such as jour-
nal articles, which are available online through different resources. Although data in
the chosen resources can be accessed via programmatic means, or downloaded in a file
based format, most users still approach the information via the web based interfaces.
In addition to experimental information, biologists commonly utilise web based tools
such as BLAST [153]. As such, members of the biological community are familiar
with the models and requirements of web based interfaces. These points lead to the
conclusion that this work should provide a web based interface.
BLAST is an intriguing tool1. Not because of what it does, but because of the
method it employs. Unlike many resources on the web, BLAST does not attempt to
provide the user with an immediate response to their query. Instead it tells the user
that a response will come, but later. It provides the user with the option of waiting, or
downloading the result in the future. The popularity of this tool proves that biologists
are willing to accept a time delay, if there is no other choice. This is important because
the fetching of data from multiple resources, the subsequent processing of that data,
and finally the argumentation process collectively ensure that the response may not
be instantaneous.
The goal of this work is to evaluate argumentation within a biological context, not
to create the perfect argumentation tool for biology. Doing the latter would require the
argumentation theory to be specialised, then implemented and optimised. Inevitably
this would result in the work being mired down in the lower level details of designing
a theory and framework - choosing which logic to use, deciding on what mechanism
to use to implement the notion of conflict, et cetera. There is no evidence that such
a substantial effort is worthwhile - accordingly this work shall use a pre-existing ar-
gumentation toolkit, rather than develop its own. This is in keeping with the way
in which most resources would adopt argumentation. There is little likelihood of the
1Technically BLAST is an algorithm, which is implemented to provide a tool.
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community being anything other than a consumer of a ready-made software frame-
work. They would deploy a common toolkit that is well documented and supported
by a known organisation, either commercial or open source (e.g. Apache Software
Foundation2).
Furthermore, this thesis will not produce a ‘complete’ or ‘fully-functioning’ tool
that will resolve all the issues discussed in Chapter 4 - doing so is beyond the resources
of such a project. Yet, it is worthwhile to consider briefly what may constitute such
a solution. Originally, this work started with the idea of generating an argumen-
tation tool to assist non-expert biologists, bioinformaticians, and software agents in
determining whether or not a gene is expressed. Such a product should be able to
recommend a result, and provide a justification for doing so. The reasons should be
comprehensible to non-expert humans and should make sense to any expert asked to
verify the result. Although a range of prototypes has been developed, as the sub-
sequent chapters make clear, this line of work requires further research. Argudas,
Chapter 12, presents a different view of a ‘complete system’, because it caters ex-
clusively for experts. Essentially, the foundation of these two systems is the same;
however, the argumentation performed and the visualisation of that argumentation is
different. Further unification may be possible as the technology develops.
Detailed requirements for the actual tool were produced in collaboration with the
expert biologist in a process that was aligned to the scheme creation task. Require-
ments were discussed with him, and evolved through the development of the first
prototype (Section 7.5), on which the expert provided comment.
7.2 Test bed
This section examines the actual resources and tools used within these prototypes;
more details are presented in Section 7.3 where the architecture is discussed.
The prototypes are built upon the data provided by two online resources, EMAGE
and GXD. A description of these resources is provided in Chapter 3. Section 7.2.1
discusses why these two resources were selected in preference to the various alternative
services that are available.
2www.apache.org
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Furthermore, Section 7.2.1 relates the reasons for selecting the biological expert.
He was a crucial part of the prototype implementation, as he provided both the expert
knowledge necessary to create arguments, and guidance for the development of the
system, in particular the user interface.
The final main component of the system is the argumentation toolkit. The fol-
lowing section, Section 7.2.1, declares and justifies the selection of a particular toolkit
before Section 7.2.2 describes and evaluates the chosen toolkit.
The argumentation toolkit is implemented in JAVA, thus it made sense to continue
with its use for the development of the web application. JAVA is augmented with
HTML and, in the second prototype, JAVASCRIPT. The web applications are served
by an Apache Tomcat3 installation. Details of the two prototypes developed during
this work will follow in Sections 7.5 and 7.6.
7.2.1 Initial decisions
Decisions made before the implementation began had major implications for the work
undertaken. The main decisions will be recounted and championed here.
EMAGE and GXD
As illustrated in Section 3.5, there is a wide range of resources publishing the re-
sults of gene expression data for the developmental mouse. Furthermore, Chapter
4 advises that it is necessary to use many resources to reduce the level of incom-
plete information. Despite this, only two resources are featured: EMAGE and GXD.
Furthermore, irrespective of these resources containing many different types of gene
expression experiment, only one (in situ hybridisation) is used.
There is no doubt that this is a limitation that restricts the range and number of
arguments that can be produced. Crucially though, this limitation does not affect the
validity of the arguments that are generated. However, prompting from the expert,
see Section 7.5.2 for details, ensured that a third resource was added to the second
prototype.
The overarching goal of this work is to investigate argumentation, not produce
3http://tomcat.apache.org/
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a comprehensive, fully supported, system. The prototypes being no more than a
mechanism through which argumentation in biology can be explored. As such, the
prototypes need to have enough functionality to allow a user’s reaction to arguments
and argumentation to be tested. There is no requirement for a complete system,
despite the obvious desirability of one.
In addition, the full inclusion of other resources requires fresh expert knowledge
and thus new experts. In situ hybridisation for the developmental mouse was selected
as the domain for the use case not only because it illustrates the problem well, but
additionally because locally based experts are readily available. The same cannot be
said for other experimental types.
As the expert worked for EMAGE, the EMAGE database was used as a data
source. EMAGE has a close relationship with GXD, and thus it is used as the second
resource. Moreover, the author already had a number of years of experience using
these resources as a client. There is no reason why competing resources could not have
been used instead; however, in this case, the chosen resources are more amenable.
Selecting EMAGE opens up the idea of spatial annotations, as many resources do
not provide these. However, this results in another decision point as discussed next.
Textual annotations derived from spatial annotations
EMAGE’s spatial annotations are the result of someone (most likely an EMAGE
editor) mapping the experimental result (image) onto the appropriate EMAGE 3D
model. Such annotations are commonly displayed to the user as a 2D image with
particular colours indicating the different levels of expression.
Although the three EMAGE editors could interpret these images, the remaining
likely evaluation participants would not be able to do so due to a lack of expertise. As
these images are a human interpretation of the experimental result (image) an expert
would prefer to see, and analyse for himself/herself, the real experimental result.
Accordingly, there seems to be no tangible benefit to using the spatial annotation
images, hence they are never employed.
The obvious alternative is to try to use the spatial annotations automatically. No
software is publicly available to enable interpretation of the spatial annotation images.
However, EMAGE developed an experimental technique to automatically analyse the
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spatial annotations and turn them back into textual annotations (so-called Textual
annotations derived from spatial annotations). This process was used for a limited
time because it required an enormous amount of effort to upgrade the 3D models
to make it work correctly. The outcome was that only a small number of these
annotations exist.
For the sake of clarity textual annotations derived from spatial annotations will
be labelled as spatial annotations, and the schemes for spatial annotations will be
applied. The latter decision, to apply the spatial annotation schemes, is in keeping
with the views of the expert.
Argumentation engine
As Chapter 2 demonstrates, many different types of argumentation software exist.
However, this work requires a tool that generates and evaluates arguments. The pro-
totype is intended to be a web-based application. For this reason the argumentation
toolkit must be a robust tool that can be integrated readily into applications.
At the onset of this work few tools that met these requirements were available.
Many different theories for argumentation have been proposed, but few have a resilient
implementation that can be integrated freely into another application. For example,
Gordon [101] produced an implementation of his theory for The Pleadings Game, but
it is not available publicly. Oscar is an implementation from Pollock [53] which is
available for download. It is a complex set of LISP code designed to test the academic
theories of its creator, and thus is not designed for third party use. OSCAR is not
supported, thus the technical issues encountered when attempting to use it could not
be resolved. The original argumentation engine concept and theory was produced by
Dung [31], but it did not include an implementation.
The lack of a generally usable argumentation toolkit prompted the creation of the
EU funded Argumentation Services Platform with Integrated Components (ASPIC)
project. ASPIC summarise the state of available argumentation toolkits before their
project as follows [154]:
Existing implementations seem more or less simple proof of concept sys-
tems. None are robust enough to be standard, reusable and portable for
deployment in applications. (page 5)
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The outcome of the ASPIC project was the one tool that was readily available,
easily integrated into a web development, free to use, and (at that time) actively
developed. Hence it is the tool selected for use in this project. A thorough discussion
of this toolkit can be found subsequently in Section 7.2.2.
7.2.2 ASPIC argumentation toolkit
Argumentation Services Platform with Integrated Components (ASPIC) was an EU
FP6 project which brought together theorists and those interested in the practical
application of argumentation in medicine and law. Fox et. al. [155] describe the goals
of the project as follows:
ASPIC is an EU funded research project (www.argumentation.org) whose
goals are to develop a theoretical consensus for four roles of argument (in
inference, decision-making, dialogue and learning) and validate it within
the context of a general software agent.
Disappointingly, the project’s web presence (www.argumentation.org) is no longer
active4. It contained a simpler description of the project using a two item list. The
second item in the list5 read as follows:
To develop efficient proof procedures and software component implemen-
tations of these models for deployment in real-world applications.
From these similar quotes it should be clear that the project focused on the creation,
and implementation, of a theory for argumentation in four aspects of AI: argument
inference; dialogue; decision making; and machine learning.
The inference component, called the argumentation engine, is an instantiation of
Dung’s theory. Originally it is described by Caminada and Amgoud [156]; though, full
details are reserved for an ASPIC project deliverable [157]. This component creates
arguments, and determines if they are justified according to Dung’s semantics. The
engine is written in JAVA, and designed to be used by the other three tools.
4A far smaller site exists at http://aspic.acl.icnet.uk
5Formerly available at www.argumentation.org/goals.html. A screen capture of this page can
be seen in Appendix C.
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The decision making component, takes a list of justified arguments provided by the
engine, and then applies decision making criteria. The result is a preferred decision
option. The dialogue tool deals with conflict resolution dialogues (one subclass of
persuasion dialogue), and again uses the argumentation engine to find appropriate
arguments that can be used by a player in the dialogue. Arguments are used to
restrict the search-space when performing machine learning. As the engine is relied
upon by the other three areas of activity, it is the most developed.
The effectiveness of these tools is illustrated by the project’s demonstration appli-
cations, which include deciding on the suitability of organs for transplant [120].
ASPIC argumentation engine
The ASPIC argumentation engine is designed to create and evaluate arguments. It
does this using facts and rules supplied by the user. Argument creation is a process
of abduction, in which backward chaining is used to build an argument starting from
the conclusion and working backwards, through facts and rules, until every premise
of every rule is instantiated with a fact. Considering the facts and rules presented
in Figure 7.1, the argument P1 (from Figure 7.3) is built by following the process
outlined in Figure 7.26.
The strength of an individual argument is assessed using either the weakest link
or last link approach (Section 2.4.5). The strength, to which the weakest/last link
algorithm is applied, comes from the user’s assignment of a number to the facts and/or
rules. This number, called the degree of belief, is a real number between 0 and 1 -
with 0 implying definitely false, and 1 definitely true. In Figure 7.1 only the rules r1
to r5 have an assignment. The other rules, and all facts, take the default value of 1.
Arguments can be evaluated as defeated (false), undefeated (true) or unknown (no
status assigned) using either Dung’s grounded semantics (Section 2.4.6) or a credulous
version of Dung’s preferred semantics (Section 2.4.6).
6Figure 7.2 is a cleaned up version of log generated by the ASPIC argumentation engine.
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facts:
a. b. c. d. e.
rules:
[r1] x <- a 0.4.
[r2] x <- b 0.5.
[r3] x <- c 0.7.
[r4] ∼ x <- d 0.6.
[r5] w <- d 0.7.
[r6] y <- x.
[r7] ∼ y <- w.
Figure 7.1: Example rules and facts that may be used with the ASPIC argumentation
engine.
searching for arguments for: y
found rule: [r6] y <- x.
searching for arguments for: x
found rule: [r1] x <- a 0.4.
searching for arguments for: a
found fact: a
Arg1 = a
Arg3 = x 0.4. (from Arg1 and r1)
Arg5 = y 0.4. (from Arg3 and r6)
Figure 7.2: Description of the process undertaken to build an argument for y using
the facts and rules from Figure 7.1.
The process of generating and evaluating arguments is wrapped within a dialogue
game. Two virtual players respond to a query from the user - the query should match
a potential conclusion of an argument7. The first player (ASPIC calls it ‘PRO’) at-
tempts to generate arguments whose conclusion matches the query, and thus supports
it, helping to prove the query can be evaluated as true. The second player (called
7If there is no possibility of an argument with an identical conclusion to the query being con-
structed argumentation is not possible.
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‘OPP’) tries to stop the first - by producing arguments that rebut either the query
or an argument produced by player one. If player two succeeds with an argument,
the first player can attempt to rebut that argument or develop a new argument to
support the query.
At each stage in the dialogue game, an argument is generated and then compared
to the existing arguments. If the new argument is stronger (has a higher degree of be-
lief) than the opposing argument(s), it temporarily defeats the opposing argument(s).
The defeated argument(s) may be reinstated if the attacker is later opposed by an
even stronger argument.
Eventually one of the players will be unable to defeat the arguments of the other
player. This signals the end of the game, at which point the arguments, and any
status assigned to them, may be examined by the user. The programmatic interface
to the engine provides a range of display mechanisms that allow the arguments to be
reproduced both textually and diagrammatically.
Due to the design of the system, the strongest argument always decides which side
wins the debate. If the first player has the strongest argument, the argument with
the highest degree of belief, then it will reinstate many (perhaps most) of the first
player’s arguments. Consequently, the majority of the first player’s arguments will
be true, and the second player’s false. The situation is reversed if the second player
has the strongest argument. If both players use an equally strong argument, then the
choice of semantics decides what happens. Grounded semantics are sceptical, thus
all arguments are defeated. Alternatively, preferred credulous semantics accepts the
arguments as equally valid.
To illustrate8 the above discussion, assume a user provides the ASPIC argumenta-
tion toolkit with the knowledge from Figure 7.1, and then asks ASPIC for arguments
supporting the conclusion y. Initially, PRO develops P1 (see Figure 7.3) as outlined
in Figure 7.2. Immediately, OPP looks for arguments for ∼y and generates O2. O2
is stronger than P1, and thus defeats it. Now PRO attempts to rebut O2 by rebut-
ting ∼y with P2, but P2 is too weak. PRO then develops P3, which has the same
strength as O2. What happens next depends on the semantics chosen for the game.
If preferred credulous PRO succeeds; however, if grounded (sceptical) PRO fails.
8The following examples are simplified in order to improve clarity.
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Assuming PRO succeeds, OPP then looks for ways to defeat P3. OPP tries to
generate new arguments to rebut y, but cannot. OPP then attempts to rebut the sub-
argument for x, in doing so OPP generates the argument O1. Both this argument,
and P3’s sub-argument for x (i.e. P4) have the same strength. With credulous
semantics both arguments are successful, and thus the attack fails. OPP has no other
option for rebutting x, and so attempts to rebut the sub-argument for c. However,
this argument is based on the fact c, which has a degree of belief of 1, and thus cannot
be defeated. OPP is unable to defeat P3, thus P1 is reinstated. Having failed to
rebut the conclusion of P1, OPP will try to attack the sub-arguments of P1; these
attacks follow the same lines as the attacks on P3 and therefore fail in the same ways.
PRO now restarts the process by putting forward the argument P2. Following that
argumentation process, PRO starts another debate with P3. As preferred credulous
semantics are employed P1, P2, P3 and O2 are all undefeated.
With grounded (sceptical) semantics, PRO cannot defeat O2 with P3. PRO has
no more arguments with which to rebut the conclusion (∼y), and so attempts to rebut
the sub-argument for w. PRO cannot build an argument for ∼w, and thus attempts
to rebut O2’s sub-argument for e. PRO is unable to develop an argument for ∼e.
There is nothing else for PRO to attack, accordingly OPP wins. PRO starts a new
line of argumentation by using P2 as the initial argument. In the same way OPP wins
this too. Finally, PRO loses a debate by starting with P3. As grounded semantics
are sceptical in nature, and PRO’s best argument has the same strength as OPP’s
best argument, all the arguments for y and ∼y in Figure 7.3 are defeated.
For more information on the argumentation engine see Appendix D.
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PRO arguments:
P1 - strength is 0.4 because of [r1].
y
[r6] y <- x.
[r1] x <- a.
a.
P2 - strength is 0.5 because of [r2].
y
[r6] y <- x.
[r2] x <- b.
b.
P3 - strength is 0.7 because of [r3].
y
[r6] y <- x.
[r3] x <- c.
c.
P4 - strength is 0.7 because of [r3].
x
[r3] x <- c.
c.
OPP arguments:
O1 - strength is 0.6 because of [r4].
∼x
[r4] ∼x <- d.
d.
O2 - strength is 0.7 because of [r5].
∼y
[r7] ∼y <- w.
[r5] w <- e.
w.
Figure 7.3: Some arguments generated from the knowledge in Figure 7.1.
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Evaluation of ASPIC toolkit
In many ways the ASPIC argumentation toolkit is exactly the type of product desired.
It is designed to be plugged into software architectures, and is written in JAVA.
ASPIC provides the full framework, so there is no need to become lost in lower level
questions such as “how should arguments be represented?” - the toolkit comes with
an implementation.
In other aspects the use of the ASPIC component is less than ideal. It provides two
styles of argument presentation: visual and textual. Visual presentation of arguments
is based on the standard method of displaying an argument as a directed graph.
ASPIC does this by producing output in a format that can be read by other toolkits,
such as DOT 9. ASPIC’s implementers provide a client to their tool that demonstrates
these presentations - none of which is suitable. This is partially because the argument
layouts are often badly displayed with arguments obscuring one another10 (e.g. see
Figure 7.4), and partly because some display graphs are too esoteric (e.g. Figure 7.5).
Textual presentation is little better. A typical example can be seen in Figure 7.6.
In this figure there are three arguments, each starting with the line ‘UNDEFEATED’.
There are three types of output in a typical argument.
The first is a natural language statement, such as “The experiment has an as-
say score of 2”. Such statements are defined by the person programming with the
argumentation engine.
9www.graphviz.org
10It is possible to manually rearrange the boxes to make the content visible.
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Figure 7.4: Screenshot from the ASPIC argumentation engine test interface - some
of the argument graphs do not display clearly.
!
Figure 7.5: Example of a DOT graph produced by the ASPIC argumentation engine.
An example of the second type is “emage expressed(‘Hoxb1’, ‘EMAP:151’)”. This
is the claim of the argument, written in ASPIC’s logical representation. Initially,
this claim had to be displayed in the logical form; however, eventually the ASPIC
developers provided a mechanism to associate a natural language statement with a
claim, which could be presented instead.
The final type of output in Figure 7.6 is similar to “>(3,1)”. This reports the result
of a built-in operation, in this case a numerical comparison in which the operation
asks if the first number is greater than the second. The output is controlled by the
engine’s developers.
The mix of styles is confusing and difficult to read. Regrettably, all the initial
default presentation styles suffered from the same limitation. By the time the ASPIC
developers provided a suitable alternative, discussions with the expert biologist had
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yielded a mechanism for use in this work.
Figure 7.6: Results page of the first prototype.
The fact that the ASPIC argumentation engine provides all five levels of Prakken’s
framework was considered initially to be entirely positive. However, there are unfor-
tunate side-effects. It means that a user is forced to use ASPIC’s chosen logical
language, ASPIC’s notion of argument strength, and ASPIC’s choice of mechanism
for comparing arguments11. The use of a first order formal logic means that the notion
of schemes is required to bridge the communication gap between the engine and the
biological expert. The required argument strength, and lack of a suitable mechanism
to assign a degree of belief to biological facts, necessitates that the expert rules have
to be assigned a confidence value. As the strengths ultimately need to be a number
between 0 and 1 it is a rational option to try and capture it in a similar way. Yet
as reported in Chapters 6 and 8 this was not entirely successful. The availability of
only weakest link and last link approaches for calculating argument strength seems
acceptable as the former is believed to be intuitive and easy to explain to biologists,
11The ASPIC toolkit is provided in a modular form so that a user can program alternatives;
however, the code is not open source which makes this difficult.
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making it a natural choice.
The final concern with ASPIC’s software was that it was still in development with
the first version of the argumentation engine used being 0.4.3, and the final version
0.4.10. As it never reached production quality, there are some minor errors and
questions over the ASPIC toolkit’s efficiency (see Appendix D). Despite the obvious
faults the ASPIC argumentation engine was the most suitable candidate.
7.3 Architecture and design
Two prototype systems were developed, both designed around the same architecture.
This section shall explore that architecture and discuss some of its limitations.
Figure 7.7 presents the architecture of both prototype systems. It is simplified
in the sense that it hides the lower level details and organisation; however, such
information is not currently obligatory.
Figure 7.7: Basic architecture for prototypes.
The system starts and ends with a biologist - not necessarily the same one. The
stick figure, in Figure 7.7, represents both the biological expert and the end user.
Considering the former, his knowledge is captured and converted into inference rules,
via the temporary step of argument schemes. The inference rules are loaded into the
ASPIC toolkit’s knowledge base.
When an end user specifies a gene-tissue pair in which (s)he is interested, via the
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user interface, the system pulls the relevant12 information from EMAGE and GXD,
processes it, and stores it in the knowledge base. A query is sent to the ASPIC
argumentation engine, and the resulting arguments are presented to the end user via
the user interface.
7.3.1 A more detailed examination
From the above description of Figure 7.7 it is clear that the diagram, in order to
aid clarity, is missing several components. Considering the right hand side of the
diagram only - where the user selects a gene-tissue pair of interest - a more thorough
exploration of the components and how they interact is provided in Figure 7.8.
Figure 7.8: Sequence diagram of underlying activities in the prototypes. The various
ASPIC components are grouped under the title ‘ASPIC toolkit’ and the components
related to the GXD database and local cache are missing. Three different mechanisms
for displaying arguments exist; however, these are all represented by the ‘Argument
Writer’.
As the project aims to create a web application the standard Model View Con-
troller model of design is preferred. In Figure 7.8 the View is represented by the User
interface, likewise Controller becomes Control. The remaining elements are part of
the Model, or external resources such as EMAGE.
The flow of information through the system is controlled by the Control object.
It starts by taking the user’s desired gene-tissue selection and arranges for biological
12Defined as all in situ experimental information available for the gene-tissue combination.
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information to be collected from the underlying resources. For brevity’s sake Figure
7.8 only considers EMAGE, but all other data sources will be accessed at this time,
e.g. GXD. Control interacts with a client specific to each resource. It is the job of the
client to extract information from the resource it represents, and then convert that
information into the data model for the project.
Information on which authors conducted the relevant experiments, and in which
journals they were published, is presented to the user. The expectation is that the
user will have a level of trust they associate with each journal and researcher, and
thus the biological information can be treated accordingly. This idea comes from two
schemes provided by the expert, and is viewed as a means by which a degree of belief
may be associated with a small number of facts.
There are a number of subtle differences in the workflows between the two proto-
types (summarised in Table 7.1). The workflow for prototype one was based on the
schemes and understanding held at the time. Subsequently, the expert abandoned
one scheme (it asked the user to evaluate the quality of the experimental results).
Additionally, the expert added a scheme relating to the user’s confidence in the re-
sources (EMAGE and GXD). These changes, in conjunction with the feedback the
expert provided for the first prototype (see Section 7.5.2), resulted in prototype two
having an amended workflow and appearance.
Prototype one asks for the information - about the journals and researchers - dur-
ing the second step; in the first step only the gene-tissue pair is requested. Prototype
two is different: it asks for confidence in the journals and the gene-tissue in the first
step, leaving only questions regarding confidence in the researcher for the second step.
Another difference between the prototypes is that they ask disparate additional
questions. In particular, the second prototype asks for confidence in the resources,
when the first does not. Moreover, the first prototype asks the user to evaluate the
relevant experimental results. This was deemed unnecessary for the second prototype.
The majority of evaluation subjects (see Chapter 8) could not perform this task; hence
there was no worthwhile reason to retain this functionality in the second prototype.
Furthermore, by not adding this question, the prototype becomes less daunting for
non-expert users who made up the bulk of the evaluation subjects.
Once the appropriate biological and trust information has been received by the
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Control object, it asks the Processor to convert the information into the format desired
by the ASPIC argumentation engine - creating the so-called facts. The facts are sent
to the ASPIC knowledge base (represented in Figure 7.8 by ASPIC toolkit) via the
ASPIC client. This client is a collection of helper methods, specific to this work, to
make using the toolkit easier.
Control loads the expert knowledge into the knowledge base, and then sends the
query to ASPIC toolkit via its client. The ASPIC argumentation engine, tries to prove
the query by conducting an argumentation game. Arguments generated during the
game are sent to the ASPIC client, which converts them into a human readable form
by using the Argument Writer before sending the arguments back through Control
to the user.
Three different display forms were experimented with during this work - all three
are represented by the abstract notion of the Argument Writer.
The components represented by ASPIC toolkit were the work of the ASPIC project.
Similarly, the EMAGE database was the work of EMAP. The EMAP and ASPIC
clients, in addition to all other components in Figure 7.8, are part of the prototype
exercise.
Step Prototype 1 Prototype 2
1 Asks for gene and tissue Asks for gene and tissue, and confi-
dence in journals and resources
2 Asks for confidence in researchers,
journals, and the experimental re-
sults
Asks for confidence in researchers
3 Displays output Displays output
Table 7.1: Summary of prototype one and two workflows.
7.3.2 Limitations and considerations
The above architecture presents something of an idealised view. Whilst creating the
real system the following challenges were encountered.
Foremost, the process of accessing the information is not without problems. In
particular, contacting the resources and pulling the information takes time. Addi-
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tionally, the time difference between the east coast of the USA (home of GXD) and
the UK means that GXD’s direct SQL connections may be closed during the UK’s
working day to allow background maintenance processes to run. Such concerns could
be resolved by the use of a local cache; however, maintaining such a repository would
come at a considerable cost as both resources are constantly updating their content.
Despite the reluctance to use a cache, the list of spatial annotations is stored
in one because that information is not available through the EMAGE web service.
As the process of creating these annotations is suspended, this list will not change,
and no update is required. Direct access to the EMAGE database would resolve this
inconsistency. However, direct access would not provide, as readily, all the information
required by the schemes. In particular, one group of schemes uses the notion of
propagation to infer new annotations (e.g. if a gene is expressed in a paw, because that
is part-of the limb, the gene is also expressed in the limb). This requires knowledge
of the parent-child relationships within each stage of the developmental mouse, which
are stored in EMAGE’s database, and the grandparent-child, great grandparent-child,
et cetera relationships that are not contained explicitly in the database. Obtaining
this information for the entire length of the path (from root note to leaf node) would
require multiple queries via the web service, or a database query using transitive
closure. Yet, in this case, with a local database already in existence, it is logical to
calculate all the relationships once and store them locally so they can be applied for
both EMAGE and GXD.
7.4 Translating between argumentation engine and
external entities
Chapter 6 discusses the conversions necessary for the argumentation toolkit to com-
municate with the expert biologist, through the staging post of schemes. In particular,
Section 6.4 reviews the process for translating between schemes and the argumenta-
tion toolkit.
Section 6.4 demonstrates how the scheme:
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Spatial annotation SA suggests verdict V
Spatial annotations are a reasonable indication of expression
Therefore it is likely that V is true
can be converted into the following PROLOG-like logic:
verdict(G, T, L) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P) 0.65.
However, for the rule to be used by the ASPIC toolkit, the rule must be entered into
the knowledge base. The easiest way of doing that is through the JAVA programmatic
interface. Here the following is used to describe the rule:
new Rule(new Term(“verdict”, new Variable(“E”), new Variable(“G”),
new Variable(“T”), new Variable(“L”), new Variable(“P”)), new ElementList(new
Term(“sa”, new Variable(“E”), new Variable(“G”), new Variable(“T”),
new Variable(“L”), new Variable(“P”))), 0.65);
7.4.1 Further conversions
Referring back to Figure 5.3, from Chapter 5, it is noticeable that two other transla-
tions exist.
The first is the translation between the resources and the ASPIC argumentation
toolkit. This happens as a two stage process - as outlined in Figure 7.8. In stage
one the disparate data models of the resources are unified. The second step involves
converting the application’s data model to the one required by the argumentation
toolkit. This stage of the process is similar to the above process for converting the
expert’s knowledge. A two stage model is used to increase the flexibility of the system.
The conversion of arguments from their logical representation in the engine into
something a user can read is the second translation. Arguments are formed from
a conclusion, and multiple rules/premises; because arguments can be chained, there
may be many levels of arguments to display. Furthermore there are three types of
information stored for each premise/rule13 in an argument: a logical representation,
a very short textual representation, and a longer textual description. In this work,
13Built-in predicates only have one form: a logical one.
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only the textual description was desired - it was based on the schemes produced
by the expert. Accordingly, displaying an argument involves using the argumentation
engine’s API to navigate through each argument, presenting only the desired elements.
As this is largely a programming exercise, details will not be provided.
7.5 Prototype one
During the process of scheme generation (see Chapter 6) the first prototype was
developed and shown to the expert in meeting 5. The system served dual purposes.
Firstly to help the expert visualise the system and the relationship between it and his
schemes, and secondly to gather the expert’s opinion of what the system should look
like. In particular, the best mechanism for the presentation of arguments.
7.5.1 Walk through
The first prototype is a basic application, with a user interface utilising HTML forms.
The first screen (not shown) asks the user for their choice of gene and tissue.
Once the biological data has been retrieved from the resources, the second screen
asks the user for their opinion of that data (e.g. Figure 7.9). Information sought
includes the user’s analysis of the results, and the user’s confidence in the researchers.
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Figure 7.9: Prototype one: asking if the user can rate the images and award a degree
of confidence in the researchers who performed the relevant experiments.
Figure 7.10: Possible alternative argument display mechanism for prototype one.
The third and final page (see Figure 7.6) presents the arguments generated from
the biological information.
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7.5.2 Initial feedback
During the discussion with the expert biologist, his opinion of the system was sought,
including his views on the presentation of arguments. As discussed in Section 7.2.2,
the default ASPIC presentations are not suitable for the intended user group. Sub-
sequently a range of alternatives was presented to the expert, e.g. Figure 7.10 uses
natural language and the notion of bullet points to hide more detailed information
until the biologist wishes to drill down into it. Other styles shown to the expert
included one based on the standard tree-based visualisation, such as Figure 7.11.
Figure 7.11: Example of a standard tree-based argument visualisation, where the
conclusion is at the top.
In this meeting the following key issues came to light. Firstly, the expert wanted
to see all the information at once, and all in English. He rejected all the example
presentation styles shown to him, and instead volunteered the idea of presenting
arguments as a natural language paragraph. Secondly, the expert suggested there
was a need to provide a visual summary of the arguments that quickly allowed the
user to determine which arguments supported the notion of the gene being expressed
and which took the opposite view. However, he did not suggest an implementation
nor provide any guidance that could lead to an implementation. Thirdly, the expert
believed there needed to be a wider range of experimental types included in the system
(only in situ hybridisation was used in prototype one). In particular, he suggested
trying to include SAGE data from the CGAP database.
The knowledge gathered during this meeting is implemented in the second proto-
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type using the schemes and confidence values finalised after the sixth scheme creation
meeting.
7.6 Prototype two
The second prototype was created during the Sealife project (see Section 8.1), with two
purposes in mind. Firstly it had to represent the evolution discussed with the expert
following the first prototype, and secondly it had to be used with an evaluation. The
evaluation will be discussed further in Section 7.7 before being detailed in Chapter 8.
7.6.1 Outline of prototype
The minor differences between prototype one and two, in terms of the architecture
and order of processes, are discussed in Section 7.3.
This prototype is developed in two separate parts using the finalised schemes and
confidence values. The first part is the argumentation system, which is a subtle
evolution of prototype one. The second part is a new graphical user interface (GUI).
The argumentation system uses amended schemes and strengths (prototype one
being built before the schemes were finalised and the strengths assigned). It employs
a different method of presenting arguments - adopting the expert’s suggestion of a
natural language paragraph. Otherwise it is similar, but not identical, to the original
prototype. The system works, but has never been connected to its front end. This
is because there is no need to do so in order to carry out the desired evaluation (see
Chapter 8). Additionally, using pre-canned queries, data, and arguments from the
argumentation system, rather than a true connection to the argumentation system,
ensures all evaluation subjects receive an equal experience during the evaluation.
7.6.2 Walk through
The second prototype has a very similar workflow to the first. Initially (e.g. Figure
7.12) the user specifies the gene-tissue pair (s)he is interested in, and then indicates
his (her) level of confidence in various journals and resources. On the second page,
once the biological information has been extracted from the resources, the user is
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asked for his (her) confidence in the relevant researchers. The final page (e.g. Figure
7.13) provides an initial textual summary (the gene is (not) expressed), followed by a
visual summary of the various arguments, and finally the arguments themselves.
Figure 7.12: First page of second prototype: asks the user which gene-tissue pair to
consider and a range of confidence questions.
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Figure 7.13: Results page of the second prototype, featuring a visual summary of the
textual arguments shown further down the image.
Figure 7.14: A close up of the argument summary from Figure 7.13.
The arguments are provided in the natural language paragraph style the expert
stipulated. This is facilitated by the creation of a custom output generator for AS-
PIC14. Following each argument is the strength (expert’s confidence) in the argument,
14Developed with assistance from ASPIC developer Matt South.
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which is automatically calculated by the argumentation engine from the constituent
sub-arguments using the weakest link method.
The visual summary (see Figure 7.14) provides an indication of which arguments
are stronger (expressed or not expressed) and tells the user which side each argument
supports. On the left side of the summary is a box containing the symbol of the
gene, and opposite is a box containing the tissue. The complete path between the two
indicates which is stronger, expressed or not expressed. Arguments themselves are
circles, containing letters referencing individual arguments. Arrows link arguments
to the conclusion they support. The style of the arrow indicates the strength of the
argument.
In ASPIC the strongest argument wins the debate. Therefore, the strongest ar-
gument decides whether or not a gene is expressed - it is labelled a strong indicator.
Arguments with a strength of less than 50% are deemed weak. Everything else is a
medium indicator. The strongest argument dictates the content of the initial textual
summary.
7.6.3 Limitations
Due to timing issues, the arguments provided for prototype two’s evaluation use a
limited range of schemes15. In particular, only the “reasons to doubt” are implemented
fully. This reduces the total number of arguments as there are none arguing for the
accuracy of the annotations. This is not a problem because the goal of the evaluation
is not to verify the performance of the system. Instead, the aim is to determine
whether or not the users can understand and interpret the information presented to
them. There is no need to verify the system’s accuracy because the goal is not to
make a decision, merely to provide information that can be employed to help the users
do so. It is worth noting that the evaluation indirectly comments on the accuracy of
the system by reviewing the schemes.
A further issue is that the rules are aggregated. For each reason to doubt an
annotation a corresponding inference rule is generated. A second set of rules collects
all the reasons to doubt, and groups all the active reasons under one new conclusion.
15A final list of rules appears in Appendix B, this is not the list of rules used in this prototype,
but a full list compiled after the evaluation when more time was available for this work.
144
Chapter 7. Arguing over gene expression: implementation
Regardless of the number of reasons, there is only ever one of the second type of
conclusion. The same is true for the reasons to doubt an experiment. This approach
has two effects. Firstly it reduces the number of available arguments, and secondly
it reduces the strength of the remaining argument to the lowest denominator. For
example, assume there are three reasons to doubt an experiment with expert assigned
confidences 15%, 25% and 45%. There should be three arguments, each with a differ-
ent strength. In reality, there is one argument, which has the confidence 15% because
of the weakest link principle.
Arguments in ASPIC are settled according to the strength of the arguments, resul-
tantly this could affect the outcome in some situations (depending on the underlying
experimental data). Fortunately this does not affect the examples used for the evalua-
tion as the strongest arguments come from annotations for which there are no reasons
to doubt the annotation or the underlying experiment. Hence there is no aggregation.
The final limitation relates to the inclusion of CGAP data. The expert wished
this to be added, and it was felt to be a good idea because it would emphasise that
the system was more than just an amalgamation of EMAGE and GXD. However no
expert was available for this resource. Instead the original expert provided a basic
level of knowledge, which would require to be extended in a real system. Accordingly,
the inclusion of CGAP is not dwelt upon in this document.
7.7 Questions for evaluation
The second prototype makes a number of assumptions based on the expert’s feedback
from the first system, and such assumptions must be tested. Furthermore there is a
need to assess the accuracy of the schemes (and associated strengths) developed earlier
in this work. For these reasons an evaluation was performed: it shall be discussed in
the next chapter. This section will concentrate on expressing the assumptions to be
tested.
The foremost assumption is that the expert is representative of his community. It
is necessary to test this, even if only indirectly. For example, do other users agree
with the need for a visual summary of the arguments? The initial assumption is also
tested by querying users to discover if they all prefer textual argument presentations
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rather than visual ones in the way the expert did.
Secondly, it is believed that the textual arguments contain all the necessary in-
formation, and should satisfy biologists. This is based on the fact that the expert
approved them. Is this belief valid? Can biological users interpret the arguments and
gain the information they need?
This issue of the user’s ability to interpret the arguments also applies to the
visual summary. The expert wanted one, but did not specify how it should appear.
Consequently, the images are conjecture based on previous work with a range of
biological users. Therefore it needs tested to ensure it is understandable.
7.8 Summary
During this chapter two prototypes are discussed - the second being an evolution of
the first following expert feedback. The rationale for the creation of these prototypes,
and the decisions behind their implementation are recalled in this chapter before they
are both illustrated using screenshots. The goal of these systems was not to produce
perfect tools, but to investigate argumentation.
Ultimately, it is the second prototype that is carried on through to the next chap-
ter, Chapter 8, where an evaluation of one use of argumentation in biology is under-
taken.
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Evaluation
This chapter reports on two of the evaluations undertaken during this work. The first
is an exploration of the GUI and presentation mechanisms developed during Chapter
7. The second is an extension, focusing on one particular issue highlighted during the
first evaluation.
Section 8.1 describes the motivation behind the first evaluation, the process under-
taken to perform it, and the results obtained. Section 8.2 concentrates on the second
evaluation, which is an online survey investigating the best visual presentation of
arguments.
Although this chapter presents the results of the evaluations, a discussion and
analysis of those results is reserved until Chapter 9.
8.1 Argumentation system evaluation
Chapter 7 discusses the creation of two prototype systems that use argumentation to
resolve inconsistencies between EMAGE and GXD. It is the second prototype that is
evaluated here - of particular interest is the user interface and the users’ interaction
with the arguments.
This work was performed during the Sealife project1. Sealife was an EU FP6
project examining the creation of a semantic web browser for the life sciences. As
part of the contribution from Heriot-Watt University two systems were developed:
this system, and GGAPS [158]. GGAPS assisted biologists and bioinformaticians in
1www.macs.hw.ac.uk/bisel/sealife
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planning and executing bioinformatics workflows online. The system took a piece of
bioinformatics information (for example a gene symbol) and determined the online
services that the information could be submitted to. The user selected a workflow
and the system automatically executed it.
Both systems were evaluated at the same time; though, details of the GGAPS
system will be minimised in this document.
It is important to note the contribution of Dr. Gus Ferguson to this evaluation. As
an employee of the Sealife project, in his role as evaluation expert, he supervised and
documented much of this evaluation. He advised on the best methods to gather the
information desired from the evaluation, acted as the observer during the evaluation
sessions, and analysed the results before editing the documentation of this work [159]2.
The rest of the work remained the responsibility of the author, including: the decision
of what to test for; the creation of the scenarios; the role of lead evaluator; the
interpretation of the results; and, the writing of some sections of the final report.
8.1.1 Aim of evaluation
The evaluation aimed to achieve a number of goals. Standard methods and protocols
were used to evaluate usability and obtain feedback on the prototype GUI. Bespoke
protocols were used to obtain a summative and formative evaluation of the function-
ality. This included additional evaluation for specific aspects of the conceptual design
of data presentation and visualisation. Moreover the evaluation was used as a focus
for expert user evaluation of the underlying system processes by select users.
In particular, this evaluation was used to explore the following questions from
Chapter 4:
• How should argumentation be presented to a biologist so that (s)he can under-
stand, and utilise it?
• Is a graphical form of argument presentation better than a textual form?
• How can all of the (users’) preferences be combined into a single interface?
In addition, Section 7.7 proposed a number of issues to consider:
2That document forms the basis of the current chapter.
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• After basing much of the system’s design on the opinion of an expert, does that
expert truly represent his community?
• Are the textual arguments complete? Do they contain all the necessary infor-
mation for a biologist to reach a decision?
• Are the users able to interpret the textual arguments, and the visual summary
of the argumentation?
• Are the schemes accurate? Are the associated strengths appropriate?
Remember that the decision as to whether or not a gene is expressed will be
controversial. Therefore, the system was not trying to provide a “correct” answer
as no such answer may exist. Consequently, the evaluation did not concentrate on
investigating the accuracy of the argumentation. Instead, it tried to focus on the
usefulness of argumentation, and the system developed in Chapter 7, for assisting
users to make a decision by themselves.
8.1.2 Method
User group and users
A user group of 18 people was evaluated. Of these 10 worked on EMAP in various
roles, ranging from system developers to biological database curators. From this group
were drawn the expert users whose function was to give expert opinion on aspects of
the system. The other 8 users were postgraduate students at Heriot-Watt University.
The 18 strong user group comprised people with varied academic and training
backgrounds. All users had degrees, the breakdown of which can be seen in Table 8.1.
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No. of users with
Subject BSc.
degrees
MSc.
degrees
PhDs. Research/
industrial
experience
Computing / IT 8 7 4 5
Biology /
Genetics
5 0 3 2
Bioinformatics 0 3 2 4
Biochemistry 1 0 0 0
Psychology 2 1 0 1
Exercise / sports
science
1 0 0 1
Geophysics 1 0 0 0
Table 8.1: Background of the users in the evaluation.
14 of the users were male. English was the first language for 7 of the 18 users,
although all users spoke and read English well.
For the analysis of the results, the users were divided into two groups:
1. Half of the users were classified as biologists (referred to as biologist group),
with formal qualifications and training in biology. 7 of these users were from
EMAP, and 2 were postgraduate students.
2. The remaining 9 users were classified as non-biologists (referred to as non-
biologist group), with little or no formal biological background. 6 were post-
graduate students from the computer sciences, life sciences and psychology de-
partments, and 3 were from EMAP.
Occasionally, the biologist group was subdivided into those who were expert in
in situ gene expression (4 users) and those whose area of biological expertise was
elsewhere (5 users).
The size3 of the user groups meant that there could be no statistically significant
3For statistically meaningful differences to occur between user groups, each group must contain
at least 30 users.
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differences between them; however, on some occasions minor differences did occur,
and if deemed noteworthy, they shall be highlighted.
Procedure
Test scenarios were created based on typical tasks the system was intended to perform.
The GUI was then hard-coded with data taken from the databases, and arguments
generated by the system developed in Chapter 7.6. This forestalled issues of availabil-
ity and variation of third-party online resources during the course of the evaluation.
Appropriate time delays were introduced to reflect delays experienced when the sys-
tem accesses online resources.
Users were asked to complete a consent form which included a brief explanation
of the systems and their purposes. They then filled in a questionnaire on their back-
ground, training and familiarity with appropriate bioinformatics online resources and
journals. Subsequently the users completed the GGAPS scenario and associated ques-
tionnaire, before the argumentation scenario and questionnaire, and finally a general
system usability questionnaire.
The evaluation was conducted using an Apple Macintosh computer (running the
Firefox browser) in a dedicated room. Two observers were used for the evaluation,
one interacting directly with the user, and the other observing the user and their
interaction with the system, recording timings, errors, comments made by user and
general observations on user actions. A script was used for consistency of order and
procedure and users were prompted to comment, ask questions or ask for help at any
stage during the evaluation.
The first argumentation scenario consisted of a walkthrough relating to the ex-
pression of a gene in the developmental mouse brain, using the default settings. The
users were presented with the system’s output (e.g. Figure 7.13) consisting of a
textual statement of what the strongest argument indicated, followed by a visual
summary of the arguments, and finally textual representations of the generated ar-
guments. Users were asked specific questions regarding the process and presentation
of the results. The second scenario involved walking through the same example, but
altering selections for some of the parameters. The users were then presented with
the argumentation modified appropriately to the altered parameters, and again asked
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specific questions regarding the results and their presentation. Finally specific ques-
tions regarding the users’ understanding of, and views on, argumentation and the
process of the system were posed. More details of the scenarios can be found in the
argumentation scenarios and questionnaire protocol in Appendix F.
Protocols
The protocols used for the evaluations are attached in Appendix F, they include:
• Script
• Time-error form
• Consent form
• Background questionnaire
• Argumentation scenarios and questionnaire
• Usability questionnaire
Please note that the GGAPS centric protocols are not included.
The general usability questions were adapted from Shneiderman’s questionnaire
for user interaction satisfaction (QUIS) [160]. The QUIS format was used where
appropriate for the other questionnaires along with more specific question formats,
such as Likert scales [161].
The protocols were drawn up and refined following iterative piloting with a small
number of postgraduate students.
8.1.3 Results: evaluation of argumentation system
This chapter will document the responses received without listing the exact ques-
tions that were posed. Thus, in order to truly understand the following text it is
recommended to consider it alongside the protocols contained in the Appendices.
Background knowledge and familiarity with bioinformatics/molecular bi-
ology
Users were asked to rate their familiarity with six bioinformatics tools and databases
used in the evaluation on a scale of 1 to 9 representing “Never Used” to “Very Fa-
miliar”. The results (see Table 8.2) show that the non-biologist group was generally
unfamiliar with all the databases and tools, while the biologist group was generally
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familiar with them; however, the biologists were unfamiliar with a small number of
resources including the SAGE gene expression resource CGAP.
Non-biologist
group
Biologist group
Median Median
XSPAN 1 1
EMAGE 1 4
GXD 1 6
BLAST 1 3
UniProt 1 3
CGAP 1 1
Table 8.2: How familiar the users are with a range of resources on a scale of 1 - 9,
with 9 representing very familiar, and 1 never used.
Users were asked to rate their knowledge from 1 = No Knowledge to 9 = Expert
on the following:
Gene Expression
Biologist group ranging from 4 to 9 with a median of 6 (mean = 6.0);
Non-biologist group ranging from 1 to 4 with a median of 2 (mean = 2.3).
Ontologies
Biologist group ranging from 1 to 8 with a median of 5 (mean = 4.7);
Non-biologist group ranging from 1 to 7 with a median of 2 (mean = 3.1).
Users were asked to indicate their familiarity with nine commonly used biological
and bioinformatics journals using the following options:
• read all of journal;
• read some papers;
• know journal but do not read it;
• never heard of journal.
The results are summarised in Table 8.3.
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The background information gathered on users was particularly useful for adding
context to comments users made during evaluation, and was the basis for the division
of the biologist group into expert and other biologists.
All ( N = 18)
Read all Read
some
Know,
do not
read
Never
heard of
Development 0 5 4 9
Mechanisms of
development
1 9 6 2
Science 1 9 6 2
Biochimica et
Biophysica Acta
0 1 6 11
Nature 0 10 5 3
EMBO 0 2 5 11
Developmental
Biology
0 4 5 9
Gene Expression
Patterns
0 3 3 12
Molecular Biology
of the Cell
0 4 5 9
Table 8.3: User familiarity with common biological and bioinformatics journals.
Time taken to complete argumentation scenarios
Table 8.4 lists the times taken by each group to complete the argumentation scenarios.
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Non-
biologist
group
Biologist
group
All (N = 18)
Argumentation Section A
Mean 4 m 22 s 4 m 45s 4 m 34 s
Minimum 2 m 56 s 2 m 20 s 2 m 20 s
Maximum 7 m 00 s 10 m 20 s 10 m 20 s
Standard
deviation
1 m 15 s 2 m 33 s 1 m 57 s
Argumentation Section B
Mean 2 m 36 s 3 m 31 s 3 m 04 s
Minimum 0 m 54 s 1 m 49 s 0 m 54 s
Maximum 4 m 17 s 4 m 42 s 4 m 42 s
Standard
deviation
1 m 08 s 0 m 56 s 1 m 06 s
Table 8.4: Duration of evaluation.
Journals and authors
During the creation of the schemes (documented in Chapter 6) the expert advised
that the users’ confidence in the journal and the research team might affect their
confidence in the experiment (and thus the result). For this to be true, the user must
be able to recognise both the journal and author(s). Consequently, users were asked
to indicate their confidence in the journals commonly used to publish gene expression
experiments by ranking them from 1 (highest confidence) to 9 (lowest confidence),
plus a “Don’t Know” option. Table 8.5 shows the results for the rankings (excluding
“Don’t Know”): there appears to be little difference between the journals. Most of
the rankings were provided by the biologist group.
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Rankings
Journal No. of
rankings
Mean Range Standard
deviation
Development 10 2.7 1 - 6 1.6
Mechanisms of
development
6 2.8 1 - 7 2.2
Science 14 3.4 1 - 7 2.4
Biochimica et
Biophysica Acta
6 4.2 1 - 8 2.6
Nature 13 3.3 1 - 7 2.3
EMBO 8 3.0 1 - 7 2.3
Developmental
Biology
10 2.7 1 - 7 2.1
Gene Expression
Patterns
9 2.0 1 - 5 1.2
Molecular Biology of
the Cell
8 2.3 1 - 4 0.9
Table 8.5: User confidence in journals - very high (1) to very low (9).
Users were asked to indicate if they recognised authors who publish in the field of
in situ gene expression for the developmental mouse - results are in Table 8.6: most
authors were only recognised by 2 subjects (half of the expert group). All of the
responses came from the biologists.
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Author No. of users recognising
Furuta Y 3
Hogan BL 4
Trainor PA 2
Hebert JM 2
Martin GR 2
Niswander L 2
Table 8.6: User recognition of authors.
Scenario one
Scenario one involved interpreting the output of the system, when the trust parameters
were left at their defaults.
When asked what the result was:
• 15 users (83%) correctly identified the result;
• 3 users (17%) responded “Don’t Know”.
When asked to identify the strongest argument in the output:
• 13 users (72%) correctly identified the strongest argument;
• 2 users (11%) identified all three supporting arguments as the strongest argu-
ment;
• 3 users (17%) did not answer.
Users based their identification of the result on a range of things, including:
• on the strongest argument (3 users);
• all three positive arguments;
• three supporting against two negative arguments;
• weight of arguments in favour;
• expert knowledge of experiments (implies ignored system results);
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• details of experiment;
• conclusion of system (2 users);
• graphical presentation of arguments (2 users);
• summary data and strengths quoted in textual details of arguments;
• no decision (3 users).
Scenario two
The second scenario used the same example, and asked the same questions, but this
time the trust parameters were set to prescribed levels.
When asked what the result was:
• 12 users ( 67%) correctly identified the result of the argumentation process;
• 3 users ( 17%) answered incorrectly;
• 3 users ( 17%) as“Don’t Know”.
When asked to identify the strongest argument in the output of the second scenario:
• 11 users (61%) correctly identified both of the two equally strong arguments;
• 4 users (22%) identified only 1 of the arguments;
• 1 user (6%) said: “C or D”;
• 2 users (11%) merely quoted the argumentation result.
Again, the users’ identification of the result was based on a variety of elements:
• on the 2 strongest arguments (7 users);
• summary data and strengths quoted in textual details of arguments (4 users);
• graphical presentation of arguments;
• no specific answer - made comments on task (6 users).
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User opinion of system
Directly following the second scenario, the subjects were asked to fill in a questionnaire
designed to gather their opinions on a number of areas of the system including:
• The questions on trust (journals and authors);
• The amount of information contained in the arguments;
• The ease of understanding the textual arguments;
• The usefulness of the graphical summary of the arguments (e.g. Figure 7.14).
The results are summarised in Figures 8.1 to 8.5. In general, those results indicated
that the users were happy with the system, approving all aspects. In most results the
differences between the user groups were not significant; though, when asked how easy
it was to understand the textual arguments (Figure 8.4) the non-biologist’s ratings
were significantly lower with a median of 3 compared to the biologist’s median of 7
(p = 0.0121).
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Figure 8.1: Were the questions on trust of journals and researchers asked of you too
few (1) - too many (9)? Median = 5.
Figure 8.2: Would the option to hide the questions on trust of journals and authors
be, undesirable (1) - very desirable (9)? Median = 6.
Figure 8.3: Was the amount of information presented in the arguments, too much (1)
- too little (9)? Median = 5.
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Figure 8.4: How well did you understand the information presented in the arguments,
not at all (1) - completely (9)? Median = 6.
Figure 8.5: How helpful were the diagrams of the arguments, totally unhelpful (1) -
very helpful (9)? Median = 8.
Presentation and perception of textual arguments
Users were given a typical argument generated by the argumentation system and
asked what they inferred from this argument. A perfect answer stated the gene
was not expressed, mentioned the notion of propagation and acknowledged that the
argument was defeasible. A correct answer mentioned two of the three components
of a perfect answer. The results broke down as follows:
Expert biologists
• 1 gave a perfect answer;
• 1 gave a correct answer
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• 1 restated the conclusion;
• 1 could not be classified.
Other biologists
• 1 gave a correct answer then introduced an error;
• 2 restated the conclusion;
• 2 were not classifiable.
Non-biologists
• 3 restated the conclusion;
• 6 could not be classified.
10 users (56%) correctly inferred that the argument supported the gene not being
expressed in the tissue. However, of these 10 users, 2 (11%) gave erroneous interpre-
tation of the STRENGTH=79% statement shown below (direct quotes):
• 4:1 people who’ve researched the area believe this to be the case (strength=79%);
• this finding has emerged from a trusted source (100%);
Comments from users who had produced erroneous remarks included (direct quotes):
• although argument strong, don’t trust underlying data;
• the brain development is abnormal;
• need special knowledge to understand the language strength;
• 30% understandable for me;
• too confusing.
Users were asked how this textual method of presentation could be improved. 11
users thought it did not need improvement, or did not comment. The comments of
the others are summarised below:
• graphical representation needed (2 users);
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• more structure to the text, e.g. bullet points (2 users);
• more prominence for expression level (2 users);
• more explanation/definition of different parts e.g. “STRENGTH = 79%” (2
users).
Presentation and perception of graphical arguments
Users were then presented with a graphical representation of a typical argument. 12
users correctly inferred that the gene was not expressed in the tissue. 2 users gave
comments which did not indicate their inference (“did not understand how the argu-
ments connect” and “trusted sources, but not much else, this is a little more confusing
than the diagram presented on screen”4). 4 users did not answer the question.
Users were asked to suggest how the graphical presentation could be improved.
The results of the 6 responses are summarised below:
• drawing the graph top-down instead of bottom-up (3 users);
• like to see strength information;
• presented as it was on the computer3;
• the diagram suggests that there is more than one answer when there is only one,
a paragraph or more fluent flow diagram may be better.
In response to the first comment, a follow-up study was undertaken to evaluate
users responses to different graphical representations of arguments - the results are
presented in Section 8.2.
Comparison of graphical and textual argument presentations
Further specific questions on both the textual and graphical presentations of the
argument were put to users. The results are given in Figures 8.6 to 8.9.
4It was assumed that this referred to the graph displayed in the scenarios; however, that graph
summarised the arguments rather than depicting a single argument.
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Figure 8.6: How easy is this textual argument to understand, very confusing (1) -
very straight-forward (9)? Median = 5.
Figure 8.7: How easy is this graphical argument to understand, very confusing (1) -
very straight-forward (9)? Median = 6.
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Figure 8.8: How intuitive do you find the inference drawn in the textual argument,
not intuitive (1) - very intuitive (9)? Median = 5.
Figure 8.9: How intuitive do you find the inference drawn in the graphical argument,
not intuitive (1) - very intuitive (9)? Median = 6.
When asked which form of presentation users favoured, 8 users preferred the graph-
ical presentation, 8 chose the textual presentation, 1 answered both (this was treated
as a “Don’t Know”), and 1 did not know which they preferred. The responses of the
user groups are compared in Table 8.7 which shows the expert biologists were split
equally between preferring the textual and graphical presentations of the arguments,
while the two other groups were divided almost evenly.
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Preferred Expert biol-
ogists (N=4)
Other biolo-
gists (N=5)
Non-
biologists
group (N=9)
Textual 2 2 4
Graphical 2 3 3
Don’t know 0 0 2
Table 8.7: User preference of argument representation.
Visual argument summary
A visual summary, such as Figure 7.14 from Chapter 7, provides a synopsis of the
outcome of argumentation process. Figure 8.55 considers the users’ opinion of the
visual summary of the arguments produced by the system; however, the motivation
was to ensure that users could interpret the graph accurately.
Initially users were asked to say whether the diagram suggested that the gene was
expressed or not. 10 users said that the gene was not expressed (correct conclusion),
2 said the gene was expressed (incorrect) and 6 selected “Don’t know”. This equated
to 44% of users being unable to use the diagram to reach the correct conclusion.
Users were then asked to judge from the diagram what they thought the strengths
of three of the arguments were. The results are shown in Table 8.8.
5Although the wording suggests the users were being asked to judge diagrams depicting argu-
ments, at this stage the only diagram they had seen was the visual summary.
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User rating
Argument Strong Medium Weak Don’t
know
Argument H
(correct: STRONG)
16 1 0 1
Argument C
(correct: WEAK)
0 0 16 2
Argument A
(correct: MEDIUM)
0 15 1 2
Table 8.8: User judgment of argument strength.
Two users (both software developers from EMAP) were responsible for all the
“Don’t knows”. The two incorrect answers came from different users. The remaining
47 answers (87%) were correct.
When asked to rate how easy the diagram was to understand from 1 (very easy)
to 9 (very hard), the median was 2 - see Figure 8.10.
Figure 8.10: How easy was the argument summary diagram to understand, very easy
(1) - very hard (9)? Median = 2.
6 users had no suggestions on how this method of presentation could be improved;
the other suggestions are summarised below:
• need to improve distinguishing of strong/medium/weak arguments (5 users)
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with suggestions including:
– coloured arrows (3 users);
– colour coded arguments.
• interactive diagram with suggestions including:
– be able to click/mouse-over on each argument to see details;
– maybe you could toggle arguments on and off to see different results.
• filtering of results;
• explanation/more information of background process/studies leading to rating
of argument strength (4 users);
• conclusion arranged closer to gene;
• need to know relationships between weak, medium, and strong.
System results page
Users were presented with the output from the system in the format used in the
scenarios (one line natural language summary, summary diagram and natural lan-
guage arguments). Users were asked which sections they would use to make their own
decision. The results are summarised as follows:
• 6 users used all three elements;
• 3 used the summary and the diagram;
• 3 used the diagram only;
• 3 used the diagram and the textual arguments;
• 2 used the textual arguments only;
• 1 used the summary and the textual arguments;
• no users relied only on the summary.
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Focusing solely on the expert users:
• 2 users applied the summary, 2 did not;
• 3 subjects used the diagram;
• 3 applied the textual arguments.
Additional comments
Users were asked for additional comments on the system and presentation of the ar-
gument process and these are summarised below (direct quotes):
Presentation of arguments
• Illustration is extremely useful for an overview, although text is useful to deter-
mine strength of the argument developed;
• Would like to have more explanation of argumentation process and why one
argument wins over another;
• Would like to be able to view each argument as a graph.
Issues of detail
• I may look at detailed descriptions if I need to do more work (dry or wet) and
would like to be able to navigate different levels of detail where desired;
• The diagram of arguments is helpful but the detailed description is needed as
well. The diagram is just the simplified version (summary) of the text and I
don’t trust the diagram alone;
• Would use personal expertise of system to re-query based on argument and look
at more detail e.g. link to database would be useful;
• Would like to be able to view some sort of personal profile for each researcher
to help user determine level of trust;
• Should show on the results page how any changes of trust in journals /databases/
authors have altered the results and what changes in parameters have occurred.
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The scenarios
• Not really comfortable with artificiality of example.
This is an abbreviated list of the comments, a full list can be seen in Appendix E.
8.1.4 Conclusions
Results provided earlier in this chapter divulge a number of insights into both the
underlying argumentation based system, and the techniques used to present its output
to biologists.
In the first scenario (default trust values) the majority of non-biologists correctly
answered the question asking them to identify the strongest argument, in contrast only
1 expert and 3 other biologists answered correctly. In the second scenario (modified
trust values), comments showed that the experts had problems accepting the scenario
imposing changes in trust status for journals and authors. As they disagreed with the
trust values, and felt the scenario to be unrealistic, they either did not answer the
question or simply expressed their disagreement with the system, resulting in correct
answers from less than half of the biologists’ group. Again the non-biologist user
group generally answered correctly.
Issues of trust in expert or decision aid systems have been addressed in work done
since the late 1980s. One example is Muir [162] who raised the issue of modelling
and measuring users trust in such systems and identified a phenomenon of spreading
distrust in a system from one area to another. In the evaluation of the argumentation
system, responses, comments and observations indicated that users appreciated the
imposed conditions and contrived nature of the evaluation scenarios and there was
no spread of distrust in the system beyond this issue. Work on trust in decision aid
systems has been focused on modelling and measuring trust in individual systems
[163]. Currently there does not seem to be any generalised method of measuring trust
akin to QUIS for measuring usability.
Users were satisfied with the amount of information presented by the system,
with 15 scoring it in the 4-6 out of 9 range, and 12 of those rating it at 5 (just right).
Ratings of how well users understood the arguments (1 = Not at all - 9 = Completely),
showed that the non-biologist groups ratings, with a median of 3, were significantly
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lower compared with the biologists with a median of 7 (p = 0.0121). Comments and
observations indicated that most of the issues concerning the biologist group related
to the strength ratings while the low levels of understanding among the non-biologists
were due to a lack of biological knowledge.
From a detailed examination of the responses and observations, it emerged that
the presentation of results from the argumentation system was clear and enabled
users, who used the system as an expert system, to reach valid conclusions. However,
experts seemed to have issues with trusting the argumentation system and the results
it produced, making their use of the system problematic.
When considering the arguments, and their presentation, the textual argument
alone appeared to be too complex. This combined with the poorly understood
strength rating system, suggested that textual representation would be unsuitable
as a sole presentation method. Most users found the graphical version simpler and
more intuitive - the majority of the users found the argument easy to understand
(median 6) and intuitive (median 6) with no significant differences between the biol-
ogist and non-biologist groups. However, half the experts preferred the textual form,
implying that both mechanisms should be available. Regardless of the version used, it
appeared that the explanation of the argument (reason for the inference step) needed
further clarification.
Concentrating on the argument strengths, in Section 6.2 the reasons behind using
numerical values for documenting the strength of an argument were given. Although
there was clear evidence that the strength of an argument was often misinterpreted
by users, there was no indication that this was because of the use of numerical values.
Instead, the more likely explanation was that the biological users were confused by the
term “strength” interpreting it in its biological sense rather than its argumentation
one. This would be resolved by a better choice of label, for example: argument score.
Generally the results page was acknowledged by the users as a success, with re-
sponses showing that all three elements of the page (summary statement, summary
image, textual arguments) were widely employed. Despite its popularity, it is worth
noting that 8 of the 18 users (44%) were unable to determine which conclusion the
summary image presented. However, the majority of users were able to ascertain cor-
rectly the strength of the individual arguments. Nevertheless, the summary diagram
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requires further development.
Overall it was evident that there were several areas requiring further work and
examination:
• although graphical representations of arguments were easier for users to under-
stand, some experts preferred the textual form, and in both representations the
explanation of the argument (reason for the inference) needed clarification;
• the summary image may have been improved by greater use of colour;
• the questions on researchers should have been optional, and hidden by default;
• a more reliable and robust method of creating the strength levels for the argu-
ments confidences was required.
These bullet points contain a number of subtle issues. Some consideration of these
matters is provided in Chapters 9 to 11. Additionally, Section 8.2 briefly explores
which form of graph-based argument representation is most suitable for the life sci-
ences. Full resolution of these bullet points will require a series of detailed investiga-
tions that are beyond the scope of this thesis.
Moreover, the evaluation raised questions concerning the schemes used in this
work; however, this discussion shall be withheld until Chapter 11.
Despite this further work the evaluation showed that the system was able to convey
its message to users from a broad spectrum of backgrounds, and with varied biological
expertise. The results from the non-biologist group demonstrate that the presentation
of the system’s results was clear and understandable, if the user accepted the results
on trust. Members of the biologist group had difficulty with this, and employed
their own knowledge to evaluate the information rather than using the information
presented by the system.
An analysis of the results and conclusions from this evaluation, and what they
mean for argumentation within biology, is provided in Chapter 9.
8.2 Online evaluation
The second evaluation concentrated solely on one question: several main forms of
graphic presentation (of arguments) are featured in tools and publications, which of
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these was favoured by biologists? This evaluation was conducted in response to the
previous evaluation. There users were asked to comment on a graphical depiction of
a typical argument in which the argument was presented as a tree-like graph with the
conclusion at the top, e.g. Figure 8.11. A number of users commented that the graph
was upside down.
Consequently, it was decided to compare that initial graph, with the same repre-
sentation rotated 180◦, so that the conclusion was at the bottom (e.g. Figure 8.12).
The former was colloquially known as the bottom-up graph, as it must be read from
the bottom-up, and the second graph top-down. Another common form of argument
presentation, reading from left-to-right, was proposed by Toulmin. It was decided
to include a simplified form of this presentation in the evaluation (e.g. Figure 8.13).
Each graph featured the same argument, which was an extended version of the graph
from the first evaluation (extended to include extra information in the explanation).
8.2.1 Evaluation of argument graphs
The evaluation of the representations was undertaken as an online survey, with a user
group drawn from biologists and bioinformaticians, including some staff from EMAP
and participants recruited by email invitation through the Scottish Bioinformatics
Forum6 mailing list. The survey used the three graphs shown in Figures 8.11 to 8.13.
The first query required participants to select their preference between the bottom-up
and the top-down versions of the tree-based argument graph. The second question
required them to select their preference between their chosen tree-based representation
and the Toulmin-like graph. The participants’ choices for both stages were submitted
through an online form.
This evaluation made no attempt to record the background of its subjects. The
fact that they either worked for EMAP or chose to subscribe to a mailing list for
biologists and bioinformaticians in Scotland suggested that they were probably based
in Scotland and worked in a biology related discipline. However, it was impossible to
say which discipline. Furthermore, no attempt was made to record the reason for the
users’ preference.
6www.sbforum.org
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Figure 8.11: Bottom-up version of argument.
Figure 8.12: Top-down version of argument.
Figure 8.13: Toulmin-like version of argument.
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A total of thirty-eight participants responded. For the tree-type graph (bottom-up
versus top-down) the top-down version was most popular with thirty-one respondents
(82%) favouring it. In the second stage, the Toulmin-like graph was clearly favoured
over the tree-type with twenty-four respondents (63%) indicating it was their preferred
representation. Further analysis showed that twenty-three (74%) of the thirty-one who
originally selected the top-down tree-graph chose the Toulmin-like representation at
the second stage. In contrast only one (14%) of the seven users who initially favoured
the bottom-up version choose the Toulmin-like graph as their overall preferred repre-
sentation.
8.2.2 Conclusion
Although it was impossible to catalogue the participants in this study, it was legiti-
mate to class them as biologists and bioinformaticians. In this case, the online survey
clearly showed that individuals working in the biological community had a clear pref-
erence for the Toulmin-like graph. Furthermore, there was strong evidence that the
default graphical representation of many argumentation theory scholars and systems
(the bottom-up tree) was the least favoured depiction with this user group.
8.3 Summary
This chapter presents two evaluations of the second prototype discussed in Chapter
7.
The evaluations undertaken show that the basic GUI developed for the argumenta-
tion system was appropriate; however, it was not perfect. Important issues were raised
that require attention before any similar system could be made publicly available.
In particular the second evaluation highlighted the importance of developing a
range of visual presentation styles for arguments. Furthermore, it suggested that
the standard presentation method used by default on many argumentation tools and
toolkits is not appropriate for the target user group of this system. In addition, the
first evaluation highlighted the importance of using both graphical and textual based
arguments presentation styles.
This first evaluation raised doubts over the accuracy and relevance of some the
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schemes produced in Chapter 6 - something that will be commented on further in
Chapter 11. Additionally, the assignment and presentation of argument strengths
were shown to be inadequate. Clearly a more “natural” mechanism must be found.
Despite these issues, feedback on the system was broadly positive, and indicated that
such a system could prove useful.
An analysis of the output of this chapter, and its impact on argumentation within
the biological world, is discussed next in Chapter 9.
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Analysis: presentation of
arguments and argumentation
Earlier, in Section 4.6, a number of questions were raised for this thesis to deliberate
upon. Further questions were posed in Section 7.7 whilst considering the prototypes
constructed during Chapter 7. Chapters 9 to 11 shall provide answers to these ques-
tions by returning to work discussed in Chapters 5 to 8, and augmenting it with
related work and analysis.
Initially the questions to be answered will be restated in Section 9.1.
9.1 Questions to be resolved: a summary
Chapter 4 motivates this work by exploring the inconsistency and incompleteness
between, and within, two online resources publishing in situ hybridisation gene ex-
pression information for the developmental mouse. Argumentation is proposed as a
mechanism to help end users resolve these issues. In doing so, it is acknowledged
that a number of issues have to be tackled in order to demonstrate argumentation is
a suitable approach. These challenges, stated as questions, are discussed in detail in
Section 4.6. Here a reprise will be given.
Initially three high-level issues are documented:
1. Which form of argumentation is appropriate as a solution to the issues described
in Sections 4.1 to 4.3 - and how effective is it?
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2. How should argumentation be presented to a biologist so that (s)he can under-
stand, and utilise it?
3. What insights have been gained from the work, and how does that inform the
future use of argumentation within biology?
Question 1 will be explored in Chapter 10, and Chapter 11 discusses question 3.
However, question 2 is related closely to the evaluation, therefore it will be considered
in this chapter.
In Chapter 4, question 2 is extrapolated to provide the first three questions in
Table 9.1. The remaining questions in Table 9.1 come from Section 7.7, where they
are proposed in response to the prototype systems documented in Chapter 7.
Question Answered in
Which is the best visual presentation mechanism for arguments? Section 9.2
Which presentation mechanism - graphical or textual - seems most
appropriate?
Section 9.3
How well do the standard argumentation concepts translate to the
biological domain?
Section 9.4
Can a biological user interpret the information in the arguments
correctly?
Section 9.5
Do the expert approved textual arguments provide all the infor-
mation necessary for a biologist to reach a decision?
Section 9.6
Is the visual summary of the debate a worthwhile inclusion? Section 9.7
Table 9.1: Summary of questions answered in Chapter 9.
It should be remarked that the presentation of arguments to a biologist is a com-
plex matter. One obvious complication is that it is necessary to distinguish between
an argument and argumentation. The former is a single justification, the latter a
series of justifications situated inside a debate. Therefore to present argumentation it
will be necessary to determine the best way of presenting arguments, and the context
in which they are used. Creating a good solution, let alone the ideal one, will involve
social scientists, psychologists, and experts from other disciplines working together.
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Various evaluations and tests will need to be performed, and analysed. It is not fea-
sible to do all of this here, and thus answer the overarching question. However, it is
possible to produce a preliminary solution, evaluate that solution, and analyse it -
Chapters 7 and 8 do this.
The subsequent sections (9.2 to 9.7) answer each of these questions from Table 9.1
in turn before a summary is provided in Section 9.9.
9.2 Which is the best visual presentation mecha-
nism for arguments?
Traditionally argumentation tools/systems present arguments visually using the no-
tion of a graph. Choosing the appropriate mechanism is important, as Scheuer et al.
remark:
. . . the form of external argument representation (and accompanying inter-
action) does matter and, thus, should be seriously considered by system
designers. The studies by Suthers and Hundhausen [164], Suthers et al.
[165], Nussbaum et al. [166], McAlister et al. [167], Schwarz and Glassner
[168], and Stegmann et al. [169] show that the way in which a system lays
out an argument visually and allows students to use it has an impact on
the behavior and learning gains of students. ([170] page 90)
Commonly, argumentation systems choose to visualise arguments as a bottom-up
graph (conclusion at the top with facts and rules beneath), yet the comparisons of
different styles of graph, in Section 8.2, suggest this is the least popular style with
the biological user group. During the evaluation of the prototype system, see Section
8.1.3, a number of users commented that the bottom-up style seems to be upside down.
This perception continues in the second evaluation, with 82% of users favouring the
top-down graph over the bottom-up.
Overall, the most popular graph is the left-to-right graph loosely based on Toul-
min’s representation, which is in-keeping with the findings in other domains:
Ye and Johnson [149] describe empirical studies demonstrating that argu-
ment structured explanations are the most effective in terms of bringing
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about changes in users attitudes toward rule-based systems. In particu-
lar, they indicate the significance of the Toulmin model for structuring
explanations, in that identifying premises of rules as components of the
Toulmin schema highlights discrete response steps that an explanation fa-
cility should follow in order to convincingly answer user queries. ([150]
page 33)
A likely cause of this popularity is that it is natural to read from left-to-right. However,
this presentation may not work so well in cultures where the norm is to read from
right-to-left. Although the bottom-up graph is the least popular representation, it
has roughly 16% of the votes. This indicates that it would be appropriate to make a
number of different presentation styles available for the users to chose from.
A second comment by Scheuer et al. is of note, for although not directly applicable
there is an equivalent sentiment for biology:
our review has shown that the vast majority of the existing argumenta-
tion tools make use of graph-based argument representations. . . . But are
graphs really the best way to visually represent arguments in educationally
targeted systems? ([170] page 91)
This work examines only graphical styles of argument presentation. Furthermore
the styles are based on pre-existing formats. The second quote from Scheuer et al.
clearly demonstrates the limitation of this work. Overlooking this imperfection, this
work shows that biologists find the Toulmin-like approach best; however, it is likely
that a number of different styles should be provided in order to ensure that everyone
is able to use a presentation format (s)he finds natural.
9.3 Which presentation mechanism - graphical or
textual - seems most appropriate?
Although the prototype system presents arguments exclusively in a textual format,
additional evaluation questions probe the differences in user attitudes to textual and
visual presentation of arguments. In the first study the visual arguments are displayed
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only in the bottom-up style. As the second investigation shows this to be the least
popular visual style, a comparison might be biased towards the textual arguments.
The comparison, see Section 8.1.3, seems to indicate that users are evenly split in
terms of their preference. However, the visual arguments are perceived as being more
readily understandable and marginally more intuitive - see Figures 8.6 to 8.9.
It seems that there is no single ideal solution, with the textual and visual argu-
ments both required. Initially this appears surprising as the content of the graphical
argument is identical to the textual argument - the difference is that the former is laid
out in such a way that the individual elements and their relationship is clear. Perhaps
the users, being new to argumentation, simply do not realise the significance of the
diagrams and instead are interested purely in the text? It might be informative to
repeat the study with users who are educated in basic argumentation skills - many US
schools teach informal logic (or critical argumentation) and have done so for a consid-
erable time whereas Scottish schools only recently have started to introduce a subset
of these skills to the curriculum. The US biologists, more used to argumentation
through their basic education, may provide a different result.
Alternatively, Verheij proposes the explanation may be concerned with the com-
plexity of the domain and the information to be conveyed:
A general question in the design of argument assistants is whether argu-
ments should be graphically represented in the first place. Especially the
complexities and subtleties of legal argument may impede such represen-
tations, and require natural language representations. . . . A compromise
could be the dual representation of arguments, both graphically and in
natural language. ([171] page 321)
This highlights the need for further investigation in the area. In the meantime it
seems appropriate to include both textual and visual arguments.
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9.4 How well do the standard argumentation con-
cepts translate to the biological domain?
Biology has its own terminology, and concepts - these are refined and extended within
the subdomain of gene expression. The same is true for most other domains, includ-
ing argumentation. Therefore, can the respective concepts and jargon intermingle
successfully?
The evaluation indicates that the biologists are able to cope with the argumenta-
tion concepts and terminology, with one notable exception. The confidence or believed
strength of an argument, is indicated using the word “strength”. Unfortunately, in
the gene expression subdomain the word is associated with the expression level - thus
a percentage is taken to mean several different things.
A percentage could indicate the percentage of the tissue in which a gene is ex-
pressed. An alternative is the assumption that the percentage is referring to the
amount of gene expressed in the tissue. In hindsight it is not difficult to see why the
biologists misinterpreted the information. Fortunately an alternative term should not
be difficult to obtain.
Ideally, such an issue would be identified during an early trial of the evaluation
and thus rectified for the majority of users. Although trials of the evaluation were
undertaken, the subjects were students at Heriot-Watt University, and thus not gene
expression experts. Hence the trials did not detect the problem. As all four experts
were tested on the same day, there was no opportunity to make a correction, thus all
experts encountered the same limitation.
Clearly, this experience highlights the importance of precise terminology, and the
value of conducting trial evaluations with a limited number of experts. Nevertheless,
the lack of any major terminology or conceptual conflict demonstrates that argumen-
tation works within this domain.
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9.5 Can users interpret the information in the ar-
guments correctly?
This query raises an interesting complication: what is the appropriate mechanism for
judging the success of an argument? The simplest method is to say that a successful
argument is one that persuades the audience. However, such a definition is not ap-
propriate in this case as the goal is not to persuade a biologist that a gene is (not)
expressed.
In the evaluation of Chapter 8, an attempt to understand the users’ interpretation
of the arguments is made - Section 8.1.3. However, it is debatable whether this could
ever be accurate. The reason for the lack of clarity is the controversial nature of
biology, as described by Jeffreys et al.:
Different researchers interpret data in different ways, and even the same
researcher may make inconsistent interpretations, adding an unreliable
and non-uniform element to data processing. ([9] page 924)
As each biologist will interpret a piece of information differently, according to their
own knowledge and views, it is difficult to know what a biologist should understand
from a piece of information.
In Figure 8.8, from Section 8.1.3, the subjects are asked how intuitive they find
a textual argument on a scale of 1 (not intuitive) to 9 (very intuitive). The median
response is 5, suggesting that the users feel the textual argument is acceptable. How-
ever, examining the graph, it is clear that there is a wide spread of opinion ranging
from 2 to 9. This implies that some users think they are able to understand and thus
use the information, but that other users find it difficult to do so.
In conclusion, this question is very difficult to assess and it is unfair to provide an
answer based on the limited evaluation carried out in this activity.
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9.6 Do textual arguments provide the information
necessary to reach a decision?
With respect to the discussion in Section 9.5, this consideration will disregard the
complicating factors and use the results of Chapter 8 to explore a solution.
Figure 8.3 displays the answer to the question: Was the amount of information
presented in the arguments too much (1) or too little (9)? The median response is 5,
which is the perfect response indicating the arguments are providing enough, but not
too much, information. Although Figure 8.3 is based on the responses from all users,
it accurately reflects the thoughts of the 4 expert users who assigned values: 5, 5, 5,
and 6. On the basis of this, the arguments appear to provide sufficient information.
9.7 Is the visual summary of the debate a worth-
while inclusion?
The original expert requested a visual summary of the argumentation process; how-
ever, he did not specify what this should be or the manner in which it should be
presented. Section 7.6.2 describes the visualisation arrived at for this work. This
section reports on the evaluation of it.
The final page of the system contains three distinct components. The first is a
natural language summary of the result. The visual summary is the second, and
the final element is the textual arguments. During the evaluation the users are asked
which elements they apply when deciding if the gene is expressed in the tissue. Section
8.1.3 reports that fifteen of the eighteen users claim to employ the summary. This
clearly indicates it is a useful element to include in any related or similar system.
Whilst the first analysis deals with the general notion of a visual summary, future
discussions will relate to the actual presentation mechanism deployed. Section 8.1.3
demonstrates that the diagram confuses users. Only 44% are able to correctly identify
which conclusion (expressed or not expressed) the diagram is indicating. Despite this
users believe the diagram is easy to understand (Figure 8.10).
The users identify a difficulty in distinguishing between the different argument
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strengths. However, Table 8.8 shows that the majority of users are able to correctly
gauge the strength of an argument by looking at the summary diagram.
In conclusion, the users claim to find the visual summary diagram easy to use yet
do not interpret it correctly, and the users perceive a difficultly to exist in one area
in contrast to the results of the evaluation. Overall, it seems that a summary tool is
beneficial, but the current proposal requires further work.
9.8 A final comment
The open question at the end of the argumentation specific part of the first evaluation
provided one very interesting comment:
Would like to have more explanation of argumentation process and why
one argument wins over another (see “Additional comments” from Section
8.1.3)
The most surprising aspect of this comment is that only one of the eighteen users made
this point. Owing to the complexity of providing a good argument presentation, the
implemented solution was less than ideal. As such, a significant amount of information
was hidden from the end user including: the methods used to create and assign the
degrees of confidence, the strategy applied to create arguments, and the approach
used to settle conflict. Accordingly, similar comments were expected from a greater
number of subjects.
9.9 Summary
This chapter used the evaluation contained in the previous chapter to discuss the best
presentation of arguments and argumentation. The results from Chapter 8 were used
to conclude:
• both textual and visual presentations of an argument should be included;
• a variety of different visual presentations should be provided so a user can chose
the most appropriate;
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• although difficult to produce, a visual summary of the argumentation is benefi-
cial;
• the terminology and ideas from the argumentation community are transferable
to the biological domain.
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Analysis: Which form of
argumentation?
Following on from Chapter 9 in which the evaluation was used to explore the pre-
sentation of arguments and argumentation, this chapter considers the notion of ar-
gumentation in greater depth. It recalls Chapter 4, to consider the abstract question
“Which form of argumentation is appropriate as a solution to the above issues - and
how effective is it?” plus the associated subsequent questions:
1. What practical constraints exist? What are the consequences of these con-
straints? (see Section 10.1)
2. What is argumentation in this context? (see Section 10.2)
3. How can argumentation be implemented in this domain? (see Section 10.3)
4. Which architecture appears appropriate? (see Section 10.3)
Accordingly, this chapter shall examine which form of argumentation is appro-
priate in the domain of gene expression (Section 10.2), and thus the larger world of
biology in general (Section 10.4). It shall examine the ways in which argumentation
can be implemented (Section 10.3) and whether or not it can be successful. As part of
this discussion a review of the constraints faced shall be conducted together with an
account of the way in which they shape the solution developed in this work (Section
10.1). A summary will be provided in Section 10.5.
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10.1 Constraints
Although there are many different forms and styles of argumentation, with an in-
clination towards computer science, this work takes a computational argumentation
approach - that is it wants to generate arguments and debate automatically. However,
this proves to be one of the main constraints placed upon this work.
Computational argumentation is still in the early stages of development. A set of
guidelines that can be followed in order to create an argumentation-based solution is
yet to be put in place. Furthermore Bench-Capon and Dunne [1] state that there is
no single argumentation theory, and probably never will be:
. . . just as the attempts to construct a notional definitive non-monotonic
logic from the disparate alternatives proposed in the 1980s are now recog-
nised as ill-fated, such is likely to be the outcome of efforts to build an
ultimate extension-based semantics. ([1] page 627)
Accordingly, work still focuses on developing theories rather than creating an opti-
mised implementation. This explains why there is lack of available toolkits for per-
forming argumentation. As discussed in Section 7.2.1, ASPIC was the only realistic
choice for an argumentation toolkit when this work began.
At the time of writing the situation scarcely has altered. During the ArguGrid re-
search project1 CaSAPI [172] was wrapped in a JAVA extension to produce MARGO2
[173], an argumentation engine focused on decision-making. Neither of these tools
have updated their web pages since 2008, leading to the assumption that the devel-
opment of both tools is now finished. Furthermore, MARGO clearly states on its
web pages3 that its target usergroup is “SCIENCE/RESEARCH”. A third argumen-
tation toolkit is ArgKit4. This is produced by the developer of the ASPIC toolkit.
As work is undertaken in the developer’s spare time progress is slow; however, it is
still on-going. The idea is to provide a full implementation of Prakken’s framework,
currently only the final layer has been completed. This effectively leaves the users
to define all other layers: in the meantime it is unlikely that any biological project
1www.argugrid.eu/
2http://margo.sourceforge.net/
3www.di.unipi.it/~morge/software/MARGO.html
4www.argkit.org/
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would go to the effort of doing this, preferring a ready-made solution. Other options
exist, yet they seem to be academic tools designed for research not real world use.
For example, Carneades is an argument mapping application comprising of two parts.
The first is the GUI, the second an underlying argumentation engine originally writ-
ten in the Scheme5 programming language. Although Carneades may mature into
something that is very useful, (at time of writing) its website states it is “currently
under development”. Noticeably, they are producing the latest version in Clojure6,
which renders it compatible with JAVA suggesting that this toolkit may hold promise
for future endeavours.
Other constraints are associated with the world of bioinformatics. Firstly, there
are a limited number of experts available to assist with projects like this. Furthermore,
the time an expert can commit is restricted due to his/her many other commitments.
Often the experts are distributed throughout many countries making it difficult to
work with several experts. Fourthly, the online resources are often less integrated and
harder to amalgamate than users expect. Even two obviously similar resources can
have a raft of minor differences that cause problems. As an illustration, consider the
two resources at the centre of this work.
Theoretically, EMAGE and GXD both use the EMAP anatomy. In reality, they
each use their own slightly different version of the EMAP ontology: EMAGE has some
tissues that are not in GXD and vice versa. Furthermore, these resources use different
terms to mean the same thing - for instance, when describing a level of expression
the GXD term present is equivalent to the EMAGE label detected. However, simply
mapping terms does not necessary yield the correct result as demonstrated by the
terms absent (GXD) and not detected (EMAGE). The EMAGE term means the gene is
not expressed in the tissue or any of the component parts - child nodes in the ontology.
In contrast, GXD’s application of absent is such that the gene is not expressed in the
tissue or in any component part, apart from the documented exceptions. In reality,
the effort to map EMAGE to GXD is insignificant in comparison to mapping either
resource to a third party such ABA - Chapter 12 explores this in more depth.
Although implicit in the previous text, it is perhaps worthwhile acknowledging
5www.r6rs.org
6http://clojure.org/
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that formalising a large body of domain knowledge is challenging and thus expensive.
Yet, often it is not essential to model the full extent of the knowledge, a notion
captured by James Hendler’s phrase “a little semantics goes a long way”7.
In summary, a number of constraints shape the project and affect the solution.
Creating a more effective argumentation-based proposition will require these issues to
be tackled; however, it should be remarked that the constraints associated with the bi-
ological domain do not apply just to argumentation, but to all integrative technologies
and proposals.
10.2 What is argumentation in this context?
As Chapter 5 explained, this work takes the view that argumentation is an automated
debate in which arguments are generated, and compared. Argumentation is perceived
as a device to generate and evaluate ideas, and thus encourage the users to consider
more fully whether or not a gene is expressed. Argumentation fulfils both reasoning
and explanation roles - new ideas are generated by inferring new arguments, and the
system’s reasoning is explained to the users by presenting the arguments to them.
The implementation is tied, as remarked in Section 10.1, to the only available toolkit
for performing argumentation.
One of the commonly perceived flaws raised by bioinformaticians, when this work
is presented to them, is the lack of some form of probabilistic reasoning mechanism.
There are approaches combining Bayesian nets and argumentation, e.g. Williams and
Williamson use Bayesian networks to assess mammograms and then use argumenta-
tion to explain the system’s conclusion to patients [81]. In William and Williamson’s
work, argumentation is merely a mechanism for constructing an explanation, it is not
a reasoning process. Vreeswijk [174] tries to use Bayesian networks to perform argu-
mentation. Mazzotta et. al. produce a similar system to Grasso et al. [11] which tries
to persuade people to behave in a more health conscious manner [108, 175]. Mazzotta
et al. use belief networks to model the persuasive power (strength) of each argument,
this allows them to estimate which argument will be the most powerful and in turn
tells them which argument to use. In essence, belief networks model the uncertainty
7www.cs.rpi.edu/~hendler/LittleSemanticsWeb.html
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of the strength of each argument.
Using a probabilistic mechanism would certainly help overcome a level of doubt
in the minds of many bioinformaticians with regards to argumentation. The question
remains: how to obtain the probabilities accurately? Seemingly, the solution is some
form of machine learning. However, the appropriateness of this paradigm is question-
able because of the limited availability of experts to help train the program, and the
small number of available variables on which to construct the model. In addition, it
is important to remark that the variables will change from resource to resource, thus
there may need to be several networks, one dedicated to each resource. A detailed
consideration of the surrounding issues is left as further work.
Regardless of how inferences are made, the application of natural language tech-
niques to improve the clarity of the message seems an obvious extension. A body of
expertise has been built up in the medical domain, where argumentation can be used
to provide clear statements to patients or medics - see Section 2.6.2 for more details.
An alternative style of computational argumentation could be employed - possibly
using the notion of a value-based argumentation framework (VAF) [78] in order to
counter the issue of subjectivity. VAFs (see Section 2.4.5) use the concept of an
audience to effectively create a new ordering, or preference, between arguments based
on the opinions of each audience member. This ordering will effect the ability of
arguments to defeat one another, and thus each audience member (biologist) may
have their own specific result. The concern is that there does not seem to be any
publicly available toolkit supporting the generation of a VAF.
It is plausible that the argumentation process could be re-envisaged as a dialogue
between the computer and the end user. Grasso et al [11] try to persuade users to eat
more healthily by using Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s notion of schemes [17] to
create suitable arguments whilst conversing with the user. This dynamic participatory
vision of argumentation was never considered. Biologists (or bioinformaticians) run
a tool (or tools), then analyse the output and finally reach a decision. Thus the
approach of Grasso would be antithetical to the standard practice in the biological
domain. It is impossible to state how a biologist would react to this radically different
paradigm without a formal evaluation.
Although this work concentrates on computational argumentation, with a virtual
191
Chapter 10. Analysis: Which form of argumentation?
debate being performed by the computer, there is room for alternative views of argu-
mentation to be successfully applied.
10.3 How can argumentation be implemented in
this domain?
Sharing the view of argumentation from the start of the preceding subsection, Chap-
ters 5 to 7 recount the manner in which argumentation can be implemented in this
domain. This particular discussion will focus on the perceived weaknesses of such an
implementation.
The architecture in Chapter 7 aggregates data from two online resources, and uses
the combined data as the basis for the argumentation process. However, there are a
number of basic issues with this process.
Firstly, aggregating data requires the integration of the resources. As Section 10.1
remarks, often this is not straightforward, and can be impossible. Secondly, querying
resources and pulling data may take a significant amount of time. If a substantial
volume of data is obtained, conducting the argumentation may likewise be a lengthy
activity.
The amount of time spent arguing depends on the rules and facts available. The
volume of relevant data available in the resources cannot be controlled, accordingly
the implementer must concentrate on the representation of that data. It is profitable
to spend time constructing a well considered, and optimised, set of rules and corre-
sponding portrayal of facts. However, such optimisation has its limits, and ultimately
it may be necessary to increase the efficiency of the argumentation toolkit. This, in
turn, may require an improvement in the underlying argumentation theory.
Decreasing the time spent querying the resources requires the initiation of some
form of caching. As the resources regularly insert new annotations, and amend exist-
ing annotations, maintenance of this cache might be a sizeable task.
It is worth noting that any implementation will be tied to the argumentation
toolkit utilised. Therefore, in order to truly answer the original question one must
first establish which toolkit is currently most appropriate.
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10.3.1 Which architecture seems appropriate?
In order to determine a suitable architecture, first it is necessary to decide upon the
goal of the system. If the goal is to produce a proof of concept, or prototype, then
the architecture presented in Section 7.3 is a logical starting point. It gathers all the
required data when needed, and proceeds to argue, before presenting the results to
the user. It represents an uncomplicated, reliable, mechanism by which to perform
the task.
As discussed earlier in Section 10.3, the response time of such a system may be
slow in cases where a considerable volume of data exists. Accordingly, the archi-
tecture implemented in this work would not be satisfactory in a production, or real
world, environment. In such a situation, caching of biological data and possibly some
common queries would be desirable. The addition of a cache would involve a minor
change to the architecture, and have little effect on the workflow described in Section
7.3.1.
It can be difficult to integrate the separate resources in order to argue with the
data they contain. Each resource will offer its own programmatic interface, which
may or may not provide full access to the underlying data. If full programmatic
access is not available then it may not be possible to pull the required data on the fly.
Additionally, resources routinely upgrade and extend their programmatic interfaces,
propagating change to the corresponding clients. In contrast, whilst the underlying
repositories are continually having new data added, changes to their structure and/or
organisation are far less frequent. With these considerations in mind, it becomes
sensible to explore the potential of creating a local cache using a dump from each
resource’s repository. Many resources, e.g. MGI8, publish a monthly dump of their
entire repository (including GXD, gene functions, pathways, et cetera). Whilst that
dump contains far more data than this work requires, the ability to create an optimised
workflow for extracting, processing, and locally storing the necessary data is enticing.
Furthermore, an increase in performance may be noticed as the access time for the
resource is removed. Ultimately, the decision on whether to use a local cache will
depend on the resources used and the access they provide to their data.
8http://informatics.jax.org/
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With respect to the architecture, a cache would either replace or increment the
existing databases. In terms of the workflow, whilst contacting the EMAGE database
(or perhaps instead of doing so) the system could contact the local cache and proceed
as per the rest of the workflow. If results are cached, rather than pulling data and
arguing with it, the arguments could be retrieved from the cache and sent to the user.
One possible omission from the existing architecture is a web service providing
programmatic access to cater for in silico experiments or perhaps the increasingly
popular “app” platforms represented by the latest generation of mobile devices. The
creation of such an interface to sit alongside the primary HTML interface presents no
problems and shall not be discussed further.
An appropriate summary of this discussion should remark that although the archi-
tecture from Chapter 7 may require extension and refinement, it provides a suitable
starting point for future work.
10.4 Is argumentation an appropriate mechanism
for resolving the issues in this domain?
The final aspect, or subquestion, of question 1 relates to the value of using argumenta-
tion to tackle the topics of inconsistency and incompleteness described in Chapter 4.
Can argumentation help a user unravel these issues and decide for themselves whether
or not a gene is expressed? The solution developed during this work aggregates data
from multiple resources and uses it as the foundation for an argument generation and
evaluation process, the results of which are presented to the user.
There are clear benefits associated with the aggregation of the data. It reduces
both the incompleteness and the number of resources a user has to visit. The one
negative is that it increases the amount of inconsistency.
Argumentation can be used to infer likely results for not yet performed experi-
ments, thereby reducing incompleteness further. For example, the following scheme
allows gene expression information to be inferred for a stage when the adjacent stages
have information:
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There is no experiment E suggesting R for gene G in tissue T
Experiment E2 suggests result R for G in tissue T − 1
Experiment E3 suggests result R for G in tissue T + 1
T − 1 is the equivalent of T but in the previous Theiler Stage
T + 1 is the equivalent of T but in the next Theiler Stage
When the same result occurs in the stage before, and the stage after, it is extremely
likely to be true for the stage in the middle
R is almost certainly true for G in T
In practice, for the current use case, there is only one implemented scheme that
directly tackles incompleteness, and the corresponding rule is seldom applicable. How-
ever, there is a perceptible potential that may be exploited more effectively in another
situation.
Upon the related problem of inconsistency, argumentation has a more dramatic
effect in this use case. If desired, the argumentation may produce some form of de-
cision as to which option (expressed or not expressed) is more likely according to
its knowledge and the available facts. Additionally, there is value associated with
the presentation of arguments without an opinion of expression. Simply exhibiting
arguments allows the focus to be on the arguments, and thus the expert knowledge
contained within. The reader can study the thought process of an expert, and under-
stand what items of data the expert values when evaluating the gene expression data.
Alternatively, if the reader is an expert, (s)he may access a wide range of relevant
information, from numerous resources, far quicker than by manual means.
A convincing justification can be created for employing natural language based
argumentation in most domains. For example, Green [12] uses the Toulmin scheme
to generate text that provides powerful, clear, explanations for people undergoing
genetic counselling. Green’s work is applied to creating pamphlets; nevertheless, it
could be adapted for use in an expert system.
This work concentrates on computational argumentation, as such the “argumen-
tation” in the question refers to it, not the natural language argumentation of Green.
The question asks if computational argumentation is appropriate - not if it is the
“most” appropriate mechanism. However, both questions are considered.
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Considering the explicit question, based on the experiences related in Chapters
7 and 8, the answer is positive. Computational argumentation can be successfully
applied in a valuable manner: the ability to tackle incompleteness and inconsistency
has been demonstrated. Moreover, the reasoning behind generated inferences can
be explained to a biological user. Yet, to counterbalance this, the scalability of this
approach is questionable.
The workflow documented in this thesis requires expert knowledge to be captured
as schemes then turned into inference rules. These rules must be fed into an argumen-
tation toolkit together with biological knowledge pulled from third party resources.
Building a client to each resource can be expensive, especially if the resource routinely
upgrades their programmatic interface. Documenting the expert knowledge is both
expensive and difficult - Chapter 11 discusses this in detail. If a resource expands the
type(s) of data it stores, the schemes/rules must be refreshed. The same is true if
a new resource is added. Likewise, it makes sense to periodically review/refresh the
schemes/rules to ensure they are still inline with current expert opinion.
Different approaches have not been compared in this thesis; therefore, it cannot
answer with certainty the second question: is the current mechanism the most appro-
priate? However, informal feedback from bioinformaticians suggests that they would
prefer a probabilistic solution. As discussed in Section 10.2, attempts at combining
computational argumentation and statistical methods exist. The most obvious hy-
brid would use a statistical calculation to assess the strength of an argument, or its
contributing domain information - Mazzotta et. al. [108, 175] do this within medical
informatics.
Another related issue of interest, is whether or not this is a suitable area in which to
apply computational argumentation. Although it is clear that other areas may provide
more information, and thus more fuel for debate, there is no obvious reason why
argumentation cannot be applied to the current domain. Yet, it must be remembered
that the fruitfulness of that argumentation (and many other techniques) will be limited
by the difficulty of integrating resources. To offset this, there is work proceeding into
the integration of the aforesaid resources. For example, the creation of a coordinate-
based reference space for the mapping and registration of neuroanatomical data [176]
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allows resources such as EMAP and ABA to map their individual anatomy models9
into this new coordinate reference system, and thus each other. Finally, with the
progression of such efforts resources may be truly integrated, ergo one limitation on
the success of argumentation will be removed.
Whilst it must be acknowledged that the tools to support argumentation are cur-
rently too immature for real world use, and the principles behind those tools require
refinement, both the metaphor of arguing and the practice of computational argu-
mentation have potential uses within the life sciences.
10.5 Summary
During this chapter an analysis of the constraints affecting this work led into a review
of the implementation from Chapter 7. Alternative methods for conducting compu-
tational argumentation are examined before a consideration of the appropriateness of
other forms of argumentation. The culmination is a discussion of the applicability of
computational argumentation to the current use case.
9ABA focuses exclusively on the brain, and so the entire anatomy model can be mapped. EMAP
covers the whole anatomy, and thus only part of it can be mapped.
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Analysis: Insights gained
The third, and final, question from Chapter 4 is studied here: What insights have
been gained from the work, and how does that inform the future use of argumentation
within biology? This provides a single subquestion: What foundations need to be laid
before the common uptake of argumentation in biology can take place? Additionally,
Section 7.7 added the following:
1. How accurate are the schemes (and associated strengths) developed in Chapter
6? (see Section 11.1)
2. Is the expert used in this work truly representative of his community? (see
Sections 11.1 and 11.2)
Chapters 9 and 10 contain a number of observations which have been exposed
during this work, rather than restating them, this section concentrates on knowledge
gained that does not fit directly into either of the previous sections. The goal is to
provide a critique of the areas in which improvements can be made and potential
pitfalls avoided.
This thesis has the objective of exploring argumentation within biological science.
To do so it was necessary to adopt a workflow that supported the creation of a
realistic system that might be applied within the chosen use case. The overarching
ambition was never to produce a perfect solution, nor present a overly optimistic
picture depicting argumentation as the solution to all the domain’s imperfections.
Instead the focus was on analysing the work undertaken, and striving to document
the knowledge accrued in the process. During this chapter a thorough analysis of
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the workflow leading to the creation of the system in Chapter 7 shall be performed.
This will highlight potential weaknesses, of the approach adopted in Chapters 5 to 7,
and possible remedies. Most of the discussions in this chapter relate to the modelling
of domain information: scheme creation (Section 11.1), the expert assignment of
strengths (Section 11.2), and the conversion into logical rules (Section 11.3).
The fact that the end of this document is able to provide such an analysis demon-
strates that the earlier work was successful - the use of argumentation within biology
has been investigated. Whilst this chapter makes clear that computational argumen-
tation needs to evolve, there is an undoubted potential to be exploited by future work.
Section 11.4 discusses the future of argumentation in biology before the summary in
Section 11.5.
11.1 Scheme creation
Ultimately, the schemes can only be as good as the mechanism that creates them.
Subsequent examination of this process reveals a number of issues from which future
work can benefit. As the workflow centres on the biological expert, so too do the
observations in this section.
The original expert’s job was to review experiments to produce annotations, which
are stored in the EMAGE database - the actual results are hidden away in journal
articles. As such, he performed the task the schemes model on a daily basis. Further-
more, as the senior editor, the expert had to supervise the other editors and where
necessary resolve differences of opinion. His expertise for the chosen use case was
unquestionable; however, the expert had no previous experience of participating in a
knowledge capture process, and found it difficult to engage with. As this discussion
makes clear, the extraction of expert knowledge can be very challenging.
There is little published research on the creation of argumentation schemes by a
domain expert with which to compare the current work. The available literature on
schemes often focuses on the dialogue and natural language aspects.
Silva et. al. [177] is interesting because it starts with already documented “rea-
soning templates” (effectively diagrammatic schemes) and asks a domain expert to
use those to explain his reasoning, customising them if necessary, during case-based
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reasoning. The act of customising the schemes provides a mechanism to help the
expert describe his knowledge. No such pre-existing schemes were available for the
current domain.
Shipman and Marshall [178] discuss the difficulties associated with working with a
number of knowledge formalisms, including argumentation and the Toulmin scheme.
Although their work does not focus directly on the application of schemes a number
of their ideas do transfer over, for example:
Tacit knowledge is knowledge users employ without being conscious of
its use [179]. Tacit knowledge poses a particularly challenging problem
for adding formal structure and content to any system since, by its very
nature, people do not explicitly acknowledge tacit knowledge ([178] page
342).
The notion that experts are not aware of all their own knowledge presents a massive
impediment for all knowledge-based approaches. Similar ideas can be found in the
work of Bliss [180], which suggests that experts develop mental models of concepts
and processes that can be very hard for them to access. Such knowledge, referred to
as deep knowledge, is unarticulated. Knowledge that has never been articulated can
be extremely difficult for the expert to recall [181, 180, 182]. The biological expert
was being asked to provide tacit knowledge, and struggled.
Bliss [180] suggests a further hurdle: mental models naturally evolve as the person
gains experience and knowledge, or as a result of the person consciously thinking
about their activities and knowledge. Consequently, the act of asking an expert to
document their knowledge can change that knowledge. This could explain why the
expert continued to modify the schemes. Essentially, the schemes only capture a
snapshot of the expert’s ever-changing mental model. The captured knowledge will
expire eventually, and thus the schemes need to be refreshed regularly.
In addition, Shipman and Marshall quote Mittal and Dim [183]:
We believe that experts cannot reliably give an account of their expertise:
We have to exercise their expertise on real problems to extract and model
their knowledge ([178] page 34)
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Essentially, if experts are trying to think about how they use their expertise, they are
not thinking about the expertise. In effect the task becomes thinking about how to
provide the knowledge required rather than actually providing it.
Mittal and Dims’ quote demonstrates that real world examples should have been
used from the outset, instead of introducing them in meeting 4.
The task facing the expert was made harder for him by the inexperience of the
analyst, and the analyst’s comparative lack of biological knowledge. This caused the
expert to simplify the discussions to a relatively high level - as commented on in
Section 6.3.2. Clearly it cannot be stated for certain that an evaluator with greater
biological knowledge would have generated more biological schemes.
On occasions when an attempt was made to capture biological ideas, the challenge
was often too arduous. An example of this was encountered in the third meeting,
and was the reason behind the change of approach requested by the expert. During
the second meeting, the expert had suggested that the area of the spatial mappings
could provide a measure of their quantity. Schemes 3, 4, and 5 from Appendix A.2.1
record the idea that the greater the number of individual voxels1 in which the gene
is expressed, the more likely the gene is to be expressed. Furthermore, the higher
the morphological match2, and data pattern clarity3, the more probable the voxel
mapping is to be correct. In the third meeting, the expert was asked which of the
three measures was most important - the goal being to create an ordering which could
be used as the basis of the degree of belief. This ostensibly simple question caused
the expert to ask his colleagues for assistance. They decided that a fourth measure,
model quality4, is most important, but concluded that further research was required
to rank the remaining three measures. Additionally, the editors believed that a new
investigation was required to identify a level at which a certain number (or percentage)
of voxels being expressed is meaningful.
1The 3D models are comprised of Volumetric Pixels (voxels).
2Indication of how well the EMAGE 3D model correlates to the subject of the experiment. It is
a score between 0 and 3, with 0 being terrible and 3 very good.
3Indicates how clear the experimental result is, again this is measured with a score between 0
and 3.
4The lower the quality of EMAGE’s model, the larger the voxels and thus the less meaningful
each voxel is.
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These schemes were removed, and a less elaborate replacement sought. The expert
was able to state that a spatial annotation can be dismissed when the percentage
mapped is less than 3% (scheme 7 from Appendix A.2.1). Yet, when asked to quantify
his assertion that the meaning of each percentage is weakened as the size of the tissue
increases, he felt that further experimentation was required. The scheme now says
that a spatial annotation is more meaningful than a second spatial annotation, if it
affects a larger area (the 6th scheme in Appendix A.2.1). Although this second scheme
appears to be a simplification of a complex matter, it is accurate, and as precise as
was possible.
The fundamental restraint, for both of the previous two examples, is a lack of bio-
logical knowledge. There are gaps in the community’s knowledge, hence the expert’s
knowledge is not complete.
A further topic of interest, is that several of the expert’s comments are open to
interpretation. For example, when the expert suggested that textual annotations are
more reliable than spatial annotations, was that a rule that should be implemented
as a scheme? Or was it a remark that related to the ordering of the schemes for those
annotations, and thus implied the relative degrees of belief for the annotations? Al-
though it is believed that both approaches are valid, the former was selected. In effect
the statement was treated as a rule in which the expert has a degree of confidence.
This may have been because the analyst was concerned with creating schemes, and
so had a propensity for interpreting the remark as such.
A final analyst related concern is the difficulty of managing a library of schemes.
Almost 70 schemes exist, and keeping track of these schemes and their interactions is
a sizeable task, as demonstrated by the existence of a small number of holes in the
knowledge, i.e. missing schemes. For example: what should happen when the same
resource produces conflicting conclusions for the same experiment5? There is a related
issue: when should the knowledge recording stop? Biology is a vast, interrelated series
of subdomains, therefore it is easy to cross boundaries and take tangential paths.
Moreover, it is not difficult to get lost in detailed discussions. It is not clear where the
5This can happen in a very rare situation in which a gene is said to be not expressed in a high
level tissue, but is described as being present in a substructure. Due to propagation, if the gene is
expressed in a child node, it is also expressed in the parent.
202
Chapter 11. Analysis: Insights gained
boundary between enough and too much knowledge lies. For example, although one
scheme relies on the idea of two annotations being from the same experiment, there
is no scheme that indicates how to identify this. Is this an implementation issue that
can be ignored, or an important piece of biological praxis that should be recorded?
The last expert related quandary identified is possible bias. In particular, scheme
5 from Appendix A.2 suggested the annotators of EMAGE are more reliable than the
annotators of GXD. This may be a correct statement; however, with no independent
expert to verify it, there is no way of ensuring its accuracy. Although other experts
are available, they too work for the EMAGE project - so the bias may not be removed
through their inclusion.
The potential bias raises an interesting question. Should the expert ever be over-
ruled? If the goal is to capture his knowledge, surely the answer is no? However, if
there is a clear bias should it not be “watered down”? The latter approach is em-
ployed in relation to scheme 5 from Appendix A.2, with the subsequent (6th) scheme
suggesting that a disagreement between the EMAGE and GXD editors should be a
reason to distrust both annotations. Yet this is in stark contrast to the previous
claim that the schemes would be a model of the expert’s reasoning. The justification
of this decision is not transparent. However, it is felt that including such a scheme
without asking for the opinions of the GXD curators is unacceptable. Furthermore,
the expert approved the weakened scheme, meaning it is logically no different to the
other schemes.
One possible solution to the issue of bias is to employ multiple experts. Addi-
tionally, including multiple experts may reduce the impact of evolving mental models
by excluding the most controversial (i.e. likely to change) ideas. Lindgren [184] is
working to create a decision support system for medics trying to diagnose dementia.
To aid this, together with her colleagues, Lindgren is building a framework that allows
medics to work collaboratively to create schemes [185]. Crucially, the medics are able
to work from fully researched and published medical guidelines, which means bias has
already been resolved. Obstacles such as tacit knowledge have likewise been removed,
as the medics merely convert the guidelines from one form (published document) into
another (list of schemes). Without the existence of biological guidelines, the current
task is substantially different to that facing Lindgren’s medics.
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Although the basic idea of collaborative scheme generation ostensibly seems promis-
ing, it raises some intriguing questions. Would allowing the expert the opportunity
of brain-storming ideas with another expert furnish more biological schemes? Would
it have helped the expert to dispense knowledge that he was unable, or unwilling to
do? Is it fair to believe that it would identify areas of personal opinion as opposed to
generally accepted opinion and scientific fact? Furthermore, what difficulties would
it in turn cause?
Shipman and Marshall contribute to this discussion:
The difficulties of creating useful formalizations to support individuals are
compounded when different people must share the formalization. . . . Differences
occur not just within a group of users but between groups as well. ([178]
page 344)
This raises the prospect of agreement between those that work as database cura-
tors; yet, conflict between that group and those who carry out the experiments. Might
this even go further, with disagreement between subgroups? For example between
industrial researchers and academics, or industrial scale researchers and traditional
small scale research labs. Clearly, some form of managed conflict resolution would
be beneficial. The fact that the experts may be in different geographical locations
suggests that the entire process of scheme creation may need to be based online. The
above concerns require further scrutiny.
11.1.1 Comments from the evaluation
In addition to the preceeding analysis, the evaluation in Chapter 8 advances reasons
to doubt some of the schemes. The evaluation is designed to test some of the schemes
the expert provided in Chapter 6. In particular, the expert proposed that the users’
opinion of the research team behind an experiment, and the journal that published
it, would impact on the users’ confidence in the experiment. For this to be true, the
users must recognise the research team and the journal. Clearly, the non-biologists
were unable to help.
Table 8.5 summarises the responses of the subjects upon being asked to supply
their confidence in journals related to the current use case. The standard deviation
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for each journal is relatively low, this suggests that the users have a similar opinion
of that journal. Furthermore, the average (mean) scores for the journals do not vary
widely, indicating that the users’ believe the journals to be of broadly similar quality.
These points seem to suggest that a scheme based on the users’ confidence in a journal
is redundant.
There were 9 biologists, including 4 domain experts. Yet Table 8.6 demonstrates
that most research teams (authors) are recognised by just 2 users. Again, this raises
qualms over the relevance of the associated scheme, it is likely that questions relating
to confidence in the research team should be hidden by default, with an option allowing
domain experts to answer.
The intuitiveness of the arguments (schemes) is called into doubt too (Figure
8.9). This time their author rated them as 8/9 - suggesting they were very intuitive.
However his colleague, and fellow EMAGE editor, responded with 3/9. As these
individuals perform almost the same role within EMAGE, it seems natural to suppose
their reasoning would be aligned far more closely. This contradiction leads towards the
conclusion that different biologists use different methods and patterns of reasoning,
which supports the claim that using only one expert for the creation of schemes is
insufficient.
11.2 Expert assigned strengths
Expert assigned strengths are measures of the confidence (degree of belief) the biolo-
gist creator had in each scheme. The aforesaid biologist disagreed with those strengths
during the evaluation, which raises concerns over the reliability of their capture.
As for the scheme’s strengths, they are mainly unremarkable. However, as Section
6.3.2 comments, the expert employs a small number of the values available to him.
This connotes that the mechanism of associating a percentage with the scheme is too
finely grained, prompting the question: what else could be utilised?
Silva et. al. [177] use symbolic methods to quantify the strength of an argument.
Essentially, their expert created a range of labels (e.g. “nuisance”, and “problem”)
which are assigned numerical values (nuisance = 6.0 and problem = 7.0). Then
symbols (so-called qualitative signs) are used to vary the final numerical score. For
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example, ++nuisance = 6.5. Such an analysis is based on the work of Fox and
Parsons [186] in the medical domain, indeed the symbols used (++,+,−,−−) are
very similar to a notation (+ + +,++,+) routinely used as a form of shorthand on
patients’ medical records. Fox and Parsons [186] compare a range of numerical and
symbolic dictionaries for use in their own argumentation implementation, logic of
argumentation [74]. Earlier work by some of the same authors, [187], awards a score
of ±1 or ±2 to each argument scheme, which is inherited by the generated arguments,
depending on whether the argument is strong (2), weak (1), for (+) or against (−)
the conclusion being argued over.
In this document, the strength of an argument is used in two ways. Firstly, the
argumentation engine uses it to resolve conflict between two arguments. Secondly, it
provides the end users with some indication of how reliable an individual argument
is. For the latter to be true, the mechanism for communicating the strengths must
be meaningful to the end users. The use of common medical shorthand makes sense
if creating a system for the medical fraternity. However, biologists do not use such
codes. Therefore no symbolic language is immediately available.
The use of natural language labels seems far more intuitive and user friendly. Yet
two issues exist here. First, is the expert’s definition of a term the same as the users’?
The resources, and the experts who work on them, use different labels as there is
no standardised vocabulary. Therefore, a level of vagueness and unreliability will be
introduced. The second issue is implementation related.
The ASPIC argumentation engine uses a degree of belief to capture an argument’s
strength - this is a floating point value between 0 and 1. Regardless of what mechanism
is used to capture the strength, it ultimately needs to be converted into a numeric
value. Such a mapping will need to be performed by the expert. Consequently, the
expert will have to assign numerical values to the schemes irrespective of whether he
initially assigns symbols or labels. Adding labels, or symbols, seems to add complexity
and work, for this reason, the expert was asked to deal entirely with numbers. The
simplest numerical abstraction appeared to be the idea of percentages, and so this
was employed. Additionally it has the advantage of being very easy to convert into
the floating point number that the argumentation engine stipulates.
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11.2.1 Expert reliability
An issue to be aware of when dealing with experts, is the accuracy of the individual
specialists. In this work an expert is used both to provide the schemes, and to assign
a degree of confidence to them. It is difficult to know how to proceed without such
input. Yet, as Walton notes, the users of expert opinion are often not capable of
judging the quality of that opinion and thus simply apply it:
It is quite common for presumptions to be based on expert opinion where
the person who acts on the presumption - not being an expert - is not in
a position to verify the proposition by basing it on hard evidence within
the field of expertise in question. ([55] page 39)
Walton goes on to caution that such experts, or authorities, may not prove to be
correct:
But even when they are nonfallacious, as used in a dialogue, appeals
to authority are generally weak, tentative, presumptive, subjective, and
testimony-based arguments. They are inherently subject to critical ques-
tioning, or even rebuttal, on various grounds - especially on grounds re-
lating to the reliability of the source cited. ([55] page 34)
Walton’s opinion is backed by a number of scientific studies, as Hansson reports:
Experimental studies indicate that there are only a few types of predic-
tions that experts perform in a well-calibrated manner. Thus, professional
weather forecasters and horse-race bookmakers make well-calibrated prob-
ability estimates in their respective fields of expertise [188, 189]. In con-
trast, most other types of prediction that have been studied are subject to
substantial overconfidence. Physicians assign too high probability values
to the correctness of their own diagnoses [190]. Geotechnical engineers
were overconfident in their estimates of the strength of a clay foundation
[191]. ([192] page 35)
These quotes combine to illustrate the difficulty in using expert opinion - often
it is not correct, and the user has no way of knowing what (s)he can trust. Again,
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this seems to advocate the need for a collaborative approach to scheme generation in
which multiple expert opinions balance one another, and thus remove prejudices and
errors.
Jeffreys et al. highlight that an extra range of complications must be considered
when dealing with biologists:
Different researchers interpret data in different ways, and even the same
researcher may make inconsistent interpretations, adding an unreliable
and non-uniform element to data processing. Once the data has been
interpreted, the reasoning behind an interpretation may be lost or only
vaguely recalled. When a researcher leaves a research group, the method
used to interpret data goes with them and is lost. Finally, the researchers
interpretation may be biased towards getting a preconceived result. ([9]
page 924)
The quote from Jeffreys et al. accentuates the importance of subjectivity to bio-
logical decision making: “Different researchers interpret data in different ways”. The
initial expert’s views on strength differ with those of his colleagues, and the other
experts in the evaluation. Such subjectivity affects not just the strengths, but the
schemes too.
11.3 Implementing schemes as rules
Making allowances for possible weaknesses within the scheme creation process, an-
other area of difficulty is the translation of schemes to rules for use in the argumen-
tation toolkit.
The expert who helped in this work was an individual with no knowledge of logic
and no desire to learn it. Consequently, although the expert created and then verified
the schemes he did not, and could, not verify the resulting logical inference rules.
Accordingly, there is the possibility that the rules do not match the intention of the
expert.
Although constrained natural language, the schemes are still natural language with
all the lack of precision that entails. Hence, a number of practical implementation
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decisions had to be taken when making the rules. For example, one scheme states
that when EMAGE and GXD have different textual annotations (one says the gene
is expressed, the other not expressed) for the same experiment that is a reason to
doubt both annotations. Although clear in meaning, this scheme does not state
how to decide when two annotations are derived from the same experiment. Nor
does any other scheme, which highlights a lack of depth to the schemes produced.
In this instance, the decision was made by comparing the citation information for
experiments.
Despite Verheij [62] publishing a seemingly clear mechanism by which to perform
the necessary transformation from scheme to logical rule there is still an element of
doubt because there is an aspect of subjective interpretation. Consider the following
scheme:
Spatial annotation SA suggests verdict V
Spatial annotations are a reasonable indication of expression
Therefore it is likely that V is true
1. Is SA reliable (correct)?
2. What do the textual annotations show?
3. How good is the morphological match?
4. How high is the pattern clarity?
It has four critical questions which are manifestly straightforward. Consider ques-
tion 1. The content is clear: if the spatial annotation is not reliable then this scheme
cannot be applied. Yet the implementation is not. Should this be an exception that
stops this scheme being applied when the annotation is not valid? Could it be that
a condition must be added forcing the spatial annotation to be valid? Might this
point to another argumentation scheme (or schemes) that consider(s) the validity of
spatial annotations? Although further guidance was sought in the literature, it was
not found. Perhaps this is because the solution is obvious to those with a (informal)
logic background that dominate the domain.
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In particular, the difference between extra conditions and exceptions seems minor,
surely these are the proverbial “two sides of the same coin.” The former favours
prevention, and the latter cure; however, the end is the same: an argument is stopped.
Examining the distinction from the implementation angle presents a different per-
spective. The extra conditions stop the argument being generated; however, the
exception allows the argument to be created and then kills it. Taking the argumen-
tation engine’s behaviour into account - in allowing the argument to be created and
then killed, the argument will appear as a defeated argument within the output. Yet,
if an argument is never constructed, due to extra conditions, it will not. Instead the
only sign of what happened will be buried deep inside the optional log, and thus lost.
Accordingly, modelling as an exception seems to be more explicit. Importantly, a
balance must be struck between providing users with all the necessary information,
and overburdening them with too many arguments.
While it is undemanding to implement the critical questions once they have been
categorised, performing the classification is more problematic, and often seems to rely
on personal opinion.
In summary, there are three distinct areas of concern associated with this trans-
lation process:
• The schemes are written in natural language and thus are open to interpretation;
• The mechanism for converting schemes to rules is not as explicit as initially
thought;
• The expert is not able to verify the logical inference rules.
One possible solution to all of these issues is the use of a framework designed to
help experts create rules for use in an argumentation system. Lindgren is working
towards creating a system to help physicians diagnose dementia [193]. The reasoning
undertaken by the system [184] is an evolution of the argumentation system created
by Parsons et al. [186], using Walton’s notion of schemes and critical questions.
Lindgrens’ work has the problem of which method to use to capture expert knowledge
for use in a rule based expert system. The chosen solution is to develop a collaborative
framework to allow medics to document clinical guidelines as schemes, and convert
the schemes to rules [185].
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There are clear parallels between Lindgren’s problem and the situation docu-
mented here. However, as Section 11.1 reports, there are disparities between the
current use case and Lindgren’s. Lindgren is working in the medical domain, and
thus her experts are interpreting a set of published rules (clinical guidelines) and doc-
umenting them firstly as schemes and secondly as logical rules. In gene expression no
such guidelines exist. Consequently, the biological expert employed here had to gen-
erate his own guidelines and views, which is a formidable task. Moreover, Lindgren’s
experts seem to have been working together at the same computer - it is not clear
whether her approach would work if the experts are geographically dispersed. De-
spite these obstacles, if ultimately proven successful, Lindgren’s solution may provide
a template for a similar approach in biology.
11.4 Foundations for future argumentation work
in biology
Throughout this thesis an exploration of argumentation in biology has been con-
ducted. The work has taken one form of argumentation theory and applied it to one
biological use case. By evaluating the approach taken, this thesis has demonstrated
that argumentation can be successfully utilised in the life sciences. Additionally,
analysis of the evaluation has provided a range of future extensions and/or alterna-
tive practises that could be used to improve upon the approach documented here.
This section will gather the various threads, from Chapters 9, 10 and 11, to create a
record of what needs to be improved/changed in order for computational argumen-
tation to flourish. There are two separate aspects to this current task. Firstly, what
needs to happen within the biological domain, and secondly the challenges facing the
argumentation community.
Starting with the biological domain, it is clear that integration of resources is
essential. Furthermore, the case study emphasised the importance of providing stan-
dards for improving the capture and documentation of provenance information. For
bioinformaticians to implement argumentation based solutions, they will require the
argumentation community to develop reliable standardised methods and toolkits.
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Related to the above comment regarding argumentation methods and toolkits is
the need for the community to make these items more readily available. Unfortu-
nately, argument is a very common word, so simply searching online for information
is often too general. For example, entering argumentation biology as a search term
into Google6 on the 31st August 2010 resulted in “about 11,600,000 results”. The
first result was the definition of argument from an online biological dictionary7. The
second was a series of articles presenting arguments for/against stem cell research8;
likewise, the third result was an online discussion of evolution9. The fourth was a
link to a paper [10] discussing natural language scientific arguments in science edu-
cation. Although the fourth result was argumentation, in the wider sense, it was not
computational argumentation. Changing the search term to computational argumen-
tation biology presented “about 754,000 results”, the majority of which dealt with
computational biology, not argumentation.
Other tasks for the argumentation world include tackling the open question of how
best to present arguments and argumentation, and the development of a collaborative
mechanism to enable biologists to develop and model the knowledge themselves. These
last tasks are interdisciplinary requiring input from social technologists to ensure the
environment is natural for the biological end users.
Noticeably, this chapter has concentrated on issues related to modelling the do-
main information. It appears that the effectiveness of computational argumentation
within biology hinges on the quality of the domain modelling. Regardless of the ap-
plication realm, the effort required to model domain knowledge is significant. This
prospective cost presents a substantial barrier to the successful adoption of compu-
tational argumentation. Yet the same is true for the Semantic Web, and as James
Hendler and others [194] have stated - a little semantics goes a long way.
6www.google.co.uk
7www.biology-online.org/bodict/index.php?title=Argument
8www.helium.com/knowledge/1388-arguments-for-and-against-stem-cell-research
9www.biology-online.org/biology-forum/about15556.html
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11.5 Summary
Chapter 11 concentrates on the laboriousness of domain modelling for the current use
case. It explores the knowledge capture and transformation processes, highlighting
the difficulties and discussing possible remedies. This chapter concludes by stating
that for computational argumentation to prosper within biology it is necessary to
better integrate biological resources and improve upon the number, and quality, of
argumentation tools and supporting methods available.
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Argudas: an evolution
Following on from the positive evaluation, discussed in Chapter 8, a grant proposal
was submitted to the BBSRC to create a tool based on the research contained within
this thesis. This was duly accepted, and work began on Argudas in spring 2010. Dr.
Albert Burger was the grant holder; however, the work was primarily driven by the
author, with assistance from Dr. Gus Ferguson who coded the user interface, and
helped with the evaluations.
Although this chapter is the penultimate chapter of this thesis, in actuality the
work described here was conducted in parallel with the maturation of Chapters 10 and
11. Appropriately, there is a relationship between these three chapters in which de-
velopments, and changes in understanding, related to one chapter impacted upon the
others. The current chapter is provided last because it facilitates a better presentation
of the narrative.
Argudas is designed to be an evolution of the work described in earlier chapters.
For that reason the system’s mechanics will not be discussed further. Instead this
chapter centres on the issues that have affected the work. The chapter starts by
reviewing the ways in which Argudas improves on the previous work (Section 12.1),
subsequently it examines additional problems identified during the development of
Argudas (Section 12.2), before reviewing the final system (Section 12.3). Concluding
remarks are made in Section 12.4.
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12.1 Improving on previous work
One issue clearly highlighted by the evaluation (Chapter 8) was the notion of subjec-
tivity. A second matter raised during informal discussions with typical users was the
breadth of information provided. These are two areas in which Argudas attempts to
improve on its predecessors. Priority was given to the former point, as it was likely
to have the most impact.
12.1.1 Reducing subjectivity
In order to make Argudas seem less subjective to the end users two main elements
were amended. Firstly, the summary of the result was removed from the results page.
Secondly, the schemes and their associated degrees of confidence were reviewed. Each
alteration shall now be explored and justified.
12.1.2 Reducing subjectivity: removing the conclusion
Pre-Argudas prototypes presented a one line summary of the debate at the top of
the results page, e.g. Figure 7.12 states “the arguments appear to suggest the gene
is expressed”. The evaluation, Section 8.1.3, demonstrates that the expert users were
divided with regards to this summary. Half of the experts used it, the other half did
not. A plausible reason for this is provided in the previously quoted text from Jeffreys
et al. [9]: “Different researchers interpret data in different ways”.
The phenomenon of subjectivity is explored, in relation to argumentation, in
the philosophical writings of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca [17]. Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce the notion of an audience to capture the idea that each
member of an audience has their own reasoning process, and thus each member of
the audience will judge the same argument differently. This means that there is little
point in the system trying to decide whether or not the gene is expressed. Instead
the system must generate arguments for and against the gene being expressed, and
allow the users to evaluate these arguments in order to reach their own decision. In
effect, the system should aggregate and evaluate data, presenting the relevant data
to inform the users’ decision making process.
Although the summary is a one line epitome of what the argumentation shows,
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users often interpret it as a decision. Accordingly, they expect it to match their
own reasoning. However, as Jeffreys et. al. and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
show, this is not realistic because users apply their own knowledge and beliefs, and
therefore may reach a different conclusion. In such an event, the summary provides
a reason to distrust the system, and effectively acts as a barrier between the system
and the users. That being so, Argudas does not present a one line summary. Instead
it aggregates, and interprets, information before recapping it.
12.1.3 Reducing subjectivity: schemes and degrees of confi-
dence
As remarked in Sections 11.1 and 11.2, a number of evaluation subjects (including the
original expert) disagreed with the schemes and the degrees of confidence assigned to
those schemes. Argudas did not have the resources to create a new set of schemes
as this was a substantial task; nevertheless, it was possible to review the degrees of
confidence. To this end, the original expert and one of his colleagues were asked to
review the entire list of previously generated schemes and award them a score:
0 disagree with the scheme;
? don’t know - scheme is very weak and is on the border between being rejected and
being classified as a weak scheme;
1 weak scheme, i.e. low confidence;
2 moderate scheme, i.e. medium confidence;
3 good scheme, i.e. high confidence.
In total, the two experts were asked to assign a score to sixty-eight schemes. The
experts completely agreed upon - that is they gave exactly the same score to - sixteen
schemes. A further thirty-three schemes were assigned a similar score. The notion of
similar being defined as an adjacent score, i.e. if one expert assigned 2, then either
a 1 or a 3 would be classified as similar. If the two experts assigned scores that were
neither adjacent nor exact matches, they were deemed to disagree - this happened
with 19 schemes.
216
Chapter 12. Argudas: an evolution
In conclusion, the experts broadly agreed on 72% of the schemes. This left 28%
of the schemes for which the disagreement was substantial. Regrettably, the original
expert (the EMAGE senior editor) emigrated shortly after this exercise was completed
and was no longer available to assist in the development of Argudas. Therefore this
disagreement was never resolved, nor was its root cause investigated.
Potentially the source of the disagreement was very interesting, as it was not clear
whether the conflict between the experts was caused by a genuine difference of opinion
or a difference of interpretation. As the schemes were written in natural language,
the latter is a distinct possibility.
12.1.4 Extending Argudas for richer argumentation
Argudas aims to improve on previous work with the integration of further resources
- more resources means extra information and the prospect of richer arguments. Ini-
tially the microarray data contained in ArrayExpress was targeted. Unfortunately,
this highlighted a number of integration issues.
Firstly, ArrayExpress does not use the EMAP anatomy ontology. Secondly, ac-
cessing the data held by ArrayExpress was difficult as they did not provide direct
programmatic access to their database. At that time access was via a RESTFUL
web service, which provided limited functionality and did not allow access to the data
required for this work. For example, initially it was impossible to ask for all the genes
expressed in a healthy mouse’s pancreas at stage 24 because ArrayExpress did not
compute multi-factor statistics. That is, they computed which genes were expressed
in the pancreas and which genes were expressed in stage 24 separately and there was
no way of presenting the intersection at that time. The team behind the resource
was working on improving this interface and claimed that such functionality would
become available in the future; however, the delay was problematic because of the
time constraints associated with Argudas. Finally, ArrayExpress had less data for
the developmental mouse than expected: only three stages were covered. Weighing
the costs and benefits it was decided not to pursue this integration further.
As work on ArrayExpress stopped an investigation of the Allen Brain Atlas (ABA)
and GENSAT began. Both of these resources are databases of in situ experiments
focusing predominately on the adult mouse’s nervous system, i.e. brain, spinal cord,
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et cetera. The latter project makes available a full database dump. The former
supplies an extensive range of RESTFUL1 interfaces that provide access to the desired
information.
However, bringing the data from these two new resources into Argudas is prob-
lematic. Neither resource uses the EMAP anatomy - as both focus on the brain they
have a finer granularity for the brain tissues than EMAP. Hence it is necessary to
attempt some form of mapping from their respective anatomies to EMAP. Moreover,
these resources use their own measures to describe the level of expression, GENSAT
natural language terms and ABA floating point numbers, which must be mapped
across to the corresponding EMAGE/GXD terminology.
Mapping between the different anatomy ontologies employed by the resources is
based on a series of alignments produced by Jime´nez-Lozano et al. [195]. As both
GENSAT and ABA have a finer granularity than EMAP, mapping from those re-
sources to EMAGE/GXD results in a loss of precision.
The second task is straightforward for GENSAT as their choice of labels is similar
to EMAGE’s2. Whereas EMAGE has not detected, detected, weak, moderate, and
strong GENSAT has undetectable, weak signal, and moderate to strong signal.
Mapping EMAGE/GXD expression levels to their ABA equivalents is more com-
plex. There are three separate measures of expression level published by ABA. Firstly
there is the raw experimental information, secondly there is the average information
(across all the experiments for a particular gene and tissue), and finally there is a
mathematical aggregation of the expression level and expression density. For current
purposes, the first class of information is most suitable. The ABA numbers must
be mapped to the EMAGE/GXD natural language descriptions. This is achieved
by using a list of mappings previously generated by ABA. These “mappings” are a
series of cut-offs that determine whether the expression level is not expressed, weak,
moderate or strong. There are different limits for each part of the brain. In order for
the limits to be applied to the tissues lower down in the anatomy hierarchy, the limits
need to be propagated through the brain in a similar manner to the gene expression
information.
1www.ibm.com/developerworks/webservices/library/ws-restful/
2Which, in turn, is very similar to GXD’s.
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Once this work has been undertaken it is necessary to determine what level of
integration is appropriate for these resources. At the most basic level it would be
possible to merely report the results contained in ABA and GENSAT. If either of
these resources agreed with an annotation from EMAGE/GXD, it would increase
confidence in that annotation. Fully integrating ABA and GENSAT would require the
generation of schemes for these resources, which is substantially more work and would
necessitate involvement by a resource expert. In the case of ABA such an approach
may not be fruitful; ABA does not publish all the data it collects, accordingly many
of an expert’s schemes may not be usable. The restricted resources of Argudas meant
that only the former option was realistic.
Although an interested biologist may raise a number of concerns regarding the
anatomy and expression level mappings described above, currently there is no better
way of aggregating data between the four resources of interest.
12.2 Changing the notion of arguing
As Argudas was developed it became clear that the number of arguments generated
varied enormously. For some queries there are no annotations and therefore no ar-
guments. With other queries over ten annotations were retrieved from EMAGE and
GXD, accordingly a large number of arguments were generated. For example, argu-
ing for bmp4 - future brain in stage 15 generated two hundred and fifteen arguments.
Clearly, no biologist would read all the arguments, hence there could be no guarantee
that (s)he would read all the important information. This realisation led to the con-
clusion that the potential number of arguments was too high, and steps were taken
to reduce it.
12.2.1 Reducing information overload
When Argudas generated a large number of arguments they were all unique in terms
of their content (wording, and order of words), yet semantically several arguments
seemed to duplicate one another. Identifying semantically equivalent arguments is
not a minor task. The definition of equivalent seems to depend on the individual
using the system and the biological task they wish to perform.
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There are a number of common interpretations and actions that are not appropri-
ate for certain biological tasks, and which individual biologists may, in general, reject.
For example, the EMAP anatomy ontology is defined using part-of relationships. The
outcome of which is that positive levels of expression are routinely propagated up
the ontology to higher level tissues; for example, if bmp4 is weakly expressed in the
telencephalon, it is normally correct to say that bmp4 is weakly expressed in the fu-
ture brain. Nevertheless many, but not all, biologists prefer direct annotations over
propagated ones, thus if a second annotation suggested bmp4 was not detected in the
future brain, the second annotation would take precedence.
Likewise, there is a similar problem with the granularity of information desired.
Finding two distinct annotations with the same conclusion is a powerful argument for
trusting the conclusion. However, the granularity of information desired affects the
decision as to whether or not the annotations are in agreement. Assume there are two
annotations: one annotation suggests bmp4 is strongly expressed in the future brain,
and a second annotation demonstrates bmp4 is weakly expressed in the future brain.
If the biologist is attempting to determine if the gene is expressed or not expressed,
then these annotations may be taken to agree. Yet, if the aim is to determine the
level of expression, these annotations are conflicting.
The goal of reducing the number of possible arguments was further hindered by
a user request for more positive aspects to be highlighted. For instance, although
an argument was created when the experiment’s probe information was absent, no
argument was created when it was present.
In summary, Argudas’ users appeared to wish for a broader range of prospective
arguments, and yet a smaller number of realised arguments. Reconciling these com-
peting aims seemed improbable, until someone remarked that the problem was not
the volume of the arguments but the amount of text to be read. It transpired that a
significant number of potential users wanted to scan information rather than read it.
12.2.2 The notion of argument reconsidered
Previous work, and the initial version of Argudas, used the ASPIC argumentation
engine to generate and evaluate arguments inside a virtual debate. These arguments
were presented to the users as a natural language paragraph - this display mechanism
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was chosen as it was the preference of the original expert. However, feedback suggested
this choice was subjective (Section 8.1.3). Furthermore, the potential for a large
number of arguments to be generated appeared to imply that the initial approach
was sub-optimal. There was a clear need to find an alternative method for displaying
arguments.
During internal project discussions it was proposed that the argumentation mecha-
nism should be reconsidered. This approach was based on the belief that users wanted
quick access to certain key attributes of the annotation. Theoretically there was no
need to employ the argumentation engine to create and evaluate arguments. Instead,
the most important schemes (as identified by the scheme revision process), should be
the basis for a range of key attributes that describe the annotation. The schemes
indicate whether or not the information stored in EMAGE/GXD should increase or
decrease a users’ confidence in an annotation. As such, Argudas should extract infor-
mation from the resources and present it, with associated key highlights, to the users.
It then becomes the duty of the users to evaluate the information.
In order to test this hypothesis two mock interfaces were created and evaluated.
There were three steps to each interface. The first two steps were the same: select a
gene and/or tissue of interest; report on the available annotations and allow the users
to ask for more information if desired. Figure 12.1 shows both of these: initially the
query is bmp4 - future brain in all stages; the query causes all combinations of the
gene and tissue to be displayed in a table. The table presents all relevant annotations,
summarises what each annotation shows, and provides a link to the resource’s web
page for that annotation.
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Figure 12.1: Mock-up of the user interface: simple form allows user to search for gene
and/or tissue in relation to a particular Theiler Stage. Doing so produces a table
summarising the relevant annotations found in EMAGE and GXD.
In some situations the table in Figure 12.1 would be enough to resolve a biologist’s
question; i.e. it is clear that bmp4 is expressed in the future brain in stage 14. On
the occasions when the table is not helpful, or does not provide enough information,
clicking the argue button provides more information.
In the first mock interface a number of textual arguments were displayed - in a
similar manner to Figure 7.12. The second interface can be seen in Figure 12.2 -
the arguments are now a list of key attributes such as multiple annotations agree.
Whether or not an attribute should strengthen a users’ confidence in the annotation
is indicated with a tick or cross. The attributes are divided into two layers - first
by expression level, and then by annotation. For each level of expression there are
three attributes that indicate how likely that level of expression is. Asking for more
information causes the second layer of attributes to appear. This allows the users
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to evaluate the annotations individually, and collectively as a group that promotes a
specific expression level.
Figure 12.2: Mock-up of the user interface: potential display mechanism for argu-
ments. Clicking on an argue button from Figure 12.1 produces an output where
different attributes are assigned a positive (tick) or negative (cross) indicator. Posi-
tive indicators demonstrate the annotation is more likely to be correct.
Informal exploration
The mock interfaces were explored with the assistance of two expert users from the
Medical Research Council ’s Human Genetics Unit (HGU). One expert had partici-
pated in the evaluation (Chapter 8) and in the revision of argumentation schemes
and confidence values discussed in Section 12.1.3. The second expert had attended a
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presentation on Argudas, but previously had not been involved in any work associated
with this thesis.
Each expert user was presented with a description of the planned evaluation,
then a structured walkthrough was conducted. Using a protocol, the user was guided
through each interface using the same search example: bmp4 - future brain - stage 15.
They were asked to raise any issues or aspects they liked or disliked while undertaking
the interface evaluations. The experts were then asked to score the interfaces out of
ten in terms of their usability. Ultimately, a limited set of questions was asked to
determine the users’ opinions of the requirements for refining aspects of the interface
and argument presentations. In particular, one question directly asked which style
of presentation the subject preferred. A second question asked how their favoured
approach could be improved.
Although the exploration was too limited to allow any statistical analysis, the
qualitative data collected provided useful indications for future development of the
system. During this small informal exercise, the test users were kept apart; however,
they reached identical conclusions:
1. the revised interface, using key attributes rather than textual arguments, was
better;
2. a further improvement could be made by placing the content of Figure 12.2 into
a table.
The experts differed in their implementation of the tabulation. One believed
the existing expression level layer of attributes was acceptable, and that only the
annotation layer should be converted into a table with one table for each expression
layer. The other expert user preferred all the expression level layer attributes in one
table, and all the annotation layer attributes in a second table.
Despite being limited, the evaluation demonstrated that the second interface style,
in which arguments become attributes, was preferred over the previous version.
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Figure 12.3: Final presentation mechanism for arguments. Clicking on an argue but-
ton from Figure 12.1 produces an output where different attributes are assigned a
positive (tick) or negative (cross) indicator. Positive indicators demonstrate the an-
notation is more likely to be correct. The first table covers expression level attributes,
with the second table providing details on the individual annotations.
12.3 Argudas: the final system
Following the investigation discussed in Section 12.2.2, in-house experimentation was
conducted by the author in conjunction with Dr. Ferguson. After due consideration,
the second expert’s approach was adopted - see Figure 12.3.
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Figure 12.3 represents the final presentation mechanism. The important schemes
have become columns. Strengths of expression are featured as rows in the first table.
A tick indicates a positive reason to trust the level of expression, a cross provides a
reason to doubt the level. The three dots underneath a tick or cross indicate that more
information is available as a mouse-over, e.g. the tick for strong - multiple annotations
agree presents the experiments with matching annotations. The second table has one
row dedicated to each annotation. The strengths of expression are colour co-ordinated
with the first table. The key is the same, with the addition of blue dashes reporting
that data is unavailable.
The top table in Figure 12.3 is fixed in size - one row for each level of expression.
The bottom table in Figure 12.3 varies in length, according to the volume of infor-
mation available. The greater the number of relevant annotations, the more rows the
table has. Whilst there is the potential for the bottom table to become very large
it does not happen currently. Due to the incompleteness of the domain, in the vast
majority of cases there are considerably fewer annotations (less rows) presented than
shown in Figure 12.3. Of course, the underlying resources continue to grow, and in
the future the size of the bottom table may become an issue. However, it is worth
remarking that biologists are used to dealing with long outputs, for example BLAST,
and are adept at quickly scanning for the desired information.
The conclusion, from Section 12.2.2, that key attributes should be presented in
tabular format is very significant. Implementing the recommended tabulation has a
major side effect: there is no need to perform computational argumentation. As such,
there is no need for the argumentation engine. Instead the users now perform the
argumentation themselves using the aggregated and curated information presented
by Argudas.
One consequence of this is that only those with a knowledge of the use case are
able to use Argudas, which makes it more restrictive than earlier work. Offsetting
this, is the positive way in which the change helps address the issue of subjectivity.
This occurs because the users are now able to apply their own confidence values and
criteria to the decision making process. Furthermore, because the users are able to
build their own arguments, Argudas becomes a more flexible tool. For example, it is
now possible to use Argudas to decide where, and at what level, a gene is expressed.
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12.3.1 Changes to the architecture and workflow
The removal of the ASPIC argumentation engine, and the change in the presentation
mechanism are only two of the improvements to previous work. The inclusion of data
from ABA and GENSAT requires a significant amount of pre-processing in order
to conduct the alignments. Furthermore, GENSAT has no real time programmatic
access point. Caching data locally is the only option.
With a local cache already a necessity, it seemed prudent to explore the potential
of caching data from EMAGE and GXD. Whilst the population and maintenance of
this cache creates a significant workload, it greatly improves access times to Argudas.
All the experimental data, from all four resources, is now cached.
The removal of the argumentation engine significantly simplifies both the archi-
tecture and the sequence diagram from Chapter 7. Essentially, Argudas is now a
client-server system that presents information contained in a database. When a user
enters a query, Argudas contacts the local cache and gathers all relevant experimental
data. Data is analysed according to the knowledge contained within the argumenta-
tion schemes, aggregated and finally presented.
12.3.2 Evaluation
Evaluation of the second, and final, version of Argudas involved testing the user ex-
perience with a number of biologists, bioinformaticians, and computational biologists
working with/for the HGU. The functionality of Argudas had already been evaluated
with previous versions of the user interface, so this evaluation was aimed solely at
evaluating the new version of the user interface and the method of presenting results.
Method
In total eight individuals took part in the exercise over the course of a single day. The
evaluation was performed on site, at the HGU, using a Chrome browser running on
an Apple Macintosh laptop computer.
Due to the busy schedule of the evaluation participants, the evaluation was kept
to twenty minutes. The first half was a structured walkthrough, in which the users
were guided through the process of a typical query. The second half consisted of
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a standardised usability evaluation questionnaire and a number of more open-ended
questions to gather the users’ opinions on the proposed presentation of results. The
protocol can be seen in full in Appendix G.
Results
The evaluation of Argudas was too small to draw any statistical conclusions. However,
the evaluation questionnaire presents a good summary of the tool’s usability - see
Figures 12.4 to 12.8.
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Figure 12.4: Please rate the response time, excellent (1) - bad (5)? Median = 1.13.
Figure 12.5: Please rate the appearance, excellent (1) - bad (5)? Median = 2.
Figure 12.6: How easy did you find the first table to understand, very easy (1) - very
difficult (5)? Median = 1.
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Figure 12.7: How easy did you find the second table to understand, very easy (1) -
very difficult (5)? Median = 3.
Figure 12.8: How easy did you find the third table to understand, very easy (1) - very
difficult (5)? Median = 2.5.
Discussion
Argudas presents its output inside three tables. The first is presented in Figure 12.1.
The second is at the top of Figure 12.3, and the third is at the bottom of Figure 12.3.
In contrast to the first Argudas table, the second and third tables received rela-
tively low scores in the evaluation (compare Figure 12.6 to Figures 12.7 and 12.8). It
is believed that this performance is related to two minor design issues highlighted by
the evaluation. Firstly, almost all users managed to miss the key (see Figure 12.9)
that was displayed above the second Argudas table, and thus were confused by the
blue dash (the dash, or hyphen, can be seen in the second table in Figure 12.3 where
it appears inside cells that do not have a cross or tick). Secondly, few users were
able to discover the mouse-overs without assistance. The second issue is related to
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the first, because the mouse-overs were described within the key. However, it is also
caused by the non-intrusive design of the mouse-overs. The three dots, used to indi-
cate the presence of a mouse-over, were deliberately subtle because of a desire not to
overpower the associated tick/cross. While this aspiration was undoubtably met, it
transpired that many users simply did not see the dots. Clearly, there is a balance to
be struck, and the current approach requires enhancement.
Figure 12.9: The key that explains how to interpret the tables in Figure 12.3.
Further experimentation will be required to resolve the mouse-over matter. Mak-
ing the key more prominent is a less challenging task. This can be achieved by simply
moving it from above, to beside, the tables it describes. Alternatively, having the key
float alongside the tables, as the user scrolls through the page, is an option.
Whilst additional work is needed, there is no doubt that the latest version is
an improvement on earlier interfaces. By allowing users to “eyeball” information,
Argudas provides a quick way of surveying and assessing all available information.
12.4 Summary
Argudas - a real world tool based on the research contained within this thesis - is the
theme of this chapter. The discussion recounts the evolution of Argudas from a system
using computational argumentation towards a system that utilises notions, such as
argumentation schemes, from argumentation theory. As part of this transformation,
the presentation of information shifts from a traditional argument-centric approach,
to a tabular format bespoke to Argudas. The revamp is in direct response to user
feedback and is a reflection of the users’ changing attitudes to the system.
231
Chapter 12. Argudas: an evolution
Ultimately, the system generated reflects the wish of the users to quickly scan
the range of available information. Accordingly, Argudas is a success from the users’
perspective.
Argudas demonstrates that the metaphors of argument and argumentation are
very powerful; however, the associated technology has not matured sufficiently to
merit adoption. In essence, Argudas is an “argument” for the future application of
computational argumentation in real world biological applications.
In summary, this chapter echoes the message of the Chapter 10: the tools and
methods supporting computational argumentation need further development, yet the
metaphor of arguing can be used within the life sciences already.
232
Chapter 13
Conclusion
Simplicity and naturalness are two characteristics of argumentation, which render it
comprehensible and thus make it a powerful tool. This is the insight with which
this work begins. Subsequently, argumentation is applied within a representative
biological use case in order to determine the merit of applying argumentation to the
wider life science world.
The final chapter of this thesis reviews the narrative of the journey, from concep-
tion to evaluation, documented within this thesis. Pivotal stages along the path are
recalled, before ultimately summarising the contributions of this work.
Section 13.1 starts the chapter by outlining the use case. Next, Section 13.2
provides a pre´cis of the content of this document before the key contributions are
reviewed in Section 13.3. Section 13.4 contains a brief exploration of potential future
work, before Section 13.5 provides a conclusion to this work.
13.1 Recap of use case
Whilst it seems apparent that argumentation can be applied within biology, it is
appropriate to test such a belief. This thesis does just that, focusing on a use case
from the sub-domain of in situ gene expression for the developmental mouse.
The developmental mouse is the mouse from the moment it is conceived, until the
moment before it is born. The changes that occur over this period are documented
in a series of so-called developmental stages. These stages are used to assign a time
to the gene expression information captured through experimentation.
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DNA is the body’s blue-print. It tells the body what to build, how to build it,
and when to do so. DNA is split into modules called genes. Each gene is responsible
for a small deed, accordingly genes need to collaborate in order to achieve significant
outcomes. Via a complex series of chemical reactions the instructions contained within
each gene are activated and de-activated at different times during the development of
the mouse.
An in situ gene expression experiment aims to determine to which areas of the
mouse’s body a particular gene is contributing. Furthermore, the activity of the
gene is tied to a time through the use of the developmental stages. Due to the
complex nature of the domain, results cannot be guaranteed to be accurate. Nor
can the interpretation of the results (so-called annotations) be trusted automatically.
Accordingly, contradictions are common. Moreover, not every gene has a complete
expression profile because not every experiment has been performed.
Experimental results are spread across a number of resources, which are individu-
ally, and collectively, incomplete and inconsistent. This situation is repeated across a
number of sub-domains in the life sciences, making the chosen use case representative
(in this particular aspect) of the life sciences in general.
13.2 Thesis synopsis
This thesis starts by describing argumentation and the subset of it devoted to com-
putational argumentation. It paints a rich picture of a domain in which the notion
of a reason to believe something (i.e. an argument) can be used as a unit of rea-
soning within a debate (i.e. argumentation). These basic notions may be applied
to tasks which are seemingly unrelated, or they can be utilised to model human-like
interactions and reasoning processes.
In situ gene expression for the developmental mouse is the use case for this work.
The critical characteristics - from the perspective of this work - are the inconsistent,
incomplete and distributed nature of the underlying information.
When considering the best mechanism for tackling the issues associated with the
use case, three elements of argumentation immediately appeal. Firstly, the ability
to debate the accuracy of a particular conclusion: for example, the gene is (not)
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expressed. Secondly, the use of arguments, created during the debate, as explanations
of the reasoning process. Finally, the idea of automating the above concepts in order
to create a system that can reason over the underlying information and help biological
users resolve the inherent limitations of the use case.
With this overview, it becomes necessary to consider the exact form of an ar-
gument: what is it a reason to believe? Contemplating the domain’s information:
biological researchers perform an experiment, documenting the result as an image.
This is interpreted to produce a series of annotations: e.g. the gene is weakly ex-
pressed in the brain. Collectively this information may be published in a journal.
Additionally, or alternatively, it will be published by one or more online resources.
These resources, for example EMAGE and GXD, attempt to verify then publish the
annotations. Furthermore, they publish the image that documents the result along
with some basic provenance information.
Biologists use resources like GXD to discover where a gene is expressed. This
means the overall goal of the argumentation should be to do likewise. An expert
biologist will examine the individual annotations, attempting to gauge their validity,
and ultimately arriving at a conclusion as to whether or not a particular gene is
expressed in a specific tissue. The argumentation process mimics the real world. As
a result, arguments are reasons to believe that a gene is, or is not, expressed in a
particular location. To further define the notion of argumentation for this situation,
it is necessary to consider the relationships between the different types of information
available.
Experiments are the basis for the journal articles, which are often the foundation of
the entries in EMAGE and GXD. However, the journal articles are unstructured data
sources, and although many are now open access, without text mining their content
is out of reach. Arguments must originate solely from the content of resources like
EMAGE.
Delving deeper, the annotation is essentially supported (or justified) by the other
information (image and provenance) held in the database. Conflict may occur be-
tween two experimental results (i.e. images) or between the interpretations of those
images. As there is no automatic way to analyse the images, the former is ignored.
Argumentation may be used to debate which interpretation is most likely to be accu-
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rate. Additionally, argumentation may be used to postulate an annotation when the
necessary experiment has not been undertaken.
In order to automate this debate, a third party argumentation engine is applied.
It consumes knowledge of how to interpret the domain information, together with do-
main information, before delivering arguments. EMAGE and GXD supply the domain
information, thus only the knowledge of the best means to analyse that information
is missing. As this knowledge is confined to a limited number of experts, at least
one of this number must convey their understanding of how to construe the biological
information.
The expert employed in this thesis was the senior editor of EMAGE. His knowledge
is captured and documented using Walton’s notion of schemes. An argumentation
scheme is essentially a natural language rule with premises and a conclusion. When
the premises are true, the conclusion is likely to be valid too. In order to determine
the appropriateness of applying an individual scheme in a given context, they are
commonly associated with a number of critical questions. When asking a question, a
negative answer makes the application of the scheme doubtful.
Following a number of meetings, and iterations, the expert’s knowledge is docu-
mented within schemes. Additionally, each scheme is assigned a so-called degree of
belief. This is a score which indicates the expert’s confidence in the scheme. The
higher the value, the higher the confidence. Eventually, the schemes are used to
generate arguments, to which the scores are passed on. These scores allow the ar-
gumentation engine to settle disputes - when two arguments are contradictory, the
argument with the higher score wins.
The argumentation engine indirectly applies the schemes. Before schemes can be
used, they have to be converted into the engine’s own language - a PROLOG-like logic.
This is achieved by following the method Verheij published. His technique involves
converting the natural language inference rule into the desired logic, and then using
the critical questions to add extra conditions, contradicting rules or exceptions.
With a basic outline established, a couple of prototypes were implemented in
order to evaluate the approach and the underlying notion of argumentation. The
basic workflow, created in this thesis, entails extracting information from the domain
sources before feeding that information into the argumentation engine beside the con-
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verted expert knowledge. In response to a query, the argumentation engine generates
arguments, which are presented to the user.
While the above workflow, and related architecture, remain largely static during
this work, the presentation of arguments and argumentation evolves. It is necessary
to adapt the presentation for the typical end user; however, this is a challenge.
All of the systems built in the lifetime of this document were evaluated. Some
formally, others informally. On occasions the evaluations focus solely on the presen-
tation of arguments and argumentation, at other times the value of the concepts of
arguments and argumentation are explored. Additionally, the reliability of the expert
knowledge, and his assignment of scores, are dealt with.
The evidence from these evaluations is combined with the experience gained during
this work to produce an analysis of the suitability of computational argumentation
within the life sciences. This analysis is formed in parallel to the creation of Argudas.
Discussion of Argudas - a real world tool attempting to tackle the above issues
in the current use case - concludes the thesis. It builds upon the understanding
obtained during this work to produce a platform that allows a quick inspection and
consideration of the information held within EMAGE and GXD. Due to the timing
constraints and the difficulty of presenting arguments, computational argumentation
is currently not the most appropriate technology for the system biologists envisage.
Accordingly, it is removed from Argudas.
Despite the frustrating conclusion to Argudas, the evidence from this work suggests
that argumentation will be eminently useful within the biological domain once its full
potential is realised. The simplicity and accessibility of argumentation render it a
powerful metaphor that will undoubtably increase in value and popularity as the
complexity of computational endeavours in the life sciences intensify.
13.3 Review of contributions
During this thesis the following contributions to academic knowledge and the life
science community are made:
• Creation of argumentation schemes to document expert knowledge relating to
the analysis of gene expression information;
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• Development of an architecture for an argumentation-based platform, which
aggregates distributed data before arguing with it;
• Investigation of the mechanisms with which argumentation can be presented to
a biological audience. Encompassing evaluation, analysis and direct comparison
of a number of presentation forms including natural language representations
and graph-based visualisations;
• Exploration of a gene expression use case leading to a consideration of the
application of argumentation in the biological domain including an assessment
of the role of the wider notion of argumentation theory plus the application of
computational argumentation;
• Review of the issues that hinder the development of argument-based solutions
within biology;
• Proposal of ideas for the development of both argumentation and biology to en-
able further penetration of argumentation-related technology into the biological
domain;
• Implementation of a real world tool that implements, evaluates, and evolves the
ideas discussed in this work;
• Frank consideration of the future role of the notion of argumentation within the
life sciences, including the genesis of a number of key questions regarding the
future of this technology.
In general, there is a lack of experience papers describing the use of argumentation.
This thesis, and its associated publications, help reduce this gap.
Argumentation schemes
This is the first time expert knowledge of how to interpret in situ gene expression
information for the developmental mouse has been captured. In a series of meetings,
the expert’s knowledge was modelled in a number of argumentation schemes, before
being translated into inferences rules for use by the argumentation engine.
During this work the range of impediments associated with such an endeavour
are explored and documented. It transpires it is impossible to provide a complete
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picture of the expert‘s knowledge; regardless of the method used. Even if it were
possible, the model would not cover the full range of reasoning within the domain as
different experts reason in different ways, i.e. multiple experts need to collaborate.
The schemes featured in this thesis provide a building block for future work. They
can be used as a foundation for extending the current work, or they may be analysed
in order to understand (or perhaps classify) the arguments used by biologists in this
domain. These schemes potentially could become part of a larger corpus designed
to help argumentation scholars document and study biological reasoning in general.
Moreover, the schemes can be used by other systems wishing to generate natural
language arguments and explanations.
Additionally, the process undertaken to capture the expert knowledge as schemes
and translate it into inference rules is documented. The experience presented should
enable forthcoming researchers to avoid some of the obstacles encountered during this
exercise.
Architecture
In order to evaluate the ideas contained within this thesis, it was necessary to im-
plement a prototype. Two such systems were conceived. Both followed a high-level
architecture, and corresponding workflow, designed specifically for the purpose.
A key component of both the architecture and the workflow is that they are suffi-
ciently high-level to allow the users to include whichever source(s) and argumentation
toolkit they wish.
One of the main lessons learnt, when developing the prototypes, was the need
for flexibility. Biological resources are heterogeneous and often difficult to integrate.
When deciding whether or not to use local copies of data and caching, it is necessary
to consider the availability, performance, and functionality of the individual resources
being integrated. A solution may be appropriate for one resource, but inappropriate
for a second. As the resources evolve over time, these decisions may need to be revised.
Presentation of arguments
The presentation of biological information and knowledge is often complex. The
addition of arguments and argumentation adds another layer of difficulty. Before this
work, there was no study of how arguments and argumentation could be presented to
a biological user group - was there even a need to specialise the presentation?
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Whilst this document has not found the ideal presentation mechanism, if such
a thing exists, it has shed light onto a number of important aspects. Firstly, the
results of the evaluation suggest that no single presentation mechanism is likely to
satisfy the community. Secondly, the commonly used presentation styles within tra-
ditional argumentation theory are insufficient. Of the common presentation methods,
a Toulmin-like left-to-right approach seems most suitable. Yet, subsequent work in
Argudas implies that it too can be improved upon.
Argudas clearly shows that biologists wish to scan information, and are unwilling
to read large volumes of text, regardless of whether that text is in a paragraph or
in a diagrammatic form. Therefore, the ideal solution will allow both scanning of
arguments and provide the support (reasoning) non-experts need. Whilst Argudas
allows the former it does not supply the latter, leaving the presentation of arguments
as an open question.
Application
Argumentation is not solely about reasoning. It is successfully used for natural lan-
guage generation, and within pedagogical environments. In the former it can help
improve communication between an expert and a non-expert, or between a system
and its users. Clearly, there are many roles for such technology in almost any domain.
In the classroom argumentation helps improve the scientific writing, and debating, of
students. Again, this is very worthwhile; however, it is not immediately applicable to
the current use case.
Focusing on this use case, using argumentation for reasoning seems profitable. As
argumentation is a form of non-monotonic reasoning it can handle the incompleteness
and inconsistency inherent in the use case. Computational argumentation has not
been applied, for this purpose, within the biological domain before. The only previous
work attempted to model expert reasoning in order to analyse the output of a tool,
not to tackle issues discussed above.
In order to successfully apply argumentation it is necessary to comprehend the
domain and the flow of information (and knowledge) within it. Analysing this leads
to an understanding of what an argument is - a reason to believe a gene is (not)
expressed - and what form the argumentation should take (reviewed in detail Section
13.2).
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Argudas
Ultimately, this line of work produced a real world tool to help biologists tackle the
problems of their use case. Argudas clearly demonstrates the potential of argumen-
tation by using the metaphor of an argument to construct a platform that allows
knowledgeable biologists to quickly reason for themselves using the data from a range
of underlying resources. By aggregating that data, and presenting its key attributes,
Argudas allows biologists to rapidly survey the field and make decisions without hav-
ing to directly consult multiple resources.
Current issues
This thesis contains a substantial discussion on what is hindering the progress of
computational argumentation within the life sciences. Naturally, this discussion is
closely related to ideas for developing future work. Some of the central themes of
these debates will be recapped below.
There are clearly issues impeding the integration of biological resources. They
ensure that all knowledge systems are handicapped. Work to alleviate these concerns
is ongoing; however, they will continue to have a considerable impact over both the
short and medium horizons.
A second biological barrier, is the level of subjectivity within the field. Unlike
medics, biologists often do not publish best practice guidelines. Argumentation seems
an ideal solution to this as it allows multiple opinions to be used within a single
reasoning process. Yet, capturing all these different opinions and knowing when to
trust one expert more than another is not a trivial matter.
One final issue relates to the workflow undertaken for this thesis. Whilst this
document clearly demonstrates computational argumentation can be applied within
the life sciences, there is no doubt that the process followed here is expensive. This
is largely due to the cost of capturing expert knowledge, and so is not a reflection on
argumentation per se; however, it may reduce the willingness of others to follow the
approach outlined here.
Ideas for development
As highlighted in the proceeding paragraph, the argumentation community needs
to develop a range of tools and supporting methods to improve the reliability and
usability of argumentation. The existing tools are often academic proof of concepts,
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lacking the scalability necessary for real deployment. Additionally, the range of tools
needs to be increased. For example, where is the user-friendly program that helps
users build a library of schemes? Moreover, why is there no published method telling
non-experts how to do so?
Currently, the argumentation world assumes it is communicating with fellow schol-
ars. However, for argumentation-centric methods to break through into the main-
stream, argumentation theory has to start addressing people who do not have a tra-
ditional background. Furthermore, they must do a better job of aggregating and
presenting their output to the “real world”. It is too demanding to search for ar-
gumentation related activity. The whole panoply of argumentation activity should
be presented via a single portal that provides instruction to users regardless of their
background: expert, intermediate or beginner.
Future role
This thesis outlines a number of critical aspects for the future of argumentation within
this domain. Nevertheless, the hypothesis with which this work began remains in-
tact. Originally, argumentation was explored because it was believed that the sheer
simplicity of the concept yielded a raw intuitiveness that made it amenable in ways
that other forms of reasoning were not.
It appears that argumentation may, in some areas, need to be supplemented with
more opaque forms of reasoning, for example Bayesian networks, yet the instinctive
nature of argumentation should still carry significant potential.
13.4 Future work
In some senses this document, and the work it describes, is practically complete.
Argumentation has been explored and conclusions have been drawn. As the preceding
text makes clear, there is much to do before argumentation can be pragmatically
applied within the life sciences. It would be simplistic to suggest, therefore, that until
argumentation technology moves forward there is little to be done.
Earlier in this work a raft of potential next steps was discussed: taking the current
approach into additional sub-domains of biology, developing the presentation of argu-
ments and argumentation, improving the scalability and reliability of argumentation
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engines and similar toolkits, creating methods and supporting tools that can be used
by non-experts to generate and maintain libraries of schemes, and the production of
materials to help users better understand argumentation theory. As these ideas have
been examined before, the details shall not be rehashed here.
Instead, this section shall conclude with the following remark. Unless biologists
play an active role in the development of argumentation, argumentation will not evolve
in a way that suits the life sciences. Likewise, unless experts from domains such as
psychology and sociology are drawn in, there is the real likelihood that argumentation
will never fulfil its potential as a bridge between a biologist and his/her computer.
Accordingly, all future work should start with the goal of being as multidisciplinary
as possible.
13.5 Final thoughts
The raw potential of argumentation in A.I. is clear. Yet, currently, one must make a
distinction between the use of argumentation as a metaphor, and the application of
argumentation-centric tools and methods provided by the argumentation community.
The former can be successfully applied today, whilst the latter is still awaiting its
time.
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Full list of schemes
Schemes are given in two parts. Part one is the natural language inference rule; part
two is the critical questions. The latter is identifiable by the use of an enumerated list;
however, not all schemes have these questions. Following the scheme some comments
may be provided.
Please note the following:
• Capital letters, e.g. E, indicate variables - unless it is the name of an experi-
mental technique: ISH, or SAGE;
• The ¬ symbol is used to imply the opposite or negative of something - if result
R indicates that a gene is expressed in a tissue, ¬R indicates the gene is not
expressed;
• ‘is (not) expressed’ should be taken to mean that the scheme can work either
when the gene is expressed or is not expressed;
• The result of an experiment will vary according to the technique used, e.g. ISH
produces an image showing a section of a subject, whereas microarrays provide
a picture of the array itself. However, here the term result will be used to refer
to the information published1 indicating the researcher’s belief a gene is (not)
expressed in a tissue;
1‘Published’ in the broadest sense as the information need not be printed in a journal, merely
submitting the information to EMAGE for inclusion in their resource also counts.
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• The term annotation will refer to the EMAGE/GXD Editor’s interpretation of
the result. It is the annotation which is published in their database - in the
case of EMAGE this can be spatial or textual. Note the annotation may differ
from the result on which it is based;
• V erdict will be used to indicate the view - gene is (not) expressed - supported
by the result or annotation. Can also refer to the final conclusion reached by
the user.
Please note that the term verdict is an artificial construction used here to simplify
communication. There was a need to distinguish between experimental results and
conclusions drawn from those results; however, the term ‘conclusion’ was not used to
avoid confusion with the term given to the result of an inference rule.
Most schemes have an associated ‘STRENGTH’, this indicates the expert assigned
degree of belief. As such, it represents the level of confidence the user has in any
arguments created from the scheme. The schemes that were retracted by the expert
do not have associated strengths, likewise, some that could not be implemented have
no assignment.
The current section will be divided according to the subject area of the schemes.
A.1 Experimental Reliability
The schemes in this section are loosely related to experiments; however, in many cases
the underlying reasoning would be equally applicable to annotations.
There are N number of experiments indicating result R
The greater the number of experiments supporting the same result, the more
likely the result is to be true
Therefore R is N to be true
This scheme was retired in meeting three, as the expert felt there was no difference
between 2 and more than 2 experiments with the same result. It also failed to take
account of the idea that the experiments could have been performed by the same
person/team that made the same mistake multiple times.
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Experiment E indicates result R
Experiment E2 indicates result R
Two experiments indicating the same result, increases the likelihood of the
result being correct
Therefore R is probably correct
1. Are E and E2 performed by the same lab?
2. What do other experiments/resources show?
STRENGTH=99%.
It should make no difference if E2 repeats the procedure of E or if E2 is an entirely
new experiment.
Experiment E produced result R
Experiment E2 produced result ¬R
Experiment E is more likely to be accurate than E2
If an experiment is more likely to be accurate than a second experiment, its result
is more likely to be accurate too
Therefore R is more likely to be correct than ¬R
1. Are E and E2 performed by the same lab?
2. What do other experiments/resources show?
STRENGTH=85%.
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Annotation A was derived from experiment E
Annotation ¬A was derived from experiment E2
Experiment E is more likely to be accurate than E2
If an experiment is more likely to be accurate than a second experiment, its annotation
is more likely to be accurate too
Therefore A is more likely to be correct than ¬A
1. What do other experiments/resources suggest?
STRENGTH=85%.
Experiment E produced result R
E cannot be trusted
If an experiment cannot be trusted, its result cannot be trusted
Therefore R cannot be trusted
STRENGTH=99%.
Annotation A was based on experiment E
E cannot be trusted
If an experiment cannot be trusted, an annotation based on it cannot be trusted
Therefore A cannot be trusted
STRENGTH=99%.
Verdict V was based on experiment E
E cannot be trusted
If an experiment cannot be trusted, a verdict based on it cannot stand
Therefore V is withdrawn
STRENGTH = 99%.
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A.1.1 Researcher Reliability
Included in this subsection are schemes that feature the researcher (or research team)
that carried out the experiments.
Lab (or team leader) L has worked on gene G throughout their entire career
Lab (or team leader) L2 has not focused on any particular gene
L has performed experiment E on G suggesting result R
L2 has performed experiment E2 on G suggesting result ¬R
A lab (or team leader) who specialises on a gene is more likely to produce a correct
experiment, when dealing with that gene, than a lab (or team leader) who does not
specialise
Therefore E is more likely to be accurate than E2
1. What do other experiments/resources show?
STRENGTH=50%.
The theory behind this scheme is that a specialist will be more likely to create
a fully working optimised probe, and thus perform a better experiment. The actual
results should not matter - i.e. E2 could produce R and E suggest ¬R.
Here one would presume that the expert would check to see if L and L2 were
actually experts, i.e. that a critical question to check this should exist. However,
the expert has accumulated such knowledge over the years and does not need to
do so. Therefore, for the purposes of recording his knowledge and practises, this
question does not exist. However, for practical implementation, such a question must
be employed.
Conversely, implementation did not occur. This was due to the complexity of
determining whether someone was an expert on a particular area. Evidently this
requires the ability to text mine over a resource such as PubMed2, and another set of
schemes.
2www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/
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Researcher team T performed experiment E
User has no (low) confidence in T
If the user has no (low) confidence in the researcher team, they will have no (low)
confidence in their experiments
E is not trustworthy
STRENGTH=50%.
A.1.2 Screening programs
Schemes found in this portion of the document, all relate to screening programs (large-
scale industrial research).
A screening project performed experiment E that produced result ¬R
A small scale research project performed experiment E2 that produced result R
Screening projects are less focused than optimised experiments, and do not optimise
their probes as effectively
Therefore experiment E2 is more likely to be accurate than E
1. Is the small scale research project trustworthy?
2. What do other resources/experiments suggest?
STRENGTH = 80%.
The intuition is that the less efficient probes lead to less efficient experiments, and
thus less reliable results.
Research team RT behind experiment E report that they used probe P
RT is part of a screening program
Screening programs are good at documenting their probe information
Therefore, it is very likely that E did use P
STRENGTH = 65%.
Neither this scheme nor the next one were implemented, as it is not obvious how
they can be aligned to the other schemes and the central purpose of the argumentation
process.
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Research team RT behind experiment E report that they used probe P
RT is not part of a screening program
Normal labs are not as good at documenting their probes as screening programs
Therefore, it is likely that E did use P
STRENGTH = 80%.
A.1.3 Journal Reliability
These schemes capture the idea that journals will notice and correct most simple
mistakes.
Experiment E was published in a peer reviewed journal
Experiments that have been peer reviewed in good journals are likely to be correct
E is likely to be correct
STRENGTH=15%.
Not implemented, as it is very similar to, but much weaker than, the following
scheme.
Experiment E was published in a peer reviewed journal P
User has C confidence in P
The user’s confidence in a journal will directly impact on experiments published in it
Confidence in E is at most C
STRENGTH=50%.
Experiment E was published in a specialised peer reviewed journal
Experiments that have been peer reviewed in specialised journals are very likely to
be correct
R is very likely to be correct
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In biology there are a small number of journals that are very specialised. The
initial theory behind this scheme was that such a journal would be more likely to
have a reviewer that really knew the field, and thus would be more likely to identify
errors, for example in the naming of tissues. However, this scheme was dismissed by
the expert because he rejected the theory.
A.1.4 Results
Gene G is a housekeeping gene
Housekeeping genes are of little or no interest because they are everywhere
Therefore G is of no interest
Housekeeping genes are of no interest because they rarely affect anything. They
are not normally responsible for any feature (good or bad) and are ignored often.
Data is not available in EMAGE and/or GXD to find housekeeping genes, again
other resources would be required.
Pattern clarity
All schemes in this section have the same questions; however, for brevity they are
included only with the first scheme.
ISH Experiment E produced result R
E has low pattern clarity
Experiments with low pattern clarity are very hard to analyse and so their results
are not totally trustworthy
Therefore R is possibly correct
1. What does SAGE show?
2. What does microarray show?
3. Is the equivalent result true in the previous stage?
4. Is the equivalent result true in the subsequent stage?
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STRENGTH=50%.
The use of the word possibly in the conclusion is perhaps surprising. However,
biologists often add extra qualifiers in order to emphasise the uncertainty inherent
within the domain.
ISH experiment E produced result R
E has medium pattern clarity
Experiments with medium pattern clarity can be analysed with a degree of confidence,
so results are trustworthy
Therefore R is likely to be correct
STRENGTH=65%.
ISH experiment E produced result R
E has high pattern clarity
Experiments with high pattern clarity are easy to analyse and so their results are
trustworthy
Therefore R is very likely to be correct
STRENGTH=80%.
Image analysis
There is an implicit assumption here that a user knows how to analyse the image -
yet the expert believes that is true. Indeed, he goes further, stating that the average
user will be at least as good as him at analysing the image(s). As the expert did not
wish to question his contemporaries, there are no critical questions for these schemes,
and each scheme has a strength of 100%.
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ISH experiment E suggests result R
The user, when examining the image from E, has confidence level C in R
The image is the actual result of the experiment, and so analysing it gives an
accurate result
R is C likely to be true
ISH experiment E suggests that gene G is expressed in tissue T
ISH experiment E2 suggests that G is not expressed in T
User thinks that E and E2 are looking at different parts of T
User’s analysis of images should take priority over editor’s analysis
Therefore, G is both expressed and not expressed in T
This scheme requires expert interaction from someone able to process the two ex-
perimental images. As this could not be guaranteed, this scheme was not implemented
in the final version - though it was used in the first prototype.
Cross species expression
This scheme should apply to a range of species, not just the zebrafish and mouse.
Although the expert suggested that this scheme could be of use, he himself did not
apply it.
Experiment E on the mouse produces result R for gene G and tissue T
Experiment E2 on the zebrafish produces result R for the zebrafish equivalents of G
and T
Finding the same result in multiple species provides a very good indication the result
is correct
Therefore R is very likely to be correct
It was not used in the system because of the sheer complexity of including it. It
requires a range of other resources to provide information, and thus, theoretically,
several sets of new schemes. As there was no chance of this scheme being utilised, the
expert was not asked to assign a strength to it.
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A.1.5 Method
Schemes relating to the experimental method are provided here.
Technique
The schemes here combine to produce a comparison between the in situ hybridisation
(ISH), serial analysis of gene expression (SAGE), and microarray techniques. These
schemes were not fully implemented, due to the extra work involved in creating a
set of schemes for SAGE and another for microarray. For this reason, they were not
presented to the expert to have a degree of belief assigned.
All schemes have similar questions, but for brevity they are shown only in scheme
1.
ISH experiment E produced result ¬R
SAGE experiment E2 produced result R
SAGE is more sensitive than ISH and thus may detect genes it cannot
Therefore R is probably correct
1. What does microarray suggest?
2. Can you tell what structure has been analysed?
3. Do you trust the research team?
The second and third critical questions are connected. They both relate to the
idea that ISH provides a direct image of the subject (tissue experimented on), whereas
SAGE (and microarray) do not. Thus when the researchers say they experimented
on the eye, a user cannot be sure if they mean just the eye ball, or are including some
of the optic nerve. Therefore the user cannot be sure of where the gene was actually
expressed.
ISH experiment E produced result ¬R
microarray experiment E2 produced result R
microarray is more sensitive than ISH and thus may detect genes it cannot
Therefore R is probably correct
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ISH experiment E produced result R
SAGE experiment E2 produced result ¬R
ISH is less sensitive that SAGE, and should not find genes that SAGE misses
Therefore neither result can be trusted without further investigation.
ISH experiment E produced result R
microarray experiment E2 produced result ¬R
ISH is less sensitive that microarray, and should not find genes that microarray misses
Therefore neither result can be trusted without further investigation.
Probes
A probe is the chemical used to detect a gene (via the protein/RNA) in a subject -
normally a well designed probe will identify one gene.
Experiment E uses probe P to detect gene G
Experiment E2 uses P to detect gene G2
When the same probe is used to detect different genes that probe has been badly
designed and cannot be trusted
Therefore P cannot be trusted
1. Is the probe designed to detect multiple genes?
2. What do other experiments/resources show?
The intuition is that a probe is supposed to bond with, and thus identify, a single
gene. So if it can bond with two genes, it is not well designed. However, the critical
question points out that a very small minority of probes are designed to detect multiple
genes.
Due to the complexity and resources required to pre-compute information for this
scheme it could not be implemented, accordingly it was not presented to the expert
for him to assign a strength.
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ISH experiment E produced an image showing gene G expressed in area A
ISH experiment E2 produced an image showing G expressed in area B
A does not overlap with B
E and E2 used different probes
Different probes may work differently, and thus produce different results
Therefore G may be expressed in both A and B
STRENGTH = 99%.
The use of the word ‘may’ in the conclusion of this scheme highlights the experts
desire to recognise the uncertainty naturally occurring within the life sciences.
This scheme requires expert interaction by someone able to process the two exper-
imental images. As this could not be guaranteed, this scheme was not implemented
in the final version - though it was used in the first prototype.
ISH experiment E produced an image showing gene G expressed in area A
ISH experiment E2 produced an image showing G expressed in area B
A does not overlap with B
E and E2 used the same probe
The same probe should provide the same result; failure to do so indicates a
fundamental problem
Therefore there is a problem with either E or E2 and neither can be trusted
1. What do other experiments/resources show?
STRENGTH=85%.
This scheme requires expert interaction from someone able to process the two ex-
perimental images. As this could not be guaranteed, this scheme was not implemented
in the final version - though it was used in the first prototype.
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The probe P for experiment E has not been sufficiently documented
If the probe has not been properly documented, the experiment cannot be repeated
and verified
E cannot be fully trusted
STRENGTH=45%.
Probe P cannot be trusted
Experiment E used P to gain result R
When the probe cannot be trusted, the experiment cannot be trusted
Therefore E cannot be trusted
1. What do other experiments/resources show?
STRENGTH = 85%.
This scheme was not implemented because the schemes that concluded a probe
was not reliable were not implemented.
A.2 Annotation Reliability
Textual annotation TA indicates verdict V
Spatial annotation SA indicates verdict ¬V
Textual annotations are more reliable than spatial annotations
Therefore V is probably correct
1. What do the other annotations/resources suggest?
STRENGTH = 99%.
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Annotation A indicates verdict V for tissue T
Annotation A2 indicates verdict ¬V for tissue T2
T2 is the parent of T
By application of the scheme 4 from Section A.3.1: ¬V is true for T
Direct annotation is more likely to be correct than indirect annotation
Therefore, V is probably true for T
1. What do other annotations/resources show?
STRENGTH = 55%.
Experiment E has been analysed to produce annotation A
The user has C confidence in E
Confidence in the experiment directly impacts on the confidence of the annotation
Therefore, at most the user can have C confidence in A
STRENGTH = 99%.
The confidence in the annotation can be lower than the confidence in the experi-
ment, e.g. the user may not trust the annotator. This seems to be implicitly handled
by the weakest link algorithm, hence this was not implemented.
Annotation A suggests verdict V
The user has C confidence in A
The confidence in the annotation directly impacts on the confidence of the verdict
Therefore, at most the user can have C confidence in V
STRENGTH = 99%.
This seems to be implicitly handled by the weakest link algorithm, hence this was
not implemented.
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Experiment E, in EMAGE, has annotation A
Experiment E, in GXD, has annotation ¬A
Because the editors are more experienced, EMAGE is more reliable than GXD
Therefore A is probably correct
1. Is E the only relevant experiment in EMAGE?
2. Is E2 the only relevant experiment in GXD?
3. What do the other resources suggest?
For an experiment to be ‘relevant’ it should consider the same gene and tissue.
This scheme seemed very biased, so instead of implementing it, the following
scheme was utilised instead.
Experiment E, in EMAGE, has annotation A
Experiment E, in GXD, has annotation ¬A
A difference in annotation between EMAGE and GXD is a reason to doubt
both annotations
Therefore neither A nor ¬A can be trusted
1. Is E the only relevant experiment in EMAGE?
2. Is E2 the only relevant experiment in GXD?
3. What do the other resources suggest?
STRENGTH=85%.
Verdict V was based on annotation A
A cannot be trusted
If an annotation cannot be trusted, a verdict based on it cannot stand
Therefore V is withdrawn
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STRENGTH = 99%.
The idea captured by this scheme seems implicit in argumentation, thus this
scheme was not implemented.
Annotation A indicates verdict V
Annotation A2 indicates verdict ¬V
Annotation A is more likely to be accurate than A2
If an annotation is more likely to be accurate than a second annotation, its verdict
is more likely to be accurate too
Therefore V is more likely to be correct than ¬V
1. What do other annotations/resources show?
STRENGTH = 85%.
The idea captured by this scheme seems implicit in argumentation, thus this
scheme was not implemented.
Annotation A for ISH experiment E, indicates verdict V
The pattern clarity of E is low
If the pattern clarity is low, annotations are almost useless
Therefore, A does not provide a reason to believe V
STRENGTH = 50%.
This scheme is not implemented as it is very similar to another scheme that has
been implemented.
A.2.1 Spatial
The schemes for spatial annotations should apply equally to spatial annotations and
textual annotations derived from spatial annotations.
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Spatial annotation SA suggests verdict V
Spatial annotations are a reasonable indication of expression
Therefore it is likely that V is true
1. Is SA reliable (correct)?
2. What do the textual annotations show?
3. How good is the morphological match?
4. How high is the pattern clarity?
STRENGTH=65%.
ISH experiment E produced result R, which was converted into a spatial annotation
SA by EMAGE
The research team behind E approved (created) SA
Spatial annotations performed by, or approved by, the research team are very likely
to be correct
Therefore SA is very likely to be correct
1. What do the textual annotations show?
2. Are the research team trustworthy?
3. How good is the morphological match?
4. How high is the pattern clarity?
STRENGTH = 1%.
This basic scheme can be adapted to the situation where the research team per-
form the spatial annotation rather than just approve it. The expert is making an
assumption that screening programs do not create or approve mappings (due to the
large volume of data they deal with). As those programs are often less expert than
the editors at EMAGE, if they ever were to be involved with a spatial annotation,
confidence in that annotation should fall. Again, this should be tested with a question
- but the expert does not do so.
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This scheme was not implemented as the strength was too low for it to be worth-
while.
The spatial annotation SA for experiment E indicates verdict V
SA is based on spatial mapping SM
SM features N number of voxels
N < 10
Spatial mappings with less than 10 voxels are likely to be errors in the mapping
process
SA is not a good indicator that V is true
This scheme was removed in the third meeting because it was too simplistic to
be accurate; however, the reality was too complex (or not well enough researched) to
model.
The spatial annotation SA for experiment E indicates verdict V
SA is based on spatial mapping SM
SM features N number of voxels
10 < N < 50
Spatial mappings with more than 10, but less than 50, voxels indicate the result may
be accurate
SA is an indicator that V is true
Removed, for the same reason as the previous scheme.
The spatial annotation SA for experiment E indicates verdict V
SA is based on spatial mapping SM
SM features N number of voxels
50 < N
Spatial mappings with more than 50 voxels indicate the result is very likely to be
accurate
SA is a good indicator that V is true
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Removed, for the same reason as the previous scheme.
Spatial annotation SA suggests gene G is expressed in X% of tissue T
Spatial annotation SA2 suggests G is not expressed in Y % of T
Y < X
The greater the % the more meaningful the spatial annotation
Therefore SA is probably the more reliable annotation
1. What do the textual annotations show?
2. How do the morphological mapping scores compare?
3. How do the pattern clarity scores compare?
The intuition works regardless of whether X indicates the gene is, or is not, ex-
pressed.
STRENGTH = 50%
Spatial annotation SA suggests that gene G is (not) expressed in X% of tissue T
X < 3%
A spatial annotation of less than 3% is likely to be stray voxels as a result of a bad
mapping, and can be ignored
SA can be ignored (SA does not provide a reason to believe G is (not) expressed in
T )
1. What do the textual annotations show?
2. What is the morphological mapping score?
3. What is the pattern clarity score?
STRENGTH = 80%.
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Spatial annotation SA was derived from ISH experiment E
SA was derived from spatial mapping SM
SM was performed by individual I
The user does not trust I to perform spatial mappings
If the individual performing the mapping is not trusted, the mapping cannot be
trusted, and nor can the annotation based on it
SA cannot be trusted
STRENGTH = 99%.
No questions were asked because the expert felt it unnecessary to question the
opinions of fellow domain experts.
Experiment E was performed by lab RT
Experiment E2 was performed by lab RT2
The user has more trust in RT than RT2
Spatial annotation SA was derived from E
Spatial annotation SA2 was derived from E2
SA indicates V , but SA2 indicates ¬V
When 2 spatial annotations disagree we can resolve the dispute by choosing the
annotation from the experiment that was performed by the research team the
user has more trust in
V is more likely to be correct
1. How do the morphological mapping scores compare?
2. How do the pattern clarity scores compare?
STRENGTH = 55%.
264
Appendix A. Full list of schemes
Experiment E was performed by lab RT
Experiment E2 was performed by lab RT2
The morphological match for E is greater than E2
Spatial annotation SA was derived from E
Spatial annotation SA2 was derived from E2
SA indicates V , but SA2 indicates ¬V
When 2 spatial annotations disagree we can resolve the dispute by choosing the
annotation from the experiment with the higher morphological match
V is more likely to be correct
STRENGTH = 99%.
Experiment E was performed by lab RT
Experiment E2 was performed by lab RT2
The pattern clarity is higher for E than E2
Annotation A was derived from E
Annotation A2 was derived from E2
A indicates V , but A2 indicates ¬V
When 2 annotations disagree we can resolve the dispute by choosing the
annotation from the experiment with the higher pattern clarity score
V is more likely to be correct
1. If A and A2 are from different resources, which resource does the user have
most trust in?
2. Which researcher does the user have most trust in?
STRENGTH = 85%.
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Experiment E was performed by lab RT
Experiment E2 was performed by lab RT2
Spatial annotation SA was derived from E by mapper M
Spatial annotation SA2 was derived from E2 by mapper M2
SA indicates V , but SA2 indicates ¬V
The user has more trust in M than M2
When 2 spatial annotations disagree we can resolve the dispute by choosing the
annotation by the mapper the user has more trust in
V is more likely to be correct
STRENGTH = 95%.
The morphological match and pattern clarity are not referred to here, as they are
both assigned by the mapper.
Morphological match
Spatial annotation SA was derived from ISH experiment E
The morphological match for E is low
If the morphological match is low, there is a low chance of the mapping being
spatially accurate
SA is unlikely to be accurate
1. What is the pattern clarity?
STRENGTH = 50%.
Spatial annotation SA was derived from ISH experiment E
The morphological match for E is medium
If the morphological match is medium, there is a reasonable chance of the mapping
being spatially accurate
SA is possibly accurate
1. What is the pattern clarity?
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STRENGTH = 65%.
Spatial annotation SA was derived from ISH experiment E
The morphological match for E is high
If the morphological match is high, there is a good chance of the mapping being
spatially accurate
SA is likely to be accurate
1. What is the pattern clarity?
STRENGTH = 80%.
A.2.2 Textual
Textual annotations are created by the database editor, and require them to map the
result generated from the experiment to their own representation (EMAP anatomy).
Note: the schemes here do not apply to textual annotations derived from spatial
annotations.
ISH experiment E produced result R, which was converted into a textual annotation
TA by EMAGE
Textual mappings are very regularly correct
Therefore TA is very likely to be correct
1. Is the experiment reliable?
2. What do other resources show?
STRENGTH=80%.
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Textual annotation TA was derived from ISH experiment E
TA was created by individual I
The user does not trust I to perform textual annotations
If the individual creating the annotation is not trusted, then the annotation cannot
be trusted
TA cannot be trusted
STRENGTH = 99%.
Experiment E was performed by lab RT
Experiment E2 was performed by lab RT2
Textual annotation TA was derived from E by indexor I
Textual annotation TA2 was derived from E2 by indexor I2
TA indicates V , but T2 indicates ¬V
The user has more trust in I than I2
When 2 textual annotations disagree we can resolve the dispute by choosing the
annotation that was performed by the indexor the user has more trust in
V is more likely to be correct
STRENGTH = 65%.
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Experiment E was performed by lab RT
Experiment E2 was performed by lab RT2
The user has more trust in RT than RT2
Textual annotation TA was derived from E
Textual annotation TA2 was derived from E2
TA indicates V , but TA2 indicates ¬V
When 2 textual annotations disagree we can resolve the dispute by choosing the
annotation from the experiment that was performed by the research team the
user has more trust in
V is more likely to be correct
1. How do the morphological mapping scores compare?
2. How do the pattern clarity scores compare?
STRENGTH = 50%.
A.3 Anatomical Location
The schemes contained in this subsection all rely on the notion that a tissue often
develops, yet still persists, from one Theiler Stage to the next. Furthermore, they all
highlight the fact that a gene’s expression level will usually persist from one stage to
the next.
Experiment E produced result R for gene G and tissue T
Experiment E2 produced R for G and tissue T + 1
T + 1 is the equivalent of T but in the next Theiler Stage
The same result in two adjacent stages indicates the result is likely to be true
Therefore R is likely to be true
1. Are the experiments reliable?
2. What do other resources indicate?
STRENGTH = 85%.
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The reasoning behind this scheme also works for T-1 (the same tissue in the
previous Theiler Stage).
Experiment E produced result R for gene G and tissue T
Experiment E2 produced R for G and tissue T + 1
Experiment E3 produced R for G and tissue T − 1
T + 1 is the equivalent of T but in the next Theiler Stage
T − 1 is the equivalent of T but in the previous Theiler Stage
The same result in previous and next stage indicates that the result is extremely likely
to be true in the current stage
Therefore R is extremely likely to be true
1. Are the experiments reliable?
2. What do other resources indicate?
STRENGTH = 85%.
This scheme is essentially the same as the previous scheme, and so was not imple-
mented.
There is no experiment E suggesting R for gene G in tissue T
Experiment E2 suggests result R for G in tissue T − 1
Experiment E3 suggests result R for G in tissue T + 1
T − 1 is the equivalent of T but in the previous Theiler Stage
T + 1 is the equivalent of T but in the next Theiler Stage
When the same result occurs in the stage before, and the stage after, it is extremely
likely to be true for the stage in the middle
R is almost certainly true for G in T
1. Are the experiments reliable?
2. What do other resources indicate?
STRENGTH = 85%.
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Gene G appears in low levels in almost every tissue
Genes that appear everywhere are housekeeping genes
Therefore G is a housekeeping gene
This scheme was removed as the expert felt it would be more likely to be the subject
of a set of SAGE schemes as it would not be possible to determine housekeeping genes
using EMAGE or GXD.
A.3.1 Ontological rules
The schemes in this subsection all exist because the EMAP anatomy uses part-of
relationships between the tissues (nodes) in the graph.
Experiment E suggests gene G is expressed in tissue T
T is a component of tissue T2
If a gene is expressed in a component, it must be expressed in the parent
Therefore G is expressed in S2
STRENGTH = 100%.
Experiment E suggests gene G is not expressed in tissue T
T is a component of T2
If a gene is not expressed in a component, it may be expressed in a different child
of the parent
Nothing can be inferred about the relationship between G and T2
STRENGTH = 15%.
This scheme captures the knowledge that a user cannot propagate positive gene
expression down through the EMAP anatomy.
This scheme is very difficult to implement, and its low strength makes it pointless
to do so, hence it was not implemented.
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Experiment E suggests gene G is expressed in tissue T
T is a parent of T2
If a gene is expressed in a parent, it may be expressed in a different child
Nothing can be inferred about the relationship between G and T2
STRENGTH = 65%.
Experiment E suggests gene G is not expressed in tissue T
T is a parent of T2
If a gene is annotated as being ‘not expressed’ in a parent, it cannot be expressed
in a child
Therefore G is not expressed in T2
STRENGTH = 100%
Tissue T has gene G (not) expressed in it
Tissue T2 is the child of T
T2 is T ’s only child
When a tissue has only 1 child, the child and parent are identical
Therefore, G is (not) expressed in T2
This resolves an error in the EMAP anatomy. A second scheme, for upwards
propagation (passing expression to parent) can also exist but is not shown.
Because this error was so unusual, this scheme was not implemented, nor shown
to the expert for a strength to be assigned.
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Inference rules
This chapter contains the inferences rules derived from the schemes in Chapter 6
according to the method in Chapter 7.
r2de(E) <- researcher(E, RT), trust(RT, ’low’) 0.5.
r2de(E) <- publisher(E, J), trust(J, ’low’) 0.5.
r2de(E) <- \+(probe(E, P)) 0.45.
r2te(E) <- publisher(E, J), trust(E, ’med’) 0.5.
r2te(E) <- publisher(E, J), trust(E, ’hi’) 0.5.
betterexperiment(E, E2) <- \+(screen(E)), screen(E2) 0.8.
sa(E, G, T, ’expressed’, P, indirect) <- sa(E, G, T2, ’expressed’, P, direct),
component(T2, T).
sa(E, G, T, ’absent’, P, indirect) <- sa(E, G, T2, ’absent’, P, direct),
component(T, T2).
betterspatial(E, G, T, E2) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P1, D), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), >(P1, P2) 0.5.
betterspatial(E, G, T, E2) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P1, D), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==L, L2), researcher(E, RT), researcher(E2, RT2), trust(RT, ’hi’),
trust(RT2, ’med’) 0.55.
betterspatial(E, G, T, E2) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P1, D), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), researcher(E, RT), researcher(E2, RT2), trust(RT, ’hi’),
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trust(RT2, ’low’) 0.55.
betterspatial(E, G, T, E2) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P1, D), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), researcher(E, RT), researcher(E2, RT2), trust(RT, ’med’),
trust(RT2, ’low’) 0.55.
betterspatial(E, G, T, E2) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P1, D), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), morphmatch(E, ’hi’), morphmatch(E2, ’med’) 0.99.
betterspatial(E, G, T, E2) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P1, D), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), morphmatch(E, ’hi’), morphmatch(E2, ’low’) 0.99
betterspatial(E, G, T, E2) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P1, D), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), morphmatch(E, ’med’), morphmatch(E2, ’low’) 0.99.
betterspatial(E, G, T, E2) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P1, D), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), clarity(E, ’hi’), clarity(E2, ’med’) 0.85.
betterspatial(E, G, T, E2) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P1, D), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), clarity(E, ’hi’), clarity(E2, ’low’) 0.85.
betterspatial(E, G, T, E2) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P1, D), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), clarity(E, ’med’), clarity(E2, ’low’) 0.85.
betterspatial(E, G, T, E2) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P1, D), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), spatialmapper(E, RT), spatialmapper(E2, RT2),
\ ==(RT, RT2), trust(RT, ’hi’), trust(RT2, ’med’) 0.55.
betterspatial(E, G, T, E2) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P1, D), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), spatialmapper(E, RT), spatialmapper(E2, RT2),
\ ==(RT, RT2), trust(RT, ’hi’), trust(RT2, ’low’) 0.55.
betterspatial(E, G, T, E2) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P1, D), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), spatialmapper(E, RT), spatialmapper(E2, RT2),
\ ==(RT, RT2), trust(RT, ’med’), trust(RT2, ’low’) 0.55.
betterspatial(E, G, T, E2) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P1, D),
sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2), \ ==(L, L2), >(P1, P2) 0.50.
betterspatial(E, G, T, E2) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P1, direct),
sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, indirect) 0.55.
r2dsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), r2de(E) 0.99.
r2dsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), clarity(E, ’low’) 0.5.
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r2dsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), >(3.0, P) 0.8.
r2dsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), spatialmapper(E, RT),
trust(RT, ’low’) 0.99.
r2dsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), morphmatch(E, ’low’) 0.5.
r2dsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), betterexperiment(E2, E) 0.85.
r2dsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), betterspatial(E2, G, T, E).
r2dsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), ta(E2, G, T, L2, S, D2),
\ ==(L, L2) 0.99.
r2tsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), sa(E2, G, T, L, P2, D2),
\ ==(E, E2) 0.99.
r2tsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), clarity(E, ’med’) 0.65.
r2tsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), clarity(E, ’hi’) 0.8.
r2tsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), morphmatch(E, ’med’) 0.65.
r2tsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), morphmatch(E, ’hi’) 0.8.
r2tsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), r2te(E).
r2tsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), betterspatial(E, G, T, E2).
r2tsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), sa(E2, G, T, L2, P2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), betterexperiment(E, E2).
r2tsa(E, G, T, L, P) <- sa(E, G, T, L, P, D1), ta(E2, G, T, L, S, D2) 0.99.
r2tsa(E, G, T, expressed, P) <- sa(E, G, T, ’expressed’, P, D1),
\+(sa(E2, G, T, ’absent’, P2, D2)),
\+(ta(E3, G, T, ’absent’, S, D3)).
r2tsa(E, G, T, absent, P) <- sa(E, G, T, ’absent’, P, D1),
\+(sa(E2, G, T, ’expressed’, P2, D2)),
\+(ta(E3, G, T, ’expressed’, S, D3)).
ta(E, G, T, ’expressed’, S, indirect) <- ta(E, G, T2, ’expressed’, S, direct),
component(T2, T).
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ta(E, G, T, ’absent’, S, indirect) <- ta(E, G, T2, ’absent’, S, direct),
component(T, T2).
ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1) <- ta(E, G, T1, L, S, D1), ta(E2, G, T2, L, S2, D2),
lineage(T1, T), lineage(T, T2) 0.85.
bettertextual(E, G, T, E2) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), ta(E2, G, T, L2, S2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), textualmapper(E, T1), textualmapper(E, T2),
trust(T1, ’hi’), trust(T2, ’med’) 0.65.
bettertextual(E, G, T, E2) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), ta(E2, G, T, L2, S2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), textualmapper(E, T1), textualmapper(E, T2),
trust(T1, ’hi’), trust(T2, ’low’) 0.65.
bettertextual(E, G, T, E2) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), ta(E2, G, T, L2, S2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), textualmapper(E, T1), textualmapper(E, T2),
trust(T1, ’med’), trust(T2, ’low’) 0.65.
bettertextual(E, G, T, E2) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), ta(E2, G, T, L2, S2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), researcher(E, T1), researcher(E, T2),
trust(T1, ’hi’), trust(T2, ’med’) 0.55.
bettertextual(E, G, T, E2) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), ta(E2, G, T, L2, S2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), researcher(E, T1), researcher(E, T2),
trust(T1, ’hi’), trust(T2, ’low’) 0.55.
bettertextual(E, G, T, E2) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), ta(E2, G, T, L2, S2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), researcher(E, T1), researcher(E, T2),
trust(T1, ’med’), trust(T2, ’low’) 0.55.
bettertextual(E, G, T, E2) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S1, direct),
ta(E2, G, T, L2, S2, indirect) 0.55.
r2dta(E, G, T, L, S) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), ta(E2, G, T, L2, S2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), betterexperiment(E2, E) 0.85.
r2dta(E, G, T, L, S) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), ta(E2, G, T, L2, S2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), bettertextual(E2, G, T, E).
r2dta(E, G, T, L, S) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), r2de(E) 0.99.
r2dta(E, G, T, L, S) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), clarity(E, ’low’) 0.5.
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r2dta(E, G, T, L, S) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), textualmapper(E, RT),
trust(RT, ’low’) 0.99.
r2dta(E, G, T, L, S) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), ta(E2, G, T, L, S2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), \ ==(S, S2), pubmed(E, PID1),
pubmed(E2, PID2), \ ==(PID1, PID2) 0.85.
r2tta(E, G, T, L, S) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), ta(E2, G, T, L, S2, D2),
\ ==(E, E2), \+(same(E, E2)) 0.99.
r2tta(E, G, T, L, S) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), clarity(E, ’med’) 0.65.
r2tta(E, G, T, L, S) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), clarity(E, ’hi’) 0.8.
r2tta(E, G, T, L, S) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), ta(E2, G, T, L2, S2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), bettertextual(E, G, T, E2).
r2tta(E, G, T, L, S) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), ta(E2, G, T, L2, S2, D2),
\ ==(L, L2), betterexperiment(E, E2) 0.85.
r2tta(E, G, T, expressed, S) <- ta(E, G, T, ’expressed’, P, D1),
\+(ta(E2, G, T, ’absent’, S2, D2)) 0.8.
r2tta(E, G, T, absent, S) <- ta(E, G, T, ’expressed’, P, D1),
\+(ta(E2, G, T, ’expressed’, S2, D2)) 0.8.
r2tta(E, G, T, L, S) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), ta(E2, G, T2, L, S2, D2),
lineage(T, T2) 0.85.
r2tta(E, G, T, L, S) <- ta(E, G, T, L, S, D1), ta(E2, G, T2, L, S2, D2),
lineage(T2, T) 0.85.
verdict(G, T, L) <- r2tsa(E, G, T, L, P).
verdict(G, T, L) <- r2tta(E, G, T, L, S).
∼verdict(G, T, L) <- r2dsa(E, G, T, L, P).
∼verdict(G, T, L) <- r2dta(E, G, T, L, S).
expressed(G, T) <- verdict(G, T, ’expressed’).
expressed(G, T) <- verdict(G, T, ’absent’).
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ASPIC goals
The following pages are a reproduction of one page from the argumentation services
platform with integrated components (ASPIC) website - formerly
www.argumentation.org. This page presents a brief introduction to argumentation,
and finally a short summary of the goals of the project.
The goals of the project are elementary:
1. To bring together a number of research groups who have established themselves
in formal argumentation theory, in order to develop consensus theoretical models
that improve on and extend existing models;
2. To develop efficient proof procedures and software component implementations
of these models for deployment in real-world applications.
It is the latter goal that resulted in the creation of the argumentation toolkit
utilised in this work.
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1. Introduction to Argumentation
The theory of argumentation is a rich, interdisciplinary area of research straddling
philosophy, communication studies, linguistics, psychology and artificial intelligence.
Traditionally, he focus has been on “informal” studies of argumentation and its role in
natural human reasoning and dialogue. More formal logical accounts of
argumentation have recently been proposed by the artificial intelligence community
as a promising paradigm for modelling common-sense reasoning and communication
between reasoning entities. In these works, an argument is a set of premises
offered in support of a claim. For example, consider the argument:
A1 = Information I about Tony should be published  
        because
        Tony has political responsibilities
        and
        I is in the national interest
        and
        if a person has political responsibilities and information about that person is in
the  
        national interest then that information about the person should be published
where Information I about Tony should be published is the argument’s claim, and the
italicised statements following ‘because’ are the the argument’s premises. Consider
the following counter-argument to A1 that undermines a premise in A1:
A2 = Tony does not have political responsibilities because Tony resigned from
parliament and if a person resigns from parliament then that person no longer has
political responsibilities
Consider the following counter-argument to A2:
A3 = Tony does have political responsibilities because Tony is now middle east envoy
and if a person is a middle east envoy then that person has political responsibilities
 
Argumentation is the the process whereby arguments are constructed and
evaluated in light of their interactions with other arguments. So, in the above
example, arguments A1, A2 and A3 have been constructed. A3 ‘attacks’ A2 by
contradicting A2’s claim, and A2 ‘attacks’ A1 by contradicting a premise in A1 (and so
undermining A1). The winning arguments can then be evaluated. A1 is attacked by
A2, but since A2 is itself attacked by A3, and the latter is not attacked, we obtain
that A1 and A3 are the winning arguments.
This example illustrates the modular nature of argumentation that most formal
theories (models) of argumentation adopt: 1) arguments are constructed in some
underlying logic that manipulates statements about the world; 2) interactions
between arguments are defined; 3) given the network of interacting arguments, the
winning arguments are evaluated.
The appeal of the argumentation paradigm resides in this intuitive modular
characterisation that is akin to human modes of reasoning. Also, recent work in the
AI, and computer science community at large, has illustrated the potential for
tractable implementations of logical models of argumentation, and the wide range of
application of these implementations in software systems.
Furthermore, the inherently dialectical nature of argumentation models provide
principled ways in which to structure exchange of, and reasoning about,
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principled ways in which to structure exchange of, and reasoning about,
justifications/arguments for proposals and or statements between human and or
automated reasoning entities (agents).
Consider the above example where instead of a single agent engaging in its own
internal argumentation to arrive at a conclusion, we now have two agents involved in
a dialogue. Greg proposes argument A1, Alistair argument A2, and then Greg
counters with argument A3. This represents a dialogue where each participant has
the goal of persuading the other to adopt a belief through the process of exchanging
arguments that must interact according to the underlying model of argumentation,
and where the winning arguments are evaluated according to the underlying model of
argumentation.
Of course, dialogues introduce an added dimension, in the sense that realistic
dialogues often involve more than simply the exchange of arguments. For example,
Alistair might challenge a premise in argument A1, by asking why information I is
private. The burden of proof is on Greg to provide an argument as to why I is
private. Otherwise, Alistair can be legitimately be said to be ‘winning’ the argument
or dialogue. The formal study of dialogue models therefore accounts for a broader
range of  statements or ‘locutions’ than simply those involving submission of
arguments.
Furthermore, the goal of the argumentation based dialogue may not only be to
persuade, but also to collaboratively decide or deliberate over an appropriate course
of action, or to negotiate over resources. In these dialogues, the reasons or
arguments for proposed actions, or offers and rejections, can be usefully used to
further the goal of the dialogue.
The goal of the dialogue may determine a specific set of statements or allowed
locutions, as well as rules for making locutions at any point in the dialogue, and rules
for determining the outcome of the dialogue. These rules are encoded in a dialogue’s
protocol.
Consider for example the following negotiation dialogue between a buyer and seller
of cars in which locutions also involve making, accepting and rejecting offers:
Seller -  Offer: Renault
Buyer - Reject: Renault
Seller - Why
Buyer - Argue: Because Renault is a French make of car, and french cars are unsafe
Seller - Argue: Renaults are not unsafe as Renaults have been given the award of
safest car in Europe by the European Union.
Buyer - Accept: Renault
The above example illustrates the utility of argumentation based models of reasoning
and their application to dialogues. Online negotiations involving automated software
agents are a key area of research and development. In a handshaking protocol, a
seller would simply successively make offers and have these either rejected or
accepted. The exchange of arguments provides for agreements that would not be
reached in simple handshaking protocols. In the above example, it is by eliciting the
reason for the rejection, and successfully countering this reason, that the seller is
then able to convince the buyer to buy the car.
 
2. ASPIC and Argumentation: The aims of the
ASPIC project
ASPIC is a collaborative project involving AI researchers and computer scientists in
both the academic and commercial sectors. The aim of this project is two-fold:
1)  To bring together a number of research groups who have established themselves
in    formal argumentation theory, in order to develop consensus theoretical models
that improve on and extend existing models;
2) To develop efficient proof procedures and software component implementations of
these models for deployment in real-world applications.
these models for deployment in real-world applications.
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Appendix D
Argumentation Engine
A review of the argumentation engine used in this work now follows. A brief summary
of what an argumentation framework is composed of will be conducted in Section D.1,
subsequently each of the individual aspects of the framework will be explored with
particular attention paid to how the ASPIC argumentation engine implements them.
Section D.2 provides an analysis of the actual implementation. The chapter concludes
with Section D.3 providing an example of argumentation.
D.1 Implementation of an argumentation frame-
work
Argumentation frameworks specify an abstract “template” that when implemented
allows computers to conduct argumentation automatically. Many different styles of
framework exist; Prakken [42] identified five common traits: an underlying logical
language; the concept of an argument; the concept of attack between arguments; the
concept of defeat; and a definition of argument status (how to assess if an argument
is justified). Each layer builds upon the previous one, as summarised in Figure D.1.
The following sections will examine each level in turn.
D.1.1 Logic
Prakken’s description of an argumentation framework begins with the specification of
a logical language on which the rest of the system is developed.
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Figure D.1: Prakken’s argumentation framework from [42].
An important point to note is that there are effectively three different syntaxes
for anyone wishing to use the ASPIC engine. Firstly, there is the syntax used by the
authors of the theory, e.g. [156]. Secondly, there is the PROLOG-like syntax that the
engine uses, and finally there is the JAVA API for the engine. The JAVA API will be
discussed in Section D.2.3.
Although there is a mapping between the theoretical syntax and the implemented
syntax, these are not identical. For example, the theoretical syntax resembles clas-
sical logic, whereas the implemented syntax is closer to PROLOG. To illustrate the
difference between the syntaxes consider the following very simple rule:
Natural language It is raining implies you may get wet
Theoretical raining ⇒ wet
PROLOG-like wet <- raining 0.7
The use of the word may indicates that the rule is defeasible, i.e. can be defeated. A
rule that cannot be defeated would be strict. In the theoretical version ⇒ is used to
indicate the defeasible nature of the rule (a strict rule would use→). The implemented
version uses the same arrow for both strict and defeasible rules. It is the provision of
a number, following the rule, that indicates the rule is defeasible. Despite this number
appearing to be a probability, the creators describe it as a degree of belief and as such
it documents the strength of the author’s confidence in that rule. The theory suggests
the use of such a system is necessary, but does not specify it.
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A further difference between the two syntaxes is the symbols used to indicate weak
negation. Both syntaxes use ∼ for strong negation; however, for weak negation the
theoretical syntax uses − and the implemented syntax \+.
The final main difference emerges because the implemented syntax includes prede-
fined common functions. For example, testing if one integer is greater than a second
has the predicate >(X,Y) where X and Y are variables to be instantiated at run time.
Crucially, the theoretical syntax cannot be understood by the engine therefore it
shall not be used hereafter.
The implemented logic
To initiate the process note the following basic terminology:
fact a piece of information;
rule an inference rule, which uses known facts to generate new facts;
degree of belief a numerical value (between 0 and 1) the author assigns to a rule
or fact to indicate his/her confidence in that rule/fact;
strict a rule or fact that must be true, i.e. have a degree of belief of 1;
defeasible a rule or fact that may be true - the likelihood of this event being deter-
mined by the degree of belief.
Facts can be simple literals such as a or more complex predicates like
expressed(bmp4, limb) - which states that the gene bmp4 is expressed in the structure
called limb. Notice that the individual terms are all lowercase, this indicates that
they are constants. Variables start with an uppercase letter.
A simple rule to state that a gene is expressed in a particular structure because
an unnamed resource says so, could be:
expressed(Gene, Structure) <- resourceExpressed(Gene, Structure).
The logic provides both weak and strong negation. Strong negation implements
the idea that a fact can be true or false. False is indicated by ∼. Thus to suggest a
gene is not expressed if the resources indicates that is so, the following could be used:
∼expressed(G, S) <- resourceNotExpressed(G, S).
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Weak negation captures the idea of the closed world assumption - if something is not
known to be true, then it must be false. Alternatively, if something is not known to
be false, then it must be true. For example, if a resource suggests a gene is expressed
in a structure, and a biologist is not known to disagree, then the gene must indeed be
expressed:
expressed(G,S) <- resourceExpressed(G,S),
\+(biologistNotExpressed(G,S)).
D.1.2 Arguments
Following on from the logic, the second layer of Prakken’s framework is the notion of
an argument. The concept of ‘argument’ was discussed earlier in Section 2.4.2, and
this current discussion may be considered complimentary to it. To recap that earlier
discussion, recall:
• an argument is a reason to believe something is true;
• arguments in logical fields often consist of a series of propositions that when
true imply a final proposition is also true;
• many arguments in the real world have this basic structure, which corresponds
to the logical notion of modus ponens ;
• argumentation schemes, and associated critical questions, are used to capture
the form of common classes of argument.
In [42] Prakken remarks that the definition of the argument is essentially the same
as a proof in the logical language. One important distinction is [74]:
arguments have the form of logical proof, but they do not have the force
of logical proof (page 1)
This is a reminder that traditionally logical proofs are deductive, and thus show some-
thing is definitely true, whereas arguments are commonly defeasible and accordingly
merely suggest something may be true.
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Conclusion
Premise 1
Premise 3
Rule 3: Premise 1 <- Premise 3
Premise 2
Rule 1: Conclusion <- Premise 1, Premise 2
Figure D.2: Layout of an argument in ASPIC’s argumentation engine.
Implementation of arguments in ASPIC
The implemented structure of an argument is related closely to the chosen logic - an
argument is effectively a proof in that logic.
The structure of a typical argument in ASPIC can be seen in Figure D.2. Notice
the tree-like structure, in which sub-arguments are on lower levels. Also significant is
that rules have associated names, e.g. Rule 1. This is because the engine assigns each
rule a name, unless the user has already done so. The rules are explicitly given in the
argument, therefore ensuring the argument has a modus ponens form.
D.1.3 Attack
Although the theory behind ASPIC distinguishes between rebuttal and undercut, the
engine implements both using rebuttal.
Rebuttal works as one might expect, by having two arguments with opposite
conclusions. It is possible to rebut premises, assumptions and sub-arguments too.
To undercut an inference captured in a particular rule, it is necessary to create a
second rule that rebuts the name of the first rule. For example, to undercut Rule 1
(Conclusion <- Premise 1 & Premise 2) from Figure D.2, the following rule could be
used: ∼Rule 1 <- Premise 4. If Premise 4 is ever true, Rule 1 cannot be applied.
This works because the name of the rule utilised is an implicit premise of an
argument. Thus the argument from Figure D.2 should actually be the presentation
from Figure D.3
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Conclusion
Premise 1
Premise 3
Rule 3
Rule 3: Premise 1 <- Premise 3
Premise 2
Rule 1
Rule 1: Conclusion <- Premise 1 & Premise 2
Figure D.3: The structure of an ASPIC argument, with the implicit
premise used in undercut made explicit.
D.1.4 Defeat
The penultimate layer of an argument framework deals with conflict resolution -
deciding which argument wins an individual attack.
Within the ASPIC argumentation engine, each fact and rule can be assigned a
degree of belief. If this is not done, or if the user assigns a belief of 1, this results in
the fact/rule being deemed strict. To propagate and aggregate each of the individual
degrees of belief to the final argument, the user can choose to use weakest link or
last link. Once the strength of an argument has been ascertained the following basic
principles can be applied:
• because undercut is implemented as rebuttal, it has the same properties as
rebuttal;
• strict arguments cannot be defeated by rebuttal - unless an assumption is re-
butted (rebutting an assumption always works);
– strict arguments defeat rebutting defeasible arguments;
• when two strict arguments rebut each other, they are both true;
• when two defeasible arguments rebut each other, the strongest argument (the
argument with the highest degree of belief) wins;
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• when two defeasible arguments, with the same strength, rebut each other the
outcome depends on the semantics chosen for level five of Prakken’s framework
(they are both false under the sceptical semantics, and both true with the cred-
ulous semantics).
D.1.5 Evaluation of arguments
Throughout evaluation is treated purely as the process of determining if an argument
is acceptable, which ties in with the notion of the fifth layer of the argumentation
framework.
The ASPIC argumentation engine implements two of Dung’s semantics: grounded;
and, preferred credulous - discussed in Section 2.4.6.
These are viewed as a dialogue game between two players [157]. It occurs when
the user submits a query - a fact that (s)he wishes the system to argue over the truth
of. The query, and thus the fact it represents, can be undefeated (true with respect to
current knowledge), defeated (false with respect to current knowledge), or unknown.
The game features two computer players, the proponent (PRO) who attempts to
prove the query, and the opponent (OPP) who tries to stop PRO. The game starts with
PRO creating an argument to support the query (an argument whose conclusion is
identical to the query). This process begins by searching for a rule with an appropriate
conclusion. Once found, rules with conclusions that are identical to the premises are
sought. If the premises cannot be satisfied in this manner, the facts are examined to
determine if they satisfy the premises.
OPP now attempts to defeat PRO’s argument. To succeed, OPP’s argument
must rebut part of PRO’s and have a higher degree of belief - assuming credulous
semantics. OPP starts by trying to construct arguments that rebut the conclusion of
PRO’s argument. If that cannot be done, OPP attempts to rebut the premises - this
includes performing undercuts.
If OPP succeeds in defeating PRO’s argument, PRO will attempt to counter OPP’s
argument by defeating it. This process of attack and counter-attack continues until
one player (PRO or OPP) fails to defeat the other’s argument. If PRO is stopped,
it tries a new line of defence by creating a new argument, to support the conclusion
that OPP has defeated. If PRO fails to do so, OPP wins. However, if OPP fails, it
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tries to defeat one of PRO’s previous arguments, if it cannot do so PRO wins.
The above is an obvious simplification, as there are two semantics (and games),
one sceptical and one credulous. However, the precise details are not necessary to
gain an understanding of this work.
D.2 ASPIC argumentation engine
In the previous section, the theory behind argumentation frameworks was explored,
paying particular attention to how that theory related to the ASPIC argumentation
engine employed in this work. This section will explore the ASPIC engine further,
examining aspects of its implementation and details that are unique to it.
D.2.1 Unique additions to theory
As Caminada and Amgoud [156] point out, there are two problems prevalent in many
existing theories. Namely that they do not force the list of justified arguments to
be consistent or complete. Such issues can be demonstrated easily using the ASPIC
engine. For example, if two strict arguments rebut each other, neither will defeat the
other, and the resulting set of justified arguments will contain an inconsistency.
As a possible solution to these problems [156] specifies two additional operators:
transposition and restricted-rebutting. Transposition tackles the problems of incon-
sistency and incompleteness for grounded semantics, and the combination of both
operators prevents these problems for preferred semantics.
Yet, due to questions over the reliability of the tool when enabling these operators,
they were not used in this work and shall not be discussed further.
D.2.2 Architecture
One method of implementing argumentation splits the task into four distinct phases
- the phases being related closely to the levels of Prakken’s framework. Each phase
is represented by a module in the ASPIC engine:
ArgCon creates individual arguments;
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ArgVal implements the weakest/last link algorithm to assign a degree of strength to
each argument;
ArgInt defines the notion of attack and defeat, and thus creates a network of inter-
action between the arguments;
ArgStat evaluates the status of each argument to determine which are justified.
In the above view of argumentation, the process starts by generating all pos-
sible/relevant arguments. These arguments are assessed individually to determine
their degree of belief. A network (or graph) of argument relationships is produced,
showing which arguments attack each other. Finally the network is used to generate
a list of justified arguments. For example, for grounded semantics, this starts by in-
cluding those arguments that are not attacked, and then recursively re-instating any
defended arguments.
This view of argumentation is illustrated in Figure D.4 which is taken from an
ASPIC project deliverable [154]. This diagram shows a potential relationship between
the engine and other tools, which may be facilitated by the Argument Interchange
Format (AIF).
Figure D.4: Image taken from [154] demonstrating how the ASPIC
argumentation engine might be used alongside other tools.
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As discussed above, in Section D.1.5, the fourth process is modelled as a dia-
logue game. This is in keeping with the Loui’s view of argumentation [39] that argu-
mentation can be rational only if it is conducted inside a fair and effective dialectic
disputation protocol.
Although Figure D.4 describes the knowledge store as separate, from a user’s
perspective it is not distinct from the engine.
D.2.3 Interfaces
The ASPIC argumentation engine has two user interfaces (UI), and one programmatic
interface. Each will be discussed in turn, starting with the UIs.
Command line interface
The engine is written in JAVA. Therefore, it can be executed from the command
line using JAVA. This interface allows the rules and facts to be saved in a text file,
and then passed to the engine. Alternatively, the rules/facts can be written on the
command line alongside the query. An example might be:
java -cp aspic-inference.0-4-10.bundled.jar org.aspic.inference.Engine
“a. b 0.8. ∼b.” “a.”
The output is uncomplicated. Each argument which produces a claim that matches
the query is represented in the output. Alongside the argument is a simple ‘yes’ or
‘no’ to indicate which arguments are justified and which are false. For the above
query (“a”) the result is simply:
a. yes
When using this interface, it is possible to change the semantics (grounded to
preferred credulous), the valuation method (weakest link to last link), and switch on
restricted rebutting and/or transposition. It is also possible to alter the form of the
output, options include an XML form of the AIF, and a DOT representation that
allows a graph of the justified argument(s) to be drawn.
Graphical interface
The same functionality provided by the command line interface, is likewise accessible
via a simple tool with a graphical user interface (GUI). This time the information can
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be entered via the tool, see Figure D.5 for an example. Now it is possible to see the
actual graphs, Figure D.6 provides an example. Other output representations, such
as the AIF, remain displayed in textual form.
Figure D.5: ASPIC argumentation engine Graphical User Interface
Figure D.6: One possible output from the ASPIC argumentation engine
Graphical User Interface
JAVA Interface
Although the argumentation engine is not open source, the programmatic interface
was made available. This is a series of classes which provide access to the same
functionality as the graphical and command line interfaces. In addition, through this
interface, it is possible to extend the engine by adding unique implementations of
each of the classes. It therefore becomes possible to determine which set of arguments
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to display via a user interface, and in what manner to display them. An additional
advantage of this interface, is that it allows the engine to be used as part of other
tools and projects.
The interface provides a series of objects that model the basic elements of the
PROLOG-like logic syntax, e.g. terms, and weak negation. Returning to the example
from Section D.1.1 the PROLOG-like rule wet <- raining 0.7 can be written as:
new Rule(new Term(“wet”), new ElementList(new Term(“raining”)), 0.7);
As the functionality is equivalent to that of the PROLOG-like syntax, it will not be
discussed further.
D.3 Example of argumentation
In order to understand the behaviour of the tool, and the mechanism it uses to create
then evaluate arguments a brief example is provided.
The example commences with the presumption there is a gene expression resource
and a biologist. The basic intuition that “there is a reason to believe a gene is
expressed in a structure when a gene expression resource suggests this is true” can be
captured as:
expressed(G, S) <- resourceExpressed(G, S).
Thus, if the resource says the gene is not expressed:
∼expressed(G, S) <- resourceNotExpressed(G, S).
The same is true for the biologist:
expressed(G,S) <- biologistExpressed(G, S).
∼expressed(G, S) <- biologistNotExpressed(G, S).
Appropriate facts may include that the resource believes the gene bmp4 is expressed
in the structure called hindlimb, whereas the biologist disagrees:
resourceExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb).
biologistNotExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb).
If the query expressed(bmp4, hindlimb). is posed, the following arguments will be
produced:
expressed(bmp4, hindlimb)
resourceExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb).
expressed(G, S) <- resourceExpressed(G, S).
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and
∼expressed(bmp4, hindlimb)
biologistNotExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb).
∼expressed(G, S) <- biologistNotExpressed(G, S).
The system will report that the query is justified. However, inverting the query to
ask if the gene is not expressed also results in ‘yes’. This result seems confusing, and
yet the solution is simple. Both arguments are strict, and thus cannot be defeated.
Consequently, both arguments are believed to be true, which is why both queries are
answered positively.
If both arguments are assigned a degree of belief, this problem is resolved. If the
facts are changed so that they are both assigned a belief of 0.8, the actual arguments
inherit that score (assuming weakest link principle). At this point the status of the
arguments depends on the semantics used. Grounded semantics are sceptical, and so
both arguments will be defeated. Preferred credulous semantics are credulous, and so
both arguments will be acceptable. Thus for grounded semantics, both queries will
be answered negatively; however, they will both be answered positively for preferred
credulous semantics.
If the arguments are made defeasible by assigning a degree of belief of 0.8 to the
resource’s fact and 0.7 to the biologist’s, then the semantics are immaterial. The only
justified argument suggests that the gene is expressed. Thus the first query results in
a positive answer, and the second a negative response.
Undercut
If the above example is extended, with the information that the resource has had
its security compromised we could have the following knowledge base (with the rule
names made explicit):
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[r1]expressed(G, S) <- resourceExpressed(G, S) 0.8.
[r2]∼expressed(G, S) <- resourceNotExpressed(G, S) 0.8.
[r3]expressed(G, S) <- biologistExpressed(G, S) 0.8.
[r4]∼expressed(G, S) <- biologistNotExpressed(G, S) 0.8.
resourceExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb) 0.8.
biologistNotExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb) 0.8.
[r5]∼r1 <- resourceHacked.
[r6]∼r2 <- resourceHacked.
resourceHacked 0.9.
Repeating the query, expressed(bmp4, hindlimb). results in the answer “no” as
there is no justified argument supporting that conclusion. Although an argument for
that conclusion may be generated, it will be undercut by an argument based on r5.
∼expressed(bmp4, hindlimb). will receive a positive answer as an argument can be
produced, and that argument must be justified as its only attacker is defeated.
D.3.1 Issues that may cause problems
All implementations of argumentation have flaws. This is due largely to the fact that
there is no perfect theory which can be implemented. In this section, a few of the
potential issues created by the selection of the ASPIC engine will be considered. A
roundup of generic issues, such as floating arguments, can be found in [150, 38].
Caminada and Amgoud [156] highlight that many argumentation systems produce
results that are neither complete nor consistent. ASPIC is not immune from this,
unless the extra operators are enabled. As these operators occasionally caused the
engine to fail, they were not enabled.
A more troublesome problem arises from the lack of aggregation. If an argument
is stronger than another it wins any rebuttal. If there is one argument of strength 0.9
and an opposing argument of strength 0.8, the first argument will win perpetually.
Yet, if there are four hundred opposing arguments, each with a strength of 0.8, then
intuitively the sheer weight of numbers should cause the opposing arguments to win.
Regrettably, this is not the case, as each argument is compared directly with the
original argument, and thus is weaker. This has been considered and a solution
implemented by others including Pollock [69]. However, no similar mechanism exists
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within the ASPIC engine.
A third complication is the implementation of weak defeat. \+(a) will be true
when there is no fact or satisfied rule concluding a otherwise it will be false (∼a
has no effect). In the following example assume that the contents of a resource are
believed if they are not contradicted by a biologist:
expressed(G,T) <- resourceExpressed(G,T),
\+(biologistNotExpressed(G,T)).
biologistNotExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb) 0.8.
resourceExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb).
In this example, it should be clear that there is no argument supporting the conclusion
the gene is expressed, because a biologist disagrees with the resource.
Now envisage an expert on gene expression being asked to review the opinion of
the biologist. If (s)he disagrees, then the original biologist’s opinion is no longer valid.
The example is extended to include:
∼biologistNotExpressed(G, S) <- expertExpressed(G, S).
expertExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb).
In this situation, the only argument supporting the conclusion the biologist disagrees
with the resource (biologistNotExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb)) is defeated. Thus it would
seem reasonable to assume that as the resource is no longer contradicted, its opinion
would be reinstated, i.e. expressed(bmp4, hindlimb) would be true. Yet this does not
happen.
In reality biologistNotExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb) is defeated - it has to be as the
expert’s argument is strict. Yet \+(biologistNotExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb)) is not satis-
fied, and thus the resource cannot be trusted. The assumption is not satisfied because
although biologistNotExpressed(bmp4, hindlimb) is defeated, there is still one argument
supporting that conclusion and that is enough evidence for the argumentation engine
to conclude that the assumption is invalid. This behaviour is not immediately intu-
itive.
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Full list of comments made during
the evaluation
Section 8.1.3 featured an abbreviated list of user comments obtained during the eval-
uation. The full list is below.
Presentation of arguments
• Illustration is extremely useful for an overview, although text is useful to deter-
mine strength of the argument developed;
• Keep first view simple and then have options to display more data if wanted;
• The diagrams and summaries seem intuitive and useful. Paragraphs pertaining
to studies were hard to understand, but I’m a psychologist!
• Would like to have more explanation of argumentation process and why one
argument wins over another;
• Should show arguments as an ontology: Not expressed or Expressed with parent
and child terms (direct vs. inferred argument);
• Would like to be able to view each argument as a graph;
• A direct link to visual data would be helpful;
• Would like strengths added to graph of argument;
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• Not knowing the biological processes the textual arguments are very hard to
understand.
Issues of detail
• I may look at detailed descriptions if I need to do more work (dry or wet) and
would like to be able to navigate different levels of detail where desired;
• The diagram of arguments is helpful but the detailed description is needed as
well. The diagram is just the simplified version (summary) of the text and I
don’t trust the diagram alone;
• Would use personal expertise of system to re-query based on argument and look
at more detail e.g. link to database would be useful;
• Would like to be able to view some sort of personal profile for each researcher
to help user determine level of trust;
• Should show on the results page how any changes of trust in journals/databases/authors
have altered the results and what changes in parameters have occurred.
The scenarios
• The Argument scenarios are organised in a logical way to ’vote’ the final decision.
I like it. One thing I can think of is the percent value allocated to the argument.
Maybe they are too arbitrary/objective? Could users be given instructions on
how to choose the confidence level?
• The task for the evaluation used genes that are well mapped - it would be
problematic if there were a greater number of mappings to a gene;
• Not really comfortable with artificiality of example;.
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Evaluation protocols
The protocols used for the evaluations discussed in Chapter 8 are provided here, they
include:
• Script
• Time-error form
• Consent form
• Background questionnaire
• Argumentation scenarios and ques-
tionnaire
• Usability questionnaire
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SEALIFE Evaluation Script 
General 
 
1. User reads and completes: consent form + background questionnaire 
 
2. Mark forms with User Number 
 
3. Make sure user happy with computer and controls 
 
4. Make sure pop-up windows enabled on browser 
 
Planning 
 
1. Navigate to links page for user (go to TCM user interface) 
 
2. User reads and begins scenario 1 
 
3. Start timing and error observation 
 
4. Record stage 5  timing 
 
5. End timing 
 
6. User begins scenario 2 
 
7. Start timing and error observation 
 
8. End timing 
 
9. User answers Planning questionnaire 
 
 
Argumentation  
 
1. Navigate to Argumentation UI 
 
2. User reads and begins scenario 1 
 
3. Start timing and error observation 
 
4. End timing 
 
5. User begins scenario 2 
 
6. Start timing and error observation 
 
7. End timing 
 
8. User answers Argumentation questionnaire 
 
 
Questionnaire 
 
1. User answers General questionnaire 
SEALIFE Timing and Error Monitoring Date: _ _ _ _ _ _
Start: : : 9.1 End: : : 9.2 _ _ _ _
PLANNING
PART A: Manual Method: Errors:
10
1. Start step 1: : : 9.3 Step Error
2. Start of Step 5: : : 9.4
3. Blast 1 duration: : : 9.5
4. Blast 2 duration: : : 9.6
5. End time: : : 9.7
Part B – Automated Method
1. Start step 1: : : 9.8
2. End time: : : 9.9
ARGUMENTATION
Scenario 1
1. Start step 1: : : 9.10
2. End time: : : 9.11
Scenario 2
1. Start step 1: : : 9.12
2. End time: : : 9.13
Notes: 11
English is 1st Language: Yes ! No ! Don't know ! 9.14
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SEALIFE Evaluation 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this evaluation. 
 
We are evaluating two systems that are part of the SEALIFE Project. 
 
1. The Planning System assists Biologists and Bioinformaticians to plan and execute bioinformatics 
workflows online. The system takes a bioinformatics resource and determines the available online 
processes that the resource can be submitted to. 
 
2. The Argumentation System assists Biologists and Bioinformaticians in resolving conflicts between 
online gene expression databases on whether or not genes are expressed in particular tissues. The 
Edinburgh Mouse Atlas Gene Expression (EMAGE) database, Gene Expression Database (GXD) and 
Mouse Atlas of Gene Expression  database (SAGE) are used for this evaluation. 
 
This evaluation will ask you to work through scenarios using the systems and comment on the experience 
of using it. We will also ask your opinion on information presentation. There is no time element to the 
evaluation, and we will be on hand to answer questions and give any help if necessary. 
 
No personally identifiable data will be stored, but we would be grateful if you would answer some questions 
on your professional background and experience. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
I agree to participate in the evaluation and to the collection and analysis of the data necessary for the 
evaluation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Name: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  Signature: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
SEALIFE Background Questionnaire _ _ _ _
Area/s and level of training:
Please tick the boxes which reflect your qualification/training  (more than one if appropriate):
Biology: BSc. ! MSc. ! PhD. ! Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Bioinformatics: BSc. ! MSc. ! PhD. ! Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Genetics: BSc. ! MSc. ! PhD. ! Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Computing/IT: BSc. ! MSc. ! PhD. ! Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Medicine: MB.ChB. ! MSc. ! MD./PhD. ! Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Other: _ _ _ _ _ ! _ _ _ _ ! _ _ _ _ ! _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
(Please specify)
Current and Previous Posts:
Please indicate in years the approximate time spent in post (indicate current post with asterisk):
Biology   Bioinformatics Computing/IT: Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Undergrad: ! ! ! !
(Please specify)
Postgrad/Research: ! ! ! !
Industry: ! ! ! !
Tools and Databases
Please indicate your levels of familiarity with the following tools and databases:
XSPAN
Never Used Very Familiar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 1.1
EMAGE
Never Used Very Familiar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 1.2
GXD
Never Used Very Familiar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 1.3
Blast
Never Used Very Familiar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 1.4
UniProt
Never Used Very Familiar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 1.5
CGAP
Never Used Very Familiar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 1.6
Molecular Biology and Bioinformatics Background
How knowledgeable are you about Gene Expression?
No knowledge Expert
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 1.7
How knowledgeable are you about ontologies ?
No knowledge Expert
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 1.8
Journals
Please tick to indicate your reading of the following journals:
Journal Read all Read some Know journal Never heard
of journal papers but don't read it of journal
Development ! ! ! !
Mechanisms of Development ! ! ! !
Science ! ! ! !
Biochimica et Biophys. Acta ! ! ! !
Nature ! ! ! !
EMBO ! ! ! !
Developmental Biology ! ! ! !
Gene Expression Patterns ! ! ! !
Molecular Biology of the Cell ! ! ! !
 
SEALIFE Argumentation Evaluation Scenario 
 
Argumentation  
 
Biological resources publish experimental results and for various reasons, these experiments often give 
conflicting conclusions. Argumentation is a mechanism to help resolve such conflict. In this evaluation we 
shall use 3 resources for in-situ gene expression in the developmental mouse. Each resource will provide 
all the experimental data it contains for a particular gene-structure pair. This data will be used to create 
arguments, weighted according to trust factors determined by you, for and against the gene being 
expressed in the structure. The arguments will be presented to you after the argumentation process has 
terminated. 
 
Evaluation 
 
For the evaluation, you will be asked to work through some arguments using a prototype of the 
argumentation user interface, and then answer some questions and comment on the experience. 
 
Please feel free to ask questions or comment at any stage of the evaluation. 
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Section 1 
 
The first screen comprises the interface with some pre-loaded gene-structure combinations that will be 
used for the argumentation process. 
 
1. On the start page select the Telencephalon TS15 EMAP:1212 Bmp4 item from the cart on the 
right of the screen using the appropriate Select button. 
 
2. For this scenario, levels of trust of journals that publish gene expression papers and the gene 
expression databases are left at default values; 
 
3. Click the Next Page button; 
 
4. You are presented with references related to the gene expression data; 
For this scenario, leave levels indicating your trust of the researchers/laboratories at default values; 
You can click on the PubMed button to see journal abstracts where available (close the PubMed 
windows/tabs to continue); 
 
5. Click the Next Page button; 
 
6. The final page shows the conclusion of the arguments, using a schematic of the argument and  
natural language descriptions of each indicator; 
 
7. Which do you think is the strongest argument/s? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
 Do you think the Bmp4 gene is expressed in EMAPA:1212 ? Yes ! 8.1 
  No !  
  Don't know !  
 
 
What is your decision based on? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
8.2 
 
8. Close the second and third pages to return to the start page; 
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Section 2 
 
This scenario follows a similar path, but illustrates the effect on the argument of not using one of the 
databases and choosing low vs. high levels of confidence the researchers. 
 
1. On the start page select the Telencephalon TS15 EMAP:1212 Bmp4 item from the cart on the 
right of the screen using the appropriate Select button. 
 
2. De-select CGAP from the databases list; 
 
3. For the Development journal - select a level of trust of 25% 
 
4. Click the Next Page button. 
 
5. In the list of Experiments select a 25% level of trust for the Ishibashi & McMahon, 2002 
[PMID:12361972]; 
 
6. Click the Next Page button. 
 
7. The final page shows the conclusion of the arguments, using a schematic of the argument and  
natural language descriptions of each indicator. 
 
8. Which do you think is the strongest argument/s? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
 Do you think the Bmp4 gene is expressed in EMAPA:1212 ? Yes ! 8.3 
  No !  
  Don't know !  
 
 
What is your decision based on? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
8.4 
 
9. Close the second and third pages to return to the start page; 
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Please answer the following questions based on your use of the system: 
 
 Were the questions on trust of journals and researchers asked of you     
  Too few       Too many     
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  N/A  8.5 
 Would the option to hide the questions on trust of journals and authors be  
  Undesirable     Very desirable     
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  N/A  8.6 
 Was the amount of information presented in the arguments     
  Too little      Too much     
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  N/A  8.7 
 How well did you understand the information presented in the arguments  
  Not at all         Completely     
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  N/A  8.8 
 Did you find the diagrams of the arguments helpful     
  Totally unhelpful      Very helpful     
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  N/A  8.9 
                       
                       
 Can you suggest any other resources that could be included in the system?  
                       
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
8.10 
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Section 3 
 
Journal Trust            
               
Please indicate your confidence in the following journals by ranking them from 1 (highest confidence) 
to 9 (lowest confidence) in the appropriate box.     
               
 Journals        Rank     
         (1 - 9)  Don't know  
 
Development 
    !   ! 
 
Mechanisms of Development 
 !   ! 
 
Science 
      !   ! 
 
Biochimica et Biophysica Acta !   ! 
 
Nature 
      !   ! 
 
EMBO 
      !   ! 
 
Developmental Biology 
  !   ! 
 
Gene Expression Patterns 
 !   ! 
 
Molecular Biology of the Cell 
 !   ! 
 
 
           8.11 - 8.19 
 
The following list of authors publish in the field of in-situ gene expression for the developmental mouse. 
Please put a tick in the box next to any authors you recognise. 
           
    Authors   Recognise  
    Furuta Y  ! 
    Hogan BL  ! 
    Trainor PA  ! 
    Hebert JM  ! 
    Martin GR  ! 
    Niswander L  ! 
           
8.20 - 8.25 
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Section 4 
 
The following is a statement generated by the argumentation system. Please read it and answer the 
questions below. 
 
“There is experimental evidence the gene is not expressed. There is no reason to doubt the annotation: 
(Negative expression can be propagated down).  TELENCEPHALON is part of FUTURE BRAIN. 
EMAGE:998 has a textual annotation showing Bmp4 is not expressed in FUTURE BRAIN TS15 
(EMAP:1199). STRENGTH=80%.” 
 
What can you infer from the above argument? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
8.26 
 
 How easy is this argument to understand?        
  Very confusing Very straightforward     
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  N/A  8.27 
 How intuitive do you find the inference drawn in the argument?     
  Not intuitive   Very intuitive     
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  N/A  8.28 
                       
 
How could this method of presentation be improved? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
8.29 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 7 of 10 
 
Section 5 
 
Please look at the argument contained within this graph and answer the questions below. 
 
 
 
 
 
What can you infer from the above graph?  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
8.30 
 
 How easy is this argument to understand?        
  Very confusing Very straightforward     
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  N/A  8.31 
 How intuitive do you find the inference drawn in the argument?     
  Not intuitive   Very intuitive     
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  N/A  8.32 
                       
 
How could this method of presentation be improved? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
8.33 
 
 Which form of presentation do you prefer? Natural language paragraph !  8.34 
 (tick one) Graph !   
  Don't know !   
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Section 6 
 
Please look at the following result of an argumentation process and answer the questions below. 
 
 
 
 
 What does this diagram suggest to you ? Fgf5 is expressed ! 8.35 
 (tick one) Fgf5 is not expressed !  
  Don't know !  
 
 
 Looking at the diagram above, what do you think are the strengths of the following arguments? 
  Strong Medium Weak Don’t know  
 Argument H ! ! ! ! 8.36 
 Argument C ! ! ! ! 8.37 
 Argument A ! ! ! ! 8.38 
 
 
 How easy is this diagram to understand?        
  Very easy Very hard     
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  N/A  8.39 
      
 
How could this method of presentation be improved? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
8.40 
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Section 7 
 
  
 Presented with the above results from the argumentation system, which sections would you use to make your decision on whether the gene was expressed or not? 
 (please tick as many as needed) Use     
 The summary at the top !    8.41 
 The diagram of the arguments !    8.42 
 The detailed descriptions of the arguments !    8.43 
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Section 8 
 
 
Comments on the Argumentation Scenarios             
                       
 Please write any comments you have in the space below.          
                       
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
                       
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
                       
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
                       
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
                       
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
                       
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
                       
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
                       
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
                       
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
                       
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
8.44 
 
 
SEALIFE Usability Evaluation Questionnaire _ _ _ _
This section comprises questions on the overall system, both the Task Composition and Argumentation 
sections. Please circle the numbers which most appropriately reflect your impressions about using the
SEALIFE system.  Not Applicable = N/A.  Please feel free to write any comments you have on the form.
Reactions to System Overall
What is your overall reaction to the system
Terrible Wonderful
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 2.1
Frustrating Satisfying
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 2.2
Dull Stimulating
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 2.3
Difficult Easy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 2.4
Inadequate power Adequate power
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 2.5
Rigid Flexible
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 2.6
Screen
Were the screen layouts helpful?
Not at all Very much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 3.1
Sequence of screens
Confusing Clear
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 3.2
Terminology and System Information.
Use of terms throughout system
Inconsistent Consistent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 4.1
Does the terminology relate well to the work you are doing?
Unrelated Well related
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 4.2
Messages which appear on screen
Inconsistent Consistent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 4.3
Messages which appear on screen
Confusing Clear
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 4.4
Does the computer keep you informed about what it is doing?
Never Always
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 4.5
Error messages
Unhelpful Helpful
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 4.6
System Capabilities
System speed
Too slow Fast enough
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 5.1
Correcting your mistakes
Difficult Easy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 5.2
Are the needs of both experienced and inexperienced users taken into account?
Never Always
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A 5.3
Comments on overall system
Please write any comments you have in the space below. 5.4
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Appendix G
Argudas evaluation protocols
The protocol used for the Argudas evaluation is provided here, including:
• Consent form
• Scenario
• Usability questionnaire
• Time-error form
317
Argudas	  Evaluation	  	  	  
What	  is	  Argudas?	  Argudas	  is	  a	  system	  designed	  to	  help	  a	  user	  explore	  the	  gene	  expression	  information	  contained	  within	  the	  EMAGE	  and	  GXD	  databases.	  	  Additionally,	  for	  the	  adult	  mouse,	  data	  from	  GENSAT	  and	  the	  Allen	  Brain	  Atlas	  is	  integrated.	  	  
What	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  exercise?	  This	  evaluation	  will	  explore	  how	  easy	  Argudas	  is	  to	  use.	  	  	  
What	  instructions	  will	  I	  be	  given?	  Step-­‐by-­‐step	  instructions	  to	  walk	  you	  through	  Argudas	  appear	  on	  the	  next	  page.	  	  Please	  follow	  them	  carefully.	  	  If	  at	  any	  stage	  you	  are	  unsure	  of	  what	  to	  do,	  please	  ask.	  	  Likewise,	  please	  make	  any	  comments	  you	  wish	  about	  Argudas	  or	  this	  exercise.	  	  	  	  
If	  you	  are	  happy	  to	  progress	  with	  the	  exercise	  please	  sign	  and	  date	  below:	  	  	   Signature	  _____________________________________________	  	  	  	   Date	  ________________	  	  	  You	  may	  withdraw	  from	  this	  exercise	  at	  any	  time	  you	  wish.	  	   	  
Please	  follow	  the	  steps	  described	  below:	  	  1. If	  the	  browser	  is	  not	  already	  there,	  navigate	  to:	  http://lxbisel.macs.hw.ac.uk:8080/Argudas	  	  2. You	  will	  try	  to	  discover	  if	  bmp4	  is	  expressed	  in	  the	  future	  brain	  in	  TS13:	  a. Click	  ‘Show	  /	  hide	  help’	  b. If	  you	  wish	  more	  information	  click	  ‘For	  more	  instructions	  and	  help	  click	  here’	  c. Enter	  the	  appropriate	  query	  and	  click	  ‘submit’	  	  3. Do	  you	  think	  there	  is	  sufficient	  information	  in	  the	  results	  to	  determine	  if	  
bmp4	  is	  expressed?	  	   Yes	  /	  No	  /	  Don’t	  know	  	   Why	  do	  you	  think	  this?	  
________________________________________________________________________________	  ________________________________________________________________________________	  ________________________________________________________________________________	  	  4. Ask	  Argudas	  to	  provide	  more	  information	  	  5. Once	  you	  see	  the	  two	  new	  tables:	  a. If	  you	  wish	  assistance	  understanding	  the	  output,	  click	  ‘For	  more	  help	  interpreting	  the	  tables	  click	  here’.	  b. Otherwise,	  do	  you	  think	  bmp4	  is	  expressed?	  	   Yes	  /	  No	  /	  Don’t	  know	  	  c. What	  is	  your	  decision	  based	  on?	  ________________________________________________________________________________	  ________________________________________________________________________________	  ________________________________________________________________________________	  	  6. Please	  now	  fill	  in	  the	  questionnaire.	  	   	  
Please	  circle	  your	  answer	  to	  the	  following	  questions:	  	  	  1. Please	  rate	  Argudas’	  response	  time:	  	  
Excellent	   	   	   	   Bad	   Don’t	  know	  1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   0	  	  	   2. Please	  rate	  Argudas’	  appearance:	  	  
Excellent	   	   	   	   Bad	   Don’t	  know	  1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   0	  	  	   3. Do	  you	  think	  the	  extra	  information	  provided	  by	  clicking	  `show	  /	  hide	  help’	  is	  necessary?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Yes	  /	  No	  	  	   4. Did	  you	  find	  the	  first	  results	  table	  easy	  to	  understand?	  	  
Very	  easy	   	   	   	   Very	  difficult	   Don’t	  know	  1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   0	  	  	   5. Did	  you	  find	  the	  second	  results	  table	  easy	  to	  understand?	  	  
Very	  easy	   	   	   	   Very	  difficult	   Don’t	  know	  1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   0	  	  	   6. Is	  there	  any	  extra	  information	  you	  would	  like	  to	  add	  to	  the	  second	  table?	  	  	  	  	  	  	   7. Did	  you	  find	  the	  third	  results	  table	  easy	  to	  understand?	  	  
Very	  easy	   	   	   	   Very	  difficult	   Don’t	  know	  1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   0	  	  	   8. Is	  there	  any	  extra	  information	  you	  would	  like	  to	  add	  to	  the	  third	  table?	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	   9. Why	  did	  you	  use	  the	  Argudas	  help	  page?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   10. Please	  rate	  the	  usefulness	  of	  the	  help	  page?	  	  
Very	  helpful	   	   	   	   Not	  helpful	   Don’t	  know	  1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   0	  	  	   11. What	  is	  missing	  from	  the	  help	  page?	  	  	  	  	  	   12. Any	  comments	  you	  wish	  to	  make	  about	  Argudas?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  questionnaire	  is	  now	  complete:	  	  THANKS	  FOR	  YOUR	  ASSISTANCE!	  	   	  
Protocol	  	  User	  no:	  ____	   	   	  	  Date:	  ___	  /	  ___	  /	  2011	   1st	  language	  English:	  Yes	  /	  No	  	  #######################################################	  	  Start	  time:	  ______________	  	  Did	  they	  view	  help	  page	  after	  switching	  on	  help	  ‘boxes’:	  Yes	  /	  No	  	  Did	  they	  enter	  a	  ‘correct’	  query:	  Yes	  /	  No	  
Bad	  query	  =	  _________________________________________________________________________________	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	  	  Did	  they	  view	  help	  page	  when	  presented	  with	  tables	  2	  &	  3:	  Yes	  /	  No	  	  End	  time:	  ______________	   	   	   Time	  taken:	  ______________	  	  #######################################################	  	  Comments	  on	  their	  behaviour:	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	  	  #######################################################	  	  Comments	  they	  made:	  	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	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